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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from the Third District Court, Hon. Vernice Trease presiding, review 
of a denial of an Outdoor Advertising Sign permit by the Utah Department of Transportation. 
Appellate jurisdiction is proper with the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A § 78A-4-
103(b)(1). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Court err in ruling at summary judgment that Republic failed to exhaust 
administrative remedies with UDOT where Republic timely filed its administrative 
appeal of UDOT's denial of its Deck Hockey billboard application, thereafter filed for 
reconsideration before the Department, and timely filed District Court appeal, all of 
which put the agency on notice as to the nature of the complaint, i.e. granting Reagan's 
subsequently altered and uncompleted R-407 application over Republic's original 
application for a billboard permit within the same area? 
As was stated in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Automated Geographic 
Reference Center, 2008 Ut 88: 
In reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, we afford no 
deference to the lower court's legal conclusions and review them for 
correctness. Schaerrer v. Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy, Inc., 79 P.3d 922 (Utah 
2003); Blackner v. State, 48 P.3d 949 (Utah 2002). Granting summary 
judgment is appropriate only in the absence of any genuine issue of material 
fact and where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Crestwood Cove Apartments Bus. Trust v. Turner, 164 P.3d 1247 (Utah 2007). 
Thus in reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, we review the 
facts in and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Sur. Underwriters v. E&C Trucking, Inc., 10 P.3d 338 (Utah 
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2000). 
This is the same standard of appeal for each and every issue hereafter, and duplicate 
citation will not be repeated for each such issue. 
The issue was preserved for appeal by the filing of Plaintiff Republic's Memorandum in 
Opposition to UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 1882-1990), Memorandum in 
Opposition to R.O.A.'s First Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 2013-2096), 
and Memorandum in Opposition to R.O.A.'s Second Dispositive Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 2389-2487). 
2. Did the Court err in denying Republic a trial de novo on the Deck Hockey appeal? 
The issue was preserved for appeal by the filing of Plaintiff Republic's 
Memorandum in Opposition to UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 1882-1990), 
Memorandum in Opposition to R.O.A.'s First Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment 
(R. 2013-2096), and Memorandum in Opposition to R.O.A.'s Second Dispositive Motion 
for Summary Judgment ( R. 2389-2487). 
3. Did the trial Court err in not finding Reagan's altered R-407 to be a forged 
document? 
In reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, we afford no deference 
to the lower court's legal conclusions and review them for correctness. Schaerrer v. 
Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy, Inc., 79 P.3d 922 (Utah 2003); Blackner v. State, 48 P.3d 949 
(Utah 2002). 
The issue was preserved for appeal by the filing of Plaintiff Republic's Memorandum in 
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Opposition to UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 1882-1990), Memorandum in 
Opposition to R.O.A.'s First Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 2013-2096), 
and Memorandum in Opposition to R.O.A.'s Second Dispositive Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 2389-2487). 
4. Did the Court err in failing to recognize that Reagan's alteration of the R-407 form 
constituted a new application without any retroactive effect? 
The issue was preserved for appeal by the filing of Plaintiff Republic's 
Memorandum in Opposition to UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 1882-1990), 
Memorandum in Opposition to R.O.A.'s First Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment 
(R. 2013-2096), and Memorandum in Opposition to R.O.A.'s Second Dispositive Motion 
for Summary Judgment (R. 2389-2487). 
5. Should Republic have been excused for any failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies with regard to the Wilderness sign, because it was forced to join Reagan as 
a party to its informal administrative appeal? 
The issue was preserved for appeal by the filing of Plaintiff Republic's 
Memorandum in Opposition to UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 1882-1990), 
Memorandum in Opposition to R.O.A.'s First Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment 
(R. 2013-2096), and Memorandum in Opposition to R.O.A.'s Second Dispositive Motion 
for Summary Judgment ( R. 2389-2487). 
6. Even if Republic did not fully exhaust all remedies below, does Republic qualify 
under an exception thereto where there is manifest injustice at the administrative 
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level? 
The issue was preserved for appeal by the filing of Plaintiff Republic's 
Memorandum in Opposition to UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 1882-1990), 
Memorandum in Opposition to R.O.A.'s First Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment 
(R. 2013-2096), and Memorandum in Opposition to R.O.A/s Second Dispositive Motion 
for Summary Judgment ( R. 2389-2487). 
7. Did the Court err in ruling Republic failed to exhaust administrative remedies with 
South Salt Lake City regarding the Wilderness sign? 
The issue was preserved for appeal by the filing of Plaintiff Republic's Memorandum in 
Opposition to UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 1882-1990), Memorandum in 
Opposition to South Salt Lake's Motion for Summary Judgment, (R. 1707-1809, Reply 
memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment (SSL) (R.3316-3328) and Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment against all Defendants (R.2501-2534). 
8. Did the Court err both in ruling that Republic had failed to exhaust administrative 
remedies regarding the Wilderness sign and in not applying proper standards for 
summary judgment? 
The issue was preserved for appeal by the filing of Plaintiff Republic's 
Memorandum in Opposition to UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 1882-1990), 
and Memorandum in Opposition to South Salt Lake City's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
(R.1707-1809). 
9. Did the trial Court err in permitting Reagan's altered R-407 to stand where it 
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violates state law, where the alleged "move" never occurred, and the sign was never 
built where permitted? 
The issue was preserved for appeal by the filing of Plaintiff Republic's 
Memorandum in Opposition to UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 1882-1990), 
Memorandum in Opposition to R.O.A.'s First Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment 
( R. 2013-2096), Memorandum in Opposition to R.O.A.'s Second Dispositive Motion for 
Summary Judgment ( R. 2389-2487), and Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to 
UDOT's Motion for Summary judgment Re: Spacing Prohibitions under the Utah Outdoor 
Advertising Act. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a case arising from an administrative appeal to the District Court. In 1998 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising (hereinafter "Reagan")filed three R-407 applications to move 
various billboards along the 1-15 corridor in South Salt Lake City, which applications were 
denied by UDOT and an appeal to District Court was filed by Reagan. That appeal resulted 
in an agreement with UDOT to remand the case back to UDOT for negotiations, the failure 
of which entitled either party to reactivate the appeal by motion. No further action was 
taken on that stagnant appeal for several years, during which time Reagan's South Salt Lake 
City building permits (to relocate the three signs) lapsed. In April, 2002, Appellant herein, 
Republic Outdoor Advertising, (hereinafter "Republic") a small competitor billboard 
company filed and obtained a billboard permit on one of the sites to which Reagan had 
sought to relocate its sign, but which site Republic now had leased. Republic immediately 
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filed for a Utah Department of Transportation (hereinafter "UDOT") state billboard permit 
on that same site. Inasmuch as state and federal law require that freeway access billboards 
be at least 500 feet apart from each other, Reagan now found itself on the horns of a 
dilemma in seeking to block Republic from obtaining a billboard permit in an area 
historically monopolized by Reagan. If Reagan made a new application for a billboard in 
the same area, its new application would be subsequent to Republic's and would be denied 
by UDOT. Yet Reagan no longer had any valid city permits which would allow Reagan to 
use its old applications. In order to resolve this dilemma, Reagan orchestrated a scheme 
with the complicity of UDOT whereby Reagan's original 1998 form R-407 
"APPLICATION TO ALTER OR CHANGE A CONFORMING OUTDOOR 
ADVERTISING SIGN OR STRUCTURE" was resurrected in order to place it ahead in 
time of Republic's 2002 application. On February 3, 2003, eight months after Republic's 
application, the UDOT Permit Officer, Shawn Debenham, signed the form thereby 
approving 1998 R-407 application to "move sign approx. 300f to south from So. 
Property line of Lindal Homes" as required in Step 1. Then, in accordance with the form's 
requirement that "The approved changes listed herein must be completed within 60 days of 
the clearance date in Step No. 1 below or this clearance becomes void," Mr. Debenham went 
to the site of the relocated sign on April 3,2003 to "Certify that I have personally inspected 
and photographed the sign altering or change as completed. The change is as approved 
herein." However, upon inspection, he found that (1) the sign on the Swanson property had 
not been moved to the Lindal Homes property as originally applied for, but instead was still 
Appellant's Opening Brief Page -6-
in place (2) a ne'\ v sign ii idal Cedai I lomes site • tc the R eagan 
inventory, (3) the new sign was not 300' to the south from the south property line of Lindal 
Homes , but rather jus t 90 feet south of the still existing Swanson sign, (4) the new sign was 
not 1 1 ," by 48" as originally applied foi but instead was a 6 b\ \s sign, and p; i l i ewey 
Reagan, President «if Keneiin Outdoor \dwrl iMii! ' . Mvpnlin" U» his Infer depo1 "' i»n 
test imony, then changed the sign dimensions and square footage on the original R-407 form, 
H:t left *hc new ~igr location as originally described on the form. Despi te all this. Mi 
_-. K . .;, . ; me rorm tnereoy 
certifvi •. > ba rnvs v . 
despite the o b \ ious falsity of same. 
T~ ^rdcr *~ fnciMtate the scheme, I J D O T has1 \c -How Reagan to alter o* amen J IN 
* - • I::I 'Ill iiiL Lsiiaiiu1,, Alnidi „...;• sa\ mey can no; allow . ;u.i 
did al low here) , and then give that alteration ret n >. : 1 - ' \ • - -.11 i, '' 
in IIDOT rules, regulations or policies). Reagan never did construct the sign as applied for. 
Rather, Reagan altered the issued permit to attempt to conform the permit to the sign as 
UDOT thereafter denied R epi iblic's application some fi\ e to si: ;: i i I Dnths after 
approving the resurrected R-407 permit of Reagan. Republic administratively appealed and 
ultimately appealed K »iStrict Court. While the District Court action was pending, Reagan 
i ip] iliedfi )ranc )tl: .< n t • .rdj »e rmil \ v Ill hinSOOfi sel .< »f R • :j >ublic :' , -» proposed sign, a location 
referred to herein as "Wilderness I < >g H o m e s " ; in< i \ J n ipj in: < » \ < M IJi; < h nl h S< n ill h Salt I - ib s 
Appellant's Opening Brief Page -7-
City and UDOT even though the sign did not comply with city code in several respects and 
was subsequent to Republic's still pending, but appealed, permit application. Reagan then 
removed its little sign at Lindal Cedar Homes and began advertising on the new Wilderness 
sign as well as resumed advertising on the old sign never torn down or moved. Republic 
sought summary judgment on the grounds that the Lindal sign was now removed, the sole 
ground for denying Republic's original application, but the Court required Republic to join 
Reagan as a party to address its rights vis-a-vis the new Wilderness sign (the existing 
Swanson sign site was not within 500f of Republic's proposed site and not therefore an 
impediment to its application). 
Despite (1) the false nature of Reagan's altered R-407, (2) the fact that Republic's 
application was not acted upon while Reagan's alleged appeal was pending, yet 
inconsistently Reagan's subsequent Wilderness application was acted upon by UDOT while 
Republic's appeal was pending, (3) that the Wilderness application violated city code in 
several respects, and (4) despite the fact that Republic timely appealed administratively both 
at UDOT and South Salt Lake City, the lower court herein dismissed Republic's appeal on 
the grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, from which rulings this appeal 
ensued. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On February 17, 1998 Reagan Outdoor (R.O.A. General, Inc., herein "Reagan") 
made three R-407 applications to alter or move three billboards located on 460 West and 
approximately 2800 South which is within the municipal limits of South Salt Lake City, 
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:> !
 -^ ~
 4
 i tijih s o f w h n I" .in I'tli'i h r d h r ' e l o -r. -
I - .
 4 R. 1462. 101^ fheseR-407 applications were denied, and Reagan administratively 
appealed (hereinafter rclcrred to as R eagan's "3 sign case"). The Department denied the 
resolved by stipulation dismissing the :n-val without pre judice and remandii lg the three 
signs case baiA u> TT)OT and ID vacate the denial order from which the District Court 
appeal was lak;, »i\ _w-*i,.- *. • -4/h Fither party could, if settlement discussions were 
• • \;. j . • • . .iuu ,h..l an appeal 
could be immediately taken therefrom • >e •* ' ' 
<n~ applicatiim :o remove a 14' X 4S', 672 square foot billboard then existing on the 
Swanson property and "move sign approx. 300' to south from So. Property line of Lindal 
eihii I Ionics ML»II) 
and to uaim a nv^ w i4'X 48', 672 square loot < • *= ' t\\ w Inn III n ,i, Mini 
owned by the Lawson-Snider partnership,(R.1485; 15.VJ; 
From, Ni.u^n ,?, _<MM. ^hen the ihree signs case is remanded until 2002 nothing 
Lawson-Snider partnership records its subdivision plat, essentially divid 111 u i 1 s fin ipeil \ 111 <> 
4 lots, and sells parcel 4 (R .1541, 43, 45 3526)2. As a condition of sale, Reagan releases 
1
 The District Clerk inadvertent I > failed to number the actual 
numbered the pa^es before and afir* -
2
 A copy oi Hie \Aai i., i.iv,kidcU as Audciidu.-t • »i - w Mi be known hereinafter as 
Deck! lockeyr-*-*vr!\ \i[ '* '-V-miMi* ultimatcis seeks a billboard permit, 
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its billboard lease interest in lot 4, (R.3516, 3530). Lot 4 is precisely where the South 
Swanson sign "move sign approx. 300' to south from So. Property line of Lindal 
Homes55 must be relocated to under Reagan's original R-407.3 Secondly, the underlying 
South Salt Lake (hereinafter "SSL") City building permits to relocate Reagan's three signs 
lapsed and became void. After those city permits lapsed, on April 17, 2002, Republic 
applied with SSLfora 14'x48f billboard permit on a now legal property location 510 feet 
south of Reagan's existing Swanson billboard, property hereinafter referred to as "Deck 
Hockey"/.e., lot 4) . A building permit was issued to Republic by SSL on May 13th, 2002, 
(R.61-62). That same day, Republic applied to UDOT for a state billboard permit at that 
location (R.62; 2064). 
Because freeway oriented billboards cannot be built within 500' of each other under 
federal and state law, and because UDOT applies a first in time first in right rule, (R.1641, 
1652) Reagan found itself on the horns of dilemma. Reagan no longer had a valid city 
permit that would match its existing February 17th, 1998 R-407 application and the Deck 
Hockey lot 4 property was no longer under sign lease with Reagan, and if Reagan filed a 
new R-407 application to match now existing facts, its application would be subsequent to 
Republic's. (R.109-117; 3515-3519; See also, Addendum 2). 
To resolve this dilemma, Reagan concocted a scheme with the complicity of UDOT 
3
 Addendum 2 clearly shows recorded subdivision plat with measurements. 
Edward Rogers' affidavit verified the location of the proposed sign move, a fact which 
the trial court should have assumed accurate for purposes of summary judgment against 
Republic. 
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i ill! 11 .1 >< ill ; : 1 lie M >rig. •: ' "*!•> !'^rrr-!i/.i ^ ^ S :rd ^ : i ' :v . ! - •.' 
a subsequently obtained SSI cit> permit by changing the application to J (V \ I / "2 MIUUIC 
iwui Mgiu aiid u!*.. M- iMj d*i\» .AFTERthe permit had aluady been issued. v\ineh die pumn 
59;2104; Her - -l"Uewe;> R e: igan.1609, 2168-21 ' ,J" si R ]<(i 
does not, on its face, reflect the date of the alterations, nor that a different author (Dcwc) 
Reagan) was involved. (Addendum.. 3). 
applications. (R.1944) I here is no rule at UDOT which makes aberrations or amendments 
to billboard permit applications m R-407fs retroacti\L (R.f There is, however, 
language ii itu ,\ iw iwuhi.^.iu die effect ihat wuu.retomake the changes specified in 
) . 
In die lull oi 2UG2 Kep iblie officials learned that UDOT was holding up their 
billboard, application to consider the Reagan R-407 application. In response, Dan Ford. 
coniacuw * : • utHiii.du.n, ivcb -here were "private negotiations' going on between 
ill i.ici N-ini\\ii iJcbcnliai;! un. * i/wi pen MM ^li- u u. uepoMUon UKK ;;e 
wab die onl) one who could make the original file available lor altering, and that either 
Guy Larsen or Andy Bilanzich (Reagan's employees) made the changes. Only after 
deposing both of those indh iduals and subsequentl) deposing Dewey Reagan, Reagan's 
President, was Republic finally able to find out who made the changes lo the original R-
407. Dewey Reagan originally testified he did not knou whether he made ihe changes 
before or after the permit was lirst approved, but later changed Im deposition to 
acknowledge that the changes were made April 3, 2003 ihe sixtieth day after the permit 
was orioinallv :\^rn)\Cil T.,1 *l\ ! H d i\ \\- final inspection of the permit t R " :^>8-70). 
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UDOT and Reagan and that Republic was not invited to participate therein, (R.62). Edward 
Rogers along with Ron Howell (agents for Republic) also contacted UDOT's counsel, and 
met in the presence of Reagan's counsel, around Thanksgiving of 2002, and were told "it's 
a done deal"(R.1988, 1990)5 In point of fact UDOT and Reagan entered into a stipulation 
whereby Reagan's Lindal Homes' sign application would be "fast track" approved on 
January 15th, 2003. (R.20-49-50).6 An order was entered thereon by the hearing officer 
(without any hearing) on January 23, 2003. Shawn Debenham, UDOT permit officer, 
approved Reagan's 1998 R-407 application on February 3, 2003. (R.1510, Addendum 3).7 
Then, on July 31, 2003, 14 months after Republic applied on Deck Hockey, and 
almost six months after UDOT approved Reagan's R-407 sign permit to "move" the 
Swanson sign to Lindal, UDOT finally notified Republic it was denying its Deck Hockey 
permit application(R. 1882-83). Shawn Debenham stated there was "no reason" why it took 
him 120 days after he made the decision to approve Reagan's permit to deny Republic's 
5
 The witness (Edward Rogers) testified it happened before Thanksgiving, 2003, 
but 2003 was well after the administrative appeal was filed: The event must have 
occurred in 2002 as by the fall of 2003 Republic's application had already been denied. 
6
 The other two signs in Reagan's three signs case were not acted upon until 
December 1, 2003. (R.2055-57) 
7
 It is important to note that approval of an R-407 is a two step process. The permit 
officer first approves step one, the permit, then within 60 days must verify that the sign 
altering or change has been completed "as approved herein". (R.1510) Step two of this 
process was completed on April 3, 2003, the sixtieth day and the very date when Dewey 
Reagan says he changed the R-407 form (R.2168-2170) and even though the permit 
officer testified he could NOT allow alterations to the form after the permit was signed 
off in step one. (R. 1654-59) 
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application ^ k . i y i i ) . 
in actual fact, Reagan never "moved" its Swanson sign but rather built its little sign 
on I indal Cedar Homes propeily ninety feet south of the Swanson sign and left the Swanson 
sigi 1 sti i icti ii e intact " '"' (R 63; 110 11; 1668 16' ) 0) I loreover, Reagan did not "mo s e sign 
v
 " from,. So 
to the north end of Lindal Cedar Homes property (Lot 2) some ninety feet from the Swanson 
sign and some 420' north from I,ot 4 where Reagan designated in the R-4CT -I w^\.V\ k 
i elocatii lg its sigi l to (R 62, 111; 16 Il 1 11' i >• I ! (><> /1 ' I 'he o n u iu;,: . . .;u,ui d ica.vv ivcagui i.;ad 
with Lawson-Snider Partnership r:,s h was siihnnllnl \\\\\\ Ms nrij.'iiiiil I'l'W R- 1(1/ 
provided that the sign would be built on the Southeast portion of Lindal Cedar Homes , i.e. 
2876 South Davis Drive, (R.I 'HOV After 1* -1 4 of (he T aw son-Snider partnership property 
.'-,.-. .. ~ . ,a r . i i i v i ' .u i^ ; uiu .;;. Amended Lease 
Agreement in Decembei , \Wb vviliiLaWM- S-.-drr Pnn :. r/1 : h m ^ 
located ^n T oi Z u indal Cedar Homes) of the Lawson-Snider Subdivision (R.1532-1534; 
w i u u i i the record was there ever any modific.ili* >v< * -f the rebruar\ 14. 
>'^ ' U Id/1 i liiitit'i Ilk lliiii:tmi14 1 i' hi u; (lie i(i»ii was hvmu mused lu, raihet. all 
parties acknowledge that Reagan did not ""move sipn ii|ii 1111 mi 1 Mill1 In nith fro* 
8
 A reasonable inference would be that U D O l w 1 rited 1 u itil the ti 1:1 le foi appeal : f 
Reagan ' s R-407 apnliV-'i^n iinnrovfil had elapsed. 
9
 At one point during die District i ourt case Reagan was [illegally] advertising on 
b v Sw ms.v: <\&- nn,i ?'-. Vr<\ 1 i.Klal sign. (R.!668-6Qv 
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Property line of Lindal Homes" and instead built it 90 feet south from the Swanson sign 
(R.R.62, 111; 1641, 1664-1667; 1609, 1619-1620). 
Republic timely filed an administrative appeal of the denial of the Deck Hockey 
permit arguing that (1) Reagan did not have a valid city permit when UDOT finally 
approved the R-407 and that the form had been altered after 1998 and therefore was in fact 
subsequent to Republic's application. UDOT denied the informal administrative appeal on 
January 30, 2004 (R.1905-07; 1911-13 Addendum 4). Republic petitioned for rehearing 
before the department making it clear that UDOT employees could not, in essence "rewrite" 
the application to fit the new SSL city permit . (R. 1915-1921). Hearing officer David 
Miles10 summarily denied the petition for reconsideration on February 23, 2004. (R.1923) 
Appeal was made to the District Court on March 15th, 2004 (R.l-6). 
The remaining facts occurred after Republic's District Court appeal was filed and 
was pending. Reagan voluntarily removed its little sign on Lindal (Lot 2) at least as of 
January 2006 and went back to advertising on the [never moved] Swanson sign (R.64; 1609, 
1617; 82211). However, prior to removing its little sign on Lindal Homes (Lot 2), under 
Reagan's new plan, it made application for and obtained from UDOT another billboard 
10
 The very same person (hearing officer) who approved Reagan's Lindal permit 
application. 
11
 The Lindal Homes permit number remained the same permit tag as was 
originally on Swanson and was subsequently returned to Swanson after Reagan tore down 
the Lindal sign. Reagan never tore down the Swanson building sign which leads to an 
inference that Reagan never intended Lindal to be permanent, but only to "block" 
Republic's Deck Hockey application, a fact even acknowledged by counsel for UDOT at 
oral argument. (R.822; 3393, p.7) 
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Deck Hockey sign structure, on property known as Wilderness Log Homes 12 (hereinafter 
"Wilderness") In order to obtain that I JDOT permit, Reagan first had U> obtain .1 , il\ 
I'iti 11 mil I mm SSI mi I he V 'IMLTIICSS sili I nbtaiti ilscih permiL Reagan represented u-ww. 
City that it would be relocating its existing sign al I'll* Soiilh KHI VvVs! I *U!niiiil- hillim <1 
non-conforming sign) hereinafter referred to as the "Russell" sign (R.1552). ike Russell 
sign was an obstructed sign due J T 1C reconstruction which carried >."" it >MH*dJ 
. .lpaimes must maKe exception to Uien oiainanco ioi »i * A.y .-
The City approved the height variance, but did not approve either varying setback or 
having the sign overhang the building on the site. (R.1560: 15MV After the City approved 
tl: ie • ' ariances cii le to R eagai I'S pi oposal to 1 elocat 2 an impa - ui. *w,uuh ..lose not to 
relocate the grand-fathered and impaired sign,, bi it elected to 1 - •s - - • • '' • ": N \ • . • 
(three signs located on South State Street) (R. 1790,1796). Despite the fact that the new 
signs Reagan proposed to remove were not impaired signs {le., bait and switch), and w ere 
u
 The Republic Appeal was originally filed with only the Utah Department of 
Transportation as a Defendant. (R.l-6). I JDOT moved to dismiss or alternatively require jon, ^r 
of Reagan as a party defendant (R.43-54). At the hearing thereon, Hon. Judge Hilder require-. 
joinder of Reagan as a party and that Plaintiff file an amended Complaint to include them. 
(R.989). The principal reason why Reagan needed to be joined was to address the new sign 
(Wilderness) which I JDOT now claimed prevented Republic from having its permit even though 
Lindal Cedar Homes was removed (Id) 
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not entitled to the special considerations of an impaired sign13, the City still allowed Reagan 
to build the sign in violation of city height and setback ordinances (R.1790, 1798-1802)14. 
Ironically, SSL City did not even make Reagan tear down the three signs on State Street 
before erecting the Wilderness sign in contravention to SSL ordinances. (R.1680, 1695-
1696).15 
On 9/27/05 Reagan applied to UDOT for a permit on the Wilderness sign which was 
granted in November, 2005 by then UDOT permit officer Justin Scieli who stated that he 
was unaware of Republic's Deck Hockey application and appeal (R.1605; 1673,1675-75). 
However, SSL's City permit officer, Larry Gardner, testified he called Justin Scieli when 
Reagan applied for the Wilderness SSL City permit asking about the status of Republic's 
SSL billboard vis-a-vis the proposed Wilderness sign and Justin advised that Republic's 
sign was not a legal sign and just chuckled (R.1680, 1681-83). 
13
 U.C.A. §72-7-510 (6) provides that county or municipality must make "special 
exception" to its zoning ordinance for signs impaired by interstate construction or 
reconstruction, and may be erected to a height and angle to make it clearly visible to 
traffic. 
14
 In fact, Larry Gardner, SSL City permit officer stated that as long as Reagan 
complied with the SSL cap ordinance (SSL.Ord. 16.16.620 R. 1588), which puts a cap on 
advertising space as presently existing- thus every new sign must have a removed sign to 
offset the total advertising space, the setback or height ordinances don't matter. There's 
nothing in the city code that says that, however. (See and Compare R. 1798-1802; 1566-
1593 The SSL City Code). Setbacks must be five feet plus one additional foot of setback 
for each foot of height over 25 feet (here would be 40 feet) pursuant to SSL.Ord. 
17.16.460 (R.1582) and height of freeway oriented billboards is limited to 35 feet 
(SSL.Ord. 17.16.650 R. 1589). 
15
 In point of fact one of Reagan's proposed State Street signs was not even torn 
down for a year after Wilderness was erected. (R.1680, 1696). 
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While UDOT's Shawn Debenham attested he was trained at Region 2 not to act on 
an application which conflicted with a pending appeal (R.1641, 1652), Justin Scieli did 
precisely the opposite when Reagan applied for the Wilderness sign which conflicted with 
(i.e., was within 500' of) Republic's appeal on the Deck Hockey site. 
In early 2006 Republic made an application with South Salt Lake City to build a 
proposed billboard on the Network Electric site (hereinafter "Network"), a location within 
5001 of the newly constructed Wilderness sign, with the understanding that, if granted, 
Republic would remove its Deck Hockey sign that was still on appeal with the District 
Court. (R.18-10-11). This application was rejected by SSL on April 18, 2006, due to its 
being within 200' of the Wilderness sign and noting Republic's right to appeal the decision 
to the Board of Adjustment within ten days (R. 1824,1833). Republic appealed to the Board 
of Adjustments of SSL on April 28, 2006 citing numerous reasons why SSL should never 
have permitted the Wilderness sign in the first place, specifically (1) Wilderness was within 
500' of Republic's previously SSL permitted sign at Deck Hockey, (2) the Wilderness sign 
was built overhanging a building structure in violation of SSL ordinances and SSL officials' 
specific instructions to Reagan NOT to build the sign to overhang any building, (3) the "bait 
and switch tactic" of substituting unimpaired signs after gaining concessions based on the 
representation that an impaired sign was being relocated, (4) failure to enforce even the cap 
policy as Reagan had not even torn down the State Street signs it proposed to retire as part 
of the advertising cap (R. 1831-42). A hearing was held on May 11,2006 before the Board 
of Adjustment, citing to them that the Wilderness sign was constructed in violation of the 
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Highway Beautification Act, the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, and various SSL 
ordinances. It appeared that The Board was about to rule in Republic's favor when David 
Carlson, SSL City attorney, intervened and told the Board they could not make a decision 
without Reagan being present to defend itself. The Board thereafter moved "that the 
decision of staff [denying the Network permit] to be held in abeyance, letting Republic to 
modify their appeal and to direct staff to investigate the legality of the 3015 south billboard 
[Wilderness] further". (R.1812). Republic filed an amended appeal June 7, 2006 (R.1812, 
1851). 
SSL notified Reagan its sign was built in violation of SSL ordinance regarding 
overhanging of buildings on May 12,2006. Republic was advised that Reagan appealed to 
the Board of Adjustments regarding the overhang violation and said appeal was denied. 
(R.1812). Reagan then lobbied to the City Council to change the ordinance, which was 
successfully modified by the City Council allowing Reagan to retain its overhanging sign. 
(R. 1812-13). The remainder of Republic's appeal was being ignored, thus on June 23,2006 
Republic wrote a letter to Larry Gardner reminding him that Republic's appeal was only 
tabled and the litany of violations of the Wilderness sign remained to be addressed. Larry 
Gardner responded on July 12, 2006 stating that SSL has no issue with, amd still approves 
Republic's Deck Hockey sign site, that the overhanging issue had been resolved in favor of 
Reagan by the ordinance change and that regarding the remaining issues raised by Republic 
about the Wilderness sign violations: 
City Staff is investigating the issues raised and will notify Reagan of 
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discrepancies when discovered. Reagan Outdoor has been notified of a lack 
of advertising area removed (before receipt of your letter) and Reagan is 
working to rectify the issue. It was alleged that Reagan placed additional 
signs on a location at 2250 South Main to gain additional advertising area 
before a photo was taken. This is simply not true. I remember with certainty 
all four signs being used for advertising. 
Nothing further was received from SSL so in August, 2006 Republic officials met 
with SSL City Attorney David Carlson and permit officer Larry Gardner, but were assured 
that the allegations in Republic's June 23, 2006 letter were still being looked into and 
Republic's appeal was still in abeyance. (R.1810, 1877).16 
During Republic's Third District Court case UDOT initially moved to dismiss for the 
alleged failure to join Reagan as a party Defendant, arguing not that it needed to be joined 
to protect its interests regarding the Lindal Homes Lot 2 sign, as that sign had been 
removed and Reagan had resumed advertising back on South Swanson, but that the new 
Wilderness sign was within 500' ofRepublic's Deck Hockey billboard and that Reagan must 
be made a party inasmuch as any ruling may effect the legitimacy of that subsequently 
approved sign. (R.297-308; oral argument at hearing of 10/03/06 R.989). At the conclusion 
of the hearing Judge Hilder ordered Republic to file an amended Complaint requiring 
joinder of Reagan to Republic's appeal with UDOT. (R.702-704; 989). 
Being forced to sue Reagan, Republic was left with no choice but to raise all issues it 
16
 Nevertheless, SSL took the position in their brief that the Larry Gardner's letter 
of July 12, 2006 constituted a final denial letter (although Mr. Gardner is not the SSL 
Board of Adjustments) and that any appeal had to have been made to District Court thirty 
days from the date of Mr. Gardner's letter. 
Appellant's Opening Brief Page -19-
had concerning the Wilderness sign under principles of res judicata or forever be barred. An 
amended complaint was filed 10/20/06 per the judge's order addressing all the SSL city 
issues and the Wilderness/UDOT issues (R.689-701). However, concerned about exhaustion 
issues, Republic did file on October, 10,2006 (ten days before filing the Amended Complaint) 
with UDOT an "Application, Request, and Petition for Declaratory Relief addressing to 
UDOT Republic's concerns and asking that the Wilderness permit [and one other Reagan 
sign permit not at issue in this appeal] be revoked. In response, on October 31,2006, UDOT 
denied the Declaratory Relief portion of the request on technical grounds and with respect to 
the Request [for agency action] simply stated: 
However, the Department does take seriously any allegations that outdoor 
advertising permits were issued improperly. Although prohibited from 
investigating your claims by a declaratory action, I will direct the Department's 
staff to look into your allegations and take whatever administrative action they 
may find necessary. I have asked them to complete this investigation within 30 
days and report back to me with their findings. 
Although the hearing [Republic's previous administrative appeal of Ihe denial 
of Deck Hockey] did not occur within the past 12 months and the staitute does 
not forbid the Department from hearing your petition, I think it is a sound 
general principle that disputes should not be brought up again once heard and 
appealed to a higher court.17 Therefore, I will ask the Department staff to pay 
particular attention to anything that might have occurred since January, 2004 
that would mandate revocation of the permits.18 
17
 Republic had not, of course, ever raised any issues about the Wilderness sign in 
its prior administrative hearings as Wilderness was not even applied for by Reagan until 
more than one year after the District Court appeal was filed. 
18
 Of course the entire Wilderness permit process occurred after January, 2004 as 
Reagan did not even apply at UDOT for that sign permit until 9/27/05 (R. 1605). The 
response letter mistakenly asserts that Republic claimed some of the Wilderness events 
were considered in the prior administrative proceedings, which is simply not true. 
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No further action was taken by UDOT with respect to Republic's application and/or 
request for agency action on the Wilderness permit. (R.73 3-823). 
After lengthy discovery and depositions were taken19 cross motions for summary 
judgment were filed (R.992-994: 1013-1015; 1207-1209; 1328-1329; 1459-1461). Hearing 
was held on the Motions on 12/14/07 at which time the Court ruled from the bench that 
Plaintiff was precluded from raising any issues as to the invalidity of the Wilderness permit, 
either at the City level or with UDOT by reason of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, 
and that further with respect to Lindal that Republic was precluded from even a de-novo trial 
on that issue(R.3393, p. 130-131) and that the only two issues Plaintiff could address were 
whether or not Lindal was within 500' of the Deck Hockey billboard (which was stipulated 
to) and whether or not Lindal was built where it was permitted to be located. (R. 3393, 
{Compare R. 807 with R. 737-740) 
19
 For example, Shawn Debenham ,the UDOT permit officer who handled Lindal, 
testified that the alterations to the February 17, 1998 R-407 were made by either Andy 
Bilanzich or Guy Larsen of Reagan (R.1641, 1657-1658). Further, that all the 
changes/alterations were made to the R-407 form before the permit was initially 
approved on February 3, 2003. (R. 1641-1659). That testimony was totally false. Neither 
Mr. Bilanzich nor Guy Larsen made the changes. (R.1637, 1638; 1624, 1625). The 
changes were in fact made by Dewey Reagan himself, (R.1609, 1610) and while initially 
not being willing to testify when he made those changes, (R.1609, 1610-11), Dewey later 
corrected his deposition to state specifically that the changes were all made April 3, 2003 
(2167-2169) based upon a refreshed recollection after reviewing documents maintained 
by his counsel. April 3, 2003 was the last day (60th) for verification of completion of the 
approved permit (R.1510), and certainly not prior to the initial approval of the permit as 
Debenham swore under oath. 
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p. 134)20. Request for certification of the Court's ruling at that stage was denied. (R.3393, p. 
135). 
Counsel for Reagan then prepared a proposed Order and Judgment, which contained, 
essentially, findings of fact and to which form Republic objected (R.3355-3359) but which 
Order was ultimately entered with a hand written change thereon 10/01/08. (3476-3488, 
Addendum 5). UDOT then moved for summary judgment on the remaining issues (R.3360-
63), to which Republic again objected pointing out the Swanson sign was never "moved" , 
and that Reagan's little Lindal sign was never located approx. "300f to south from So. 
Property line of Lindal Homes" as applied for in the permit. Summary Judgment was 
granted nonetheless and the Final Order and Judgment was filed 11/24/08. (R.3493-3499, 
Addendum 6). Notice of Appeal was filed 12/19/08, and an amended notice of appeal filed 
12/23/08. (R.3498-3499;3500-3501(Addendum 7). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial Court erred in ruling Republic failed to exhaust administrative remedies where 
Republic in fact filed an administrative appeal and pursued that through the administrative 
body. Republic did not and could not know that Reagan's 1998 administrative proceedings 
were formal and that it had any right to intervene therein. Moreover, when Republic learned 
20
 The Court adopted a perspective that the facts were "frozen in time" as of the 
time of the administrative hearing. (R.3393, p. 133) which is the antithesis of trial de-
novo. The fact that the Lindal little sign was no longer present as an impediment to 
Republic's billboard application was not considered at all by the trial Court below 
because of her frozen fact theory. 
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of the 1998 R-407 being pursued by the Department, UDOT officials told Republic it was 
already a done deal. Republic raised all facts it knew of at the time in the administrative 
proceeding, and cannot be held to a standard of having to raise facts it had no way of knowing 
until formal discovery was had. Republic should not have had to, in addition to its own 
administrative appeal, file a Request for agency action, as such procedure had never been used 
before at UDOT, was futile in any event, and the Department was on full notice of the claims 
of Republic by virtue of the administrative proceedings pending. 
2. The trial Court erred in denying Republic a de-novo appeal on the Deck Hockey 
application. The trial Court's application of a frozen in time theory is contrary to the type of 
statutory review required under the APA for appeals from informal adjudications and would 
render the discovery rights one has in the District Court meaningless because you could not 
use any of the discovered facts. 
3. The trial Court erred in not finding Reagan's 1998 R-407 change request which was 
altered after Republic filed its Deck Hockey application and after the change request was 
approved in 2003, to be a forged document where the document was altered without the 
authority of the original author, done with the intent to defraud Republic out of its priority 
position, and falsely purported to be the same 1998 document. 
4. The Court erred in failing to rule that Reagan's altered 1998 R-407 constituted a new 
application without any right of retroactive priority. 
5. Republic should have been excused for any alleged failure to exhaust any administrative 
remedies regarding the Wilderness sign because it was forced by the trial Court to join Reagan 
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(prematurely) as a party to its administrative appeal and address Wilderness sign issues still 
pending before the administrative bodies. 
6. Even if the Court finds that Republic did not fully exhaust all conceivable remedies, 
Republic qualifies for exceptions to the administrative remedies requirement. Republic 
showed below that there was oppression or injustice in the inconsistent conduct of UDOT in 
handling administrative permit applications. For example, UDOT would not process 
Republic's application at Deck Hockey until it resolved the alleged appeal of Reagan's 1998 
R-407. However, UDOT had no problem granting Reagan's Wilderness application while 
Republic's Deck Hockey appeal was pending. The doctrine of exhaustive remedies is not 
intended as a shield to protect administrative bodies from their own conduct, nor does it apply 
when bias or prejudgment of the administrative hearing officer has been shown. Finally, the 
"dual process" whereby not only must an applicant appeal his own permit denial, but must 
appeal the competitor's permit approval, requires a litigant to be in a "no man's land" where 
he can never timely appeal both proceedings to district court and will always have his case 
dismissed for failure to complete exhaustion of one of the two or more administrative 
proceedings. 
7. The Court erred in ruling that Republic failed to exhaust administrative remedies with 
South Salt Lake regarding the Wilderness sign, where Republic in fact pursued administrative 
remedies to the point where staff at SSL indefinitely tabled Republic's pending administrative 
appeal. Furthermore, Republic demonstrated that the Wilderness sign permit issued by SSL 
is void because the sign as built violates several SSL ordinances, and SSL law states that a 
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non-complying permit is void whether or not approved by city officials. Both SSL and UDOT 
refuse to honor this law even today. Where there is injustice or oppression the doctrine of 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not apply. 
8. The Court erred in ruling that Republic failed to exhaust administrative remedies at 
UDOT regarding the Wilderness sign where Republic in fact requested UDOT revoke the 
Wilderness sign permit and UDOT in fact did nothing. 
9. The Court erred in permitting Reagan's altered R-407 to stand where the Swanson sign 
was never moved as proposed in the application and the sign was never built as permitted. 
False or misleading statements made in a permit application void the permit under State law, 
and the failure of the permit officer to comply with the requirements of the R-407 form itself 
do not validate that void permit. 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
1. The Court erred in ruling at summary judgment that Republic failed to exhaust 
administrative remedies with UDOT where Republic timely filed its administrative 
appeal of UDOT's denial of its Deck Hockey billboard application, thereafter filed for 
reconsideration before the Department, and timely filed District Court appeal, all of 
which put the agency on notice as to the nature of the complaint, i.e. granting Reagan's 
subsequently altered and uncompleted R-407 application over Republic's original 
application for a billboard permit withing the same area. 
In Kunz &Co., v.. State DOT, 913 P.2d 765 (Utah App. 1996) this court held that mere 
denial of a billboard permit was not a final order from which judicial review may be had; 
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I 
rather the appealing party must file for administrative review, either formal of informal, prior 
to taking the matter to the District Court. Here, that was all done by Republic. Republic's 
billboard application was denied by UDOT on July 31, 2003. (R. 1882-83), Republic timely 
appealed and an informal adjudicatory hearing was held resulting in a decision which denied 
Republic's claim that Reagan did not have a valid SSL city permit by the time UDOT finally 
acted on the Lindal permit (R.1554-1556)21 and ruled that once Reagan appealed the 1998 
denial of the permit application, "the facts as then existing were in a sense frozen"(W at fn. 
2). Of course, if that were really true, Reagan could not alter its 1998 application ex-post facto 
as it did with the cooperation and assistance of UDOT's permit officer, could not relocate the 
proposed sign or do any of the myriad of changes made after February 1998 to make its old 
R-407 accommodate the circumstances existing in 2003. To make it clear, Republic was not 
just appealing the lack of City permit issue, but the entire scheme of altering the R-407 after 
Republic filed its application for permit on Deck Hockey, and after Republic timely filed a 
21
 The Amended Findings and Order at UDOT, dated January 30, 2004 specifically 
find that Reagan did have a valid city permit on the Lindal site on January 23rd, 2003 
when the Department acted upon it. That was not true. Reagan's SSL city Lindal permit 
was not legally obtained until 3/12/03 (R.1506; 2095-97) some two months after the 
"settlement order was signed and approved" and after the permit officer initially approved 
the permit on February 3, 2003 (R.1510). Although Reagan did go in 2 days after 
Republic obtained its SSL permit on Deck Hockey and did obtain a renewal permit on 
Lindal Cedar Homes, SSL notified Reagan on May 24th, 2002 that that permit [Lindal] 
was issued in error and must be corrected. (R. 1503-04; 2176, 2187-88). Shawn 
Debenham, UDOT's permit officer, introduced into evidence at Republic's adjudicatory 
hearing the erroneous Reagan May 16, 2002 SSL city permit (R.1916). Republic did not 
learn that that permit (May 16th, 2002) was invalidated 2 days later by SSL until 
depositions and discovery was had in the District Court appeal. (R.2176, 2187-88). 
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petition for reconsideration(R. 1915-1921) outlining its various complaints22 (as then known) 
which petition was summarily denied without reasoning on February 23, 2004. 
Reagan argued below, and the Court agreed that because Reagan's initial 1998 appeal 
of UDOT's denial in the three signs case was a formal proceeding, to which intervention is 
permitted, that Republic had somehow failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not 
intervening therein. The Court erred in three regards. First, it holds Republic to an omniscient 
standard. Second, there simply was then no "proceedings" to intervene into, and when 
Republic did approach UDOT about the Reagan application they were told "it's a done deal" 
and that they could not participate. Third, the only stage of the proceedings to which Republic 
allegedly could have intervened was prior to the January 23,2003 order for settlement and at 
that time, all Republic could complain of was the lack of a City permit which issue the 
Department definitively ruled upon. 
In 1998 when the Reagan formal proceedings were going on, Republic was not a party 
and did not have an application pending at Deck Hockey. Republic did not file their 
application until May 13, 2002 (R.62; 2064). A fortiori Republic could not have intervened 
then, as it had no standing. When Republic finally learned that UDOT was somehow looking 
22
 Specifically raised were the issue of alteration of the sign size, difference in 
location between the original R-407 and the approved permit, (sign was built on Lindal 
lot 2 instead of 300' feet South as specified in the R-407, i.e., Lot 4), the fact that the City 
permit was an entirely different sign altogether than that issued by SSL back in 1997, and 
that if the facts were frozen as stated by the hearing officer, then Reagan could not alter 
almost entirely its original application in order to obtain a permit designed solely to 
defraud and block Republic's application. (R.1915-1921, Addendum 9). 
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< 
to resurrect Reagan's old February 17, 1998 R-407 on South Swanson, in the fall of 2002, 
just how would Republic know the old 1998 proceedings were still "formal" as opposed to 
informal? 
Effective 2/02/2002 Transportation Rule R-907-1-1 provided that: 
All applications, Requests for Agency Action and appeals from Notices of 
Agency Action shall be processed as informal adjudicative proceedings 
pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46(b) Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
(UAPA) unless another rule specifically designates a proceeding as formal.... 
(R.2011) 
Thus the presumption is, at UDOT, administrative appeals are informal in nature. 
While there is no rule that specifically designates billboard permit reviews are to be heard as 
formal adjudications, there is a process by which request for formal adjudication can be made 
and apparently that was done by Reagan, but how would Republic know that in 2002? 
Transportation files are not like Court records you can just go in and look at, the files are 
maintained by the permit officer (R. 1656-67). There was in fact no hearing held23 on Reagan's 
resurrected R-407; rather it was handled totally by a stipulation and settlement documents to 
which Republic was not a party nor given any right of input.24 Not one of the Reagan 
documents executed in 2002 recites the matter is being handled pursuant to formal 
23
 The only hearing in Reagan's three signs case was held December 16, 1998 
(R.339-344), four years before Republic applied for Deck Hockey permit. 
24
 Ironically, UDOT argued both in its brief to the District Court and at oral 
argument to Judge Hilder that Reagan was a necessary party for any adjudication by the 
District Court lest Reagan's due process rights were violated by making any decision 
about Wilderness absent their joinder, (R.297-308; 989) but UDOT had absolutely no 
problem settling ex-parte with Reagan full well knowing that would impair Republic's 
Deck Hockey permit. 
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adjudication. (See, Stipulation for Partial Settlement (R.2049-2050 Addendum 10), Order on 
Partial Settlement (R.2052-2053Addendum 11). Neither Stipulation and Joint Motion for 
Dismissal without Prejudice (R.2040-2041 Addendum 12), by and between Reagan and 
UDOT, executed in the three signs District Court case nor the Order of Dismissal without 
Prejudice (R.2043-2044) specifies that the case will revert to formal adjudication status. The 
Order Vacating the Agency Order does not state the Reagan case returns to formal 
adjudication (R.2046-47). Rather, all those documents state the parties [Reagan and UDOT] 
will negotiate. Nevertheless, the Court below presumed the matter was revived as a formal 
adjudication, absent any evidence to support that. 
The non-moving party to a Motion for Summary Judgment is entitled to all inferences 
fairly arising from the facts in the light most favorable to him. Poteet v. White, 147 P. 3d 439 
(Utah 2006); English v. Keinke, 774?.2d 1154 (Utah App. 1989); Winegarv. Froerer Corp., 
813 P.2d 104 (1991). Here, however, the Court assumed the three signs case remained a 
formal proceeding to which intervention could be had after it was remanded back from the 
District Court, and presumed further, that Republic somehow should have known that. Given 
the fact that Republic followed its administrative appeal of UDOT's denial of the Deck 
Hockey Billboard application, completely and fully, the Court below held Republic to an 
impossible standard of knowledge 25 and improperly granted summary judgment. For 
25
 The Court in essence presumed that Republic should have known Reagan would 
alter the R-407 and otherwise violate the Outdoor Advertising Act and should have 
intervened into the Reagan proceedings when Republic could not even have known those 
proceedings were formal. Administrative applications for a billboard permit are not 
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purposes of summary judgment against Republic, the Court should have looked at the facts 
in the light most favorable to Republic and determined the three signs case lost its formal 
character when the case was remanded back to UDOT - not for further formal proceedings 
or hearings- but solely for settlement negotiations. 
Secondly, when Republic learned that its application was being delayed based upon 
Reagan's old 1998 R-407, both Dan Ford and Edward Rogers of Republic approached UDOT 
via its counsel, Mark Burns, about appearing at a hearing. Mr. Ford was told "the hearing was 
a private negotiation between Reagan and UDOT which did not concern Republic and that 
I would not be permitted to attend."(R.62). Edward Rogers (and Ron Howell) were told by 
Mr. Burns and Reagan's counsel, Leslie Van Frank, in a meeting the day before Thanksgiving 
(2002) that "it's a done deal" [referring to the Reagan 1998 R-407] (R.1988, 1990). Thus, 
even if there was some proceeding to intervene into, and there was not, both Reagan and 
UDOT deliberately misled Republic officials away from pursuing any such course of action. 
Finally, even if Republic had intervened into some imaginary proceedings in the 
Reagan three signs case prior to the time the hearing officer signed off on the order approving 
partial settlement (January 23, 2003) what more could Republic have asserted than the fact 
that Reagan no longer had a valid city permit. That issue was fully and fairly presented to 
UDOT in Republic's informal proceedings hearing and the Department ruled that "[njothing 
in the rules or state statute requires that the building permit be consistently renewed 
records open to the public, like a court docket, and a non-party cannot simply go review 
the file at will. 
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throughout the pendency of any appeal. I am not inclined to impose such requirement after 
the fact. Since Reagan's 1998 application was accompanied by a valid South Salt Lake City 
building permit, UDOT's administrative rules were fully satisfied." 
One of the exceptions to the exhaustion of remedies doctrine is where exhaustion 
would be futile; this exception requires that the party invoking the exception can positively 
state that the agency has declared what its ruling would be on a particular case. Coachella 
Valley Misquito Control v. Perb 35 Cal. 4th 1074, 29 Cal Rptr. 3d 234, 112 P.3d 623 (Cal. 
2005). See also, Nebeker v. Tax Comm'n, 34 P.3d 180 (Utah 2001)(an exception to the 
exhaustion requirement exists where it would serve no useful purpose). 
Here, Republic has precisely and specifically established what UDOT would rule as 
to the lack of a valid city permit issue. Republic could not have attacked the alteration of the 
R-407 issues in any intervention, because those only occurred after the Order Approving 
Partial Settlement, i.e. after UDOT ruled granting Reagan's Lindal Cedar Homes sign permit. 
Republic could not have attacked the failure to move the South Swanson sign issue, because 
that occurred after the Order Approving Partial Settlement (Republic had no way of knowing 
Reagan did not intend to actually tear down its South Swanson sign structure in violation of 
both law and the permit itself). Republic could not have raised the relocation issue because 
the Lindal sign was built after the Order Approving Partial Settlement. How would Republic 
have known Reagan intended to build the sign not 300" feet south from Lindal, but 90 feet 
south of South Swanson? The Court below has assumed Republic knew information it simply 
had no way of foreseeing at the time. Yes the issues were raised before the Third District 
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Court, and even some of them raised in the petition for reconsideration, but Republic could 
not have known those things to raise as a basis for any hypothetical intervention into the 
Reagan three signs case prior to the time the hearing officer David Miles26 ordered Reagan's 
Lindal R-407 permit approved because they had not yet occurred. Republic is being denied 
its day in Court for not intervening and asserting things before they even occurred. 
Both UDOT and Reagan claimed below that Republic should have filed a "request for 
agency action" with respect to (1) the Lindal sign alteration and (2) failure to properly locate 
issues. However, those specific issues were raised in the administrative petition for 
reconsideration before UDOT and summarily dismissed. Exhaustion is not required where 
it would serve no useful purpose. Nebeker v. Tax Comm }n, 34 P.3d 180 (Utah 2001); See 
also, Johnson v. Utah State Ret. Office, 621 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980). Exhaustion of remedies 
is not required where it would be futile. Shala v. Illinois Coun. On Long Term Care, 529 U.S. 
1,120S.Ct. 1084,146 L.Ed 2d 1 (2000). Whether exhausting administrative remedies would 
have been futile is a question of law for the Court of Appeals. Stephens v. Board of Regents, 
614 NW 2d 764 (Minn. App. 2000) 
As was admitted by UDOT's counsel, he had never seen anyone file a "Request for 
Agency Relief at UDOT in his six years with UDOT doing primarily billboard matters. 
(R.989, p.23). Nevertheless, despite the fact that Republic timely appealed the decision to 
26
 Ironically, this is the same hearing officer who presided over Republic's 
informal adjudication hearing. Thus Republic was, in essence, attacking his earlier 
decision to grant the Reagan permit in the first place. 
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deny its Deck Hockey application, Republic was then somehow supposed to pursue 
simultaneously another administrative appeal such as Mr. Burns had never seen done? It is 
simply converting the failure to exhaust administrative remedies into a doctrine of absurdity 
and a convenient means for administrative bodies to avoid judicial scrutiny. Republic 
properly filed all administrative appeals provided to it. Republic was not required to imagine 
every conceivable action it might have taken when there is no proof whatsoever any different 
result would result therefrom.27 In Decker v. Role, 180 P.3d 778 (Utah App. 2008) this Court 
held where the driver whose license had been suspended received a notice advising him that 
if he disagreed with the decision of the Department he could appeal to the District Court, 
which he did, and then after de novo trial the Department argued he failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies by not requesting a hearing before the Department, that the District 
Court did have jurisdiction to hear the matter. Similarly, in this case, the Department advised 
Republic in its denial of the petition for reconsideration letter that "You have 30 days from 
this date to file a complaint for judicial review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15." 
(R.1923). 
The Decker Court reasoned that the Department did not inform the other party that he 
had other administrative recourse available to him, but steered him straight to Court. The 
situation is identical here. Nowhere below did the Department ever advise Republic that (1) 
27After all, Republic did file the proverbial "Request for Agency Action" with 
respect to Wilderness and was told by UDOT the matter would be looked into but then 
was never forthcoming (R.733-823). 
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Reagan's "settlement" proceeding were formal and subject to intervention, or (2) Republic 
had a right to request agency action in lieu of appealing to Court. Rather, the Department 
notice, like Decker, directed Court appeal as the sole recourse of Republic. 
In any event, Republic did in fact request UDOT take action to deny Reagan's permit 
when it filed its petition for rehearing. Specifically, Republic noted: 
Both Region 2 and Republic introduced copies of Reagan's May 16, 
2002 SSL building permit. Shawn Debenham testified DOT gave Reagan a 
permit for the Lindal Cedar Homes Property based on the 2002 SSL building 
permit and not for the sign applied for in 1998. Republic also introduced 
Reagan's 1998 DOT application, which plainly shows the application was for 
a 672 square feet sign measuring 14 feet by 48 feet on 2 poles. 
DOT must necessarily grant a permit for a sign the same size and 
location as indicated in the accompanying city building permit (otherwise, no 
point would be served by requiring an accompanying city building permit). 
Obviously, therefore, the 1997 SSL building permit (in effect in 1998 when 
Reagan applied to DOT) was for a 672 square feet sign measuring 14 by 48 feet 
on two poles, meaning Reagan received permission from South Salt Lake to 
move the 672 square feet sign from the south side of the Swanson Property onto 
the Lindal Cedar Homes Property. 
That same 1998 DOT application was changed on February 3,2003 and 
granted.28 The change is significant. Instead of approving the moving of the 14 
by 48 two-pole sign, DOT approved the building of a monopole sign 6 feet by 
12 feet measuring 72 total square feet. That sign was built (as shown by the 
photographs introduced by Region 2), which meant Reagan had a different SSL 
building permit in 2003 than it had in 1998. 
Besides showing a difference in the size and construction of the signs 
applied for in 1998 and 2002, the evidence (see the photographs introduced by 
Region 2) showed a difference in where the sign was placed. Originally planned 
28
 Republic later learned after five depositions that, in fact, the change occurred on April 
3, 2003 and was done by Dewey Reagan himself. This demonstrates the difficulty of raising 
issues before an administrative tribunal when one does not have discovery rights to know all the 
facts upon which he is complaining. 
Appellant's Opening Brief Page --34-
to be moved 300 feet to the south, to the south property line of Lindal Cedar 
Homes (see Reagan's DOT application), the sign was built just a few feet south 
of the existing Swanson Property sign to the north property line of Lindal Cedar 
Homes. 
Republic, though, had received a SSL building permit for the 
Deckhockey Property and had applied to DOT for a permit (produced by 
Region 2 at the hearing) on May 13,2002, three days before Reagan applied for 
its SSL building permit. Because the two DOT applications conflicted due to 
the 500 feet spacing rule, only one permit could be granted. By DOT Rules and 
constitution provisions, DOT is required to grant a permit to the first applicant. 
To do otherwise is to unlawfully discriminate. In this case, DOT could either 
grant Reagan the permit it requested in 1998 (for a sign on the south end of the 
Lindal Cedar Homes Property measuring 14 by 48 feet on two poles), or, if that 
was not an option pursuant to its settlement with Reagan and the reasons stated 
above, grant Republic's 2002 DOT application for the Deckhockey property. 
DOT was not at liberty to grant Reagan's DOT application that was based on 
Reagan's 2002 SSL building permit. 
MISAPPLIED LAW 
Another reason DOT cannot grant a permit to Reagan based on Reagan' s 
1998 application is, the law that allows Reagan to place a sign on the Lindal 
Cedar Homes Property did not take effect until May 2002 {See, Hearing 
Testimony and Mark Burns' proposed correction to DOT's original order in this 
matter). As DOT correctly points out, the facts at issue in the 1998 Reagan 
appeal are frozen in time at 1998. The January 23, 2003 settlement order had 
the same legal effect as if it had, in fact, been issued on February 18, 1998. 
Likewise, the applicable law is frozen as of 1998, when Reagan initiated 
its appeal.'Tt is a 'well-established rule that statutory enactments which affect 
substantive or vested rights generally operate only prospectively,' and 'the 
substantive law to be applied throughout an action is the law in effect at the 
date the action was initiated:' State Ex Rel. T.M., 2003 UT App 191, ^ fl7, 73 
P.3d 959, 963-4 (Utah app. 2003), quoting State v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000 
(Utah 1982). Thus, a 2002 law change can have no effect on an action started 
in 1998. More specifically, DOT cannot apply the 2002 law to the 1998 action 
involving Reagan to give Reagan rights it did not have in 1998. 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, because DOT did not grant Reagan a permit based on the 
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1998 application, DOT must ignore that application in determining to whom it 
should grant a permit. The first DOT application to be considered in the 
relevant area after the 1998 application was Republic's. Therefore, Republic is 
first in line for a DOT permit and should have received one. Reagan applied for 
its 2002 permit after Republic and has no valid argument why its 2002 permit 
should be given precedence. 
There are no magic words of art required to ask UDOT to take agency action. This 
alone is sufficient. True, UDOT summarily denied reconsideration and ignored Republic's 
request, but that does not mean its Republic's failure to exhaust administrative remedies, its 
UDOT's failure to act and respond to the request. If the agency refuses to reconsider its 
decisions or procedure, or has stated a categorical rule to apply to a group of cases, rendering 
exhaustion of administrative remedies futile, requiring the protesting party to pursue 
administrative remedies would not further such interests as allowing agency to correct its own 
errors and to develop a record for judicial review. City & City of Denver v. United Air Lines, 
8 P.3d 1206 (Colo 2000).The Court below erred as a matter of law and the case should be 
reversed. 
2. The Court erred in denying Republic a trial de novo on the Deck Hockey appeal. 
There is no question that Republic timely appealed the denial of its Deck Hockey 
permit vis-a-vis UDOT's granting a permit to Reagan on Lindal. U.C.A. §63G-4-402 provides 
in relevant part: 
(l)(a) The district courts have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final 
agency actions resulting from informal adjudicated proceedings, except that 
juvenile courts have jurisdiction over all state agencies relating to . . . 
(A full text of the statute is attached to Addendum ) 
At the district court initial hearings on summary judgment Judge Trease stated or the 
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court responded to counsel as follows: 
MR. WUTHRICH: Well, in essence, if I understand, you're saying 
essentially I don't have trial de novo, that I cannot raise any issues other than 
the one that was decided down below, which was 415 feet - - or meaning that 
it was within 500 feet. If that's what the Court is saying that I can - - the only 
issue that I may address to this Court is the distance between those two signs 
and the fact that the de- - or the Lindahl [sic]Cedar Homes sign is no longer 
there, than I - - there's nothing left to argue. Is that what the Court is saying? 
THE COURT: That's why I'm saying, and that's why I've ruled the way 
I have on the issue of jurisdiction, but I wanted to give the parties the benefit 
of the doubt as to whether or not there was any further fact or evidence that you 
wanted to present regarding the issue of Debtcocky[sic] and Debtcocky [sic] 
alone. 
MR. BURNS: Well, with regard to Lindahl Cedar Home, I mean I have 
all of the facts that we would like to address with regard to how that application 
was processed and how that application was approved. Are you saying I - -
THE COURT; And I think I've ruled that the Court does not have 
jurisdiction over that issue because of the jurisdiction problems that I've now 
ruled existed, and that Republic did not exhaust its administrative remedies 
regarding an appeal, objection, or whatever you want to call it to the Lindahl 
and Wilderness Homes permits. 
MR. WUTHRICH: Well, then in essence, trial de novo for us wouldn't 
accomplish anything because we would not be able to bring up any of the issues 
that we have discovered in discovery or any of the issues that we have to raise 
before the Court, if I understand the Court's ruling. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. WUTHRICH: So essentially I think you're saying the facts are 
frozen as of the time of the hearing officer. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. WUTHRICH: Okay. We take total exception to that ruling. 
THE COURT: Absolutely. I take - -... 
(R. 3393, pp. 130-131; 133) 
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In Due South Inc v. Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control 2008 UT. 71 (Ut 2008), the 
Supreme Court addressed the proper standard of review on appeal from informal adjudicated 
proceedings. Therein the Court stated: 
The plain language of U.A.P.A. addresses both the standard and method 
of review to be applied in reviewing an informal agency decision. Section 63-
46b-15(l)(a) provides that, u[t]he district courts have jurisdiction to review by 
trial de novo all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative 
proceedings. . ." Subsection (3a) provides that "[t]he district court without a 
jury, shall determine all questions of fact and lav/ . . .presented in the 
pleadings.". Thus, in conducting a trial de novo, the district court applied the 
proper standard and method of review. Id. at p. 7. 
Review by trial de novo, as used in this subsection (1) (a), [now 63 G-4-402] means a 
new trial with no deference to the administrative proceedings below. Archer v. State Lands 
& Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1995). The District Court erred in declining a de novo 
review of a dentists claim to licensure by reciprocity, where there had been no proceeding on 
his application that was sufficiently judicial in nature, and he had not yet had the licensing 
agency's action reviewed in a "trial type hearing". Kirk v. Division of Occupational & 
Professional Licensing, 815 P.2d 242 (Utah App. 1991). 
In the instant action, there was a hearing below, but because it was informal 
proceedings, discovery was prohibited. U.C .A. §63 G-4-203 (1 )(e). Thus not until Republic got 
to the District Court and had depositions could it discover when, by whom and by what means 
Reagan's 1998 R-407 was unbelievably altered and never completed. Nevertheless, the 
District Court prohibited the use of that material in the proceedings below under her "frozen 
facts" theory. 
"De novo" means literally "anew, afresh, a second time" and it has at least two possible 
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interpretations when applied to judicial review of administrative actions: (1) a complete retrial 
upon new evidence, and (2) a trial upon the record made before the lower tribunal, and the 
meaning of "trial de novo"in each statute is dictated by the wording and context of the statute 
in which it appears, and by the nature of the administrative body, decision and procedure 
being reviewed. Pledger v Cox, 626 P.2d 415 (Utah 1981). In the present case, the statute 
specifically mandates the Court make the factual findings, not give deference to the 
administrative body as fact finder. Informal proceedings, such as was Republic's appeal, do 
not contain verbatim transcripts or other characteristics upon which "a review of the record 
below" could be made. Moreover, without discovery rights at the administrative level, how 
could a party such as Republic ever learn of the underlying facts upon which to complain?29 
The District Court below had no legal basis upon which to deny Republic a trial de 
novo on its question of the Deck Hockey vis-a-vis Lindal Cedar Homes sign. In fact, 
inasmuch as Lindal Cedar Homes sign had been removed voluntarily by Reagan, Republic 
was entitled to prevail as a matter of law because there was no longer a prior sign (Lindal 
29
 That is precisely the heart of this case. Republic had to engage in lengthy and 
prolonged discovery, all objected to by UDOT, and after deposition after deposition to 
ascertain who, when and how the Reagan R-407 was lobbied, altered, changed, never 
completed, but nonetheless miraculously approved, was thereafter precluded from 
asserting any of such [illegal] acts on the theory they were not raised at the administrative 
level. Of course they weren't raised at the administrative level. They weren't known 
until after all that time consuming and expensive discovery was had. The trial court 
has created a wonderful dilemma for all administrative claimants, you can't know of it 
without discovery and you can't use it once discovered because you didn't assert it below 
when you didn't know of it. It's the ultimate "safe harbor" for lobbied administrative 
bodies. 
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Cedar Homes) within 500f to preclude the Deck Hockey application. The Court erred in 
denying a trial de novo to Republic regarding the Lindal sign. 
3. The Court erred in not finding Reagan's altered R-407 to be a forged document. 
In the present case, the altered R-407 is a forged document. U.C.A. §76-6-501 
provides as follows: 
Forgery - " Writing" defined. (1) A person is guilty of forgery if, 
with purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he 
is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or 
utters any such altered writing: or 
(b) makes, completes, executed, authenticates, issues, transfers, 
publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, 
completion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, 
publication or utterance purports to be the act of another, 
whether the person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to 
have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered 
sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an 
original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, 
electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of 
recording valuable information including forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, 
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, 
privilege, or identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or 
writing issued by a government or any agency; or 
( c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument 
or writing representing an interest in or claim against property, or 
a pecuniary interest in or claim against any person or enterprise. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree, [emphasis added] 
In the present case the Reagan's altered R-407 is unquestionably a forgery. Each and 
every element of the forgery statute is present. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, either acting 
singularly or in concert with employees of UDOT, altered this application with the intention 
Appellant's Opening Brief Page -40-
of defrauding Republic of its priority in applying for the Deck Hockey site. Thus, they were 
acting "with the purpose to defraud anyone, or with the knowledge that he is facilitating a 
fraud to be perpetrated by anyone." The hand writing of Don Bosley was altered without his 
authority, leaving a document which purports to be the act of Don Bosley when it's not30. 
Furthermore, the document purports to have been executed in February 1998, when it in fact 
was not the case. Finally, the document is a writing which concerns a right or privilege, i.e. 
one's priority of billboard application with the Department. Forgery under Utah law is a 
felony in the third degree, and accordingly is clearly against public policy. 
"Defraud" is defined by the Encyclopedia Dictionary as meaning "to deprive of a right, 
by withholding from another, by indirection or devise, that which he has a right to claim or 
obtain." Deseret Nat. Bank v Kidman, 71 P. 873, 877 25 Utah 379 (1903). While it is true 
that "defraud" generally implies artifice or deception, one may be defrauded of his property 
when he has been wrongfully deprived thereof. To deprive of something dishonestly is to 
defraud. It is not uncommon to speak of a person as "defrauded" of his rights who has been 
wrongfully deprived of them by other means than trickery. For example, the reward justly due 
one for services may be withheld and in that sense he is "defrauded." To "defraud" implies 
or includes all acts, omissions or concealments which involve a breach of legal or equitable 
duty, trust, or confidence generally imposed, and which are injurious to another, or by which 
an undue advantage is taken of another, so that under the statute making it a criminal offense 
30
 In his affidavit Don Bosley states the 1998 R-407 document, as altered, is not his 
document. (R. 128-129) 
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to use the mails in any scheme or artifice to defraud, a plan to extort money from another by 
threatening to publish charges against him, accusing him of having committed crimes unless 
the sum demanded is paid is a scheme to defraud. Hoarman v U.S., 116 F. 350, 354 (6th Cir. 
1902). 
"Defraud" means to deprive of a right, either by procuring something by deception or 
artifice or by appropriating something wrongfully. People v Griffith, 262 P.2d 355,120 Cal. 
App. 2d 873 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1953). To "defraud" means to deprive a person of property 
or interest, estate or right by fraud, deceit or artifice. State v Jarman, 438 P.2d 250 (Nev. 
1968); "Defraud," in common parlance, means to cheat or wrongfully deprive another of his 
property by deception or artifice. State v Weigel, All A2d 372 (N.J.SUPER.A.D. 1984). 
Reagan, acting with the cooperation and consent of UDOT, set out on a journey to 
deprive Republic of its priority for a billboard permit on the Deck Hockey site by means of 
altering a February 17, 1998 R-407 in attempt to make it fit 2003 facts. There is no rule at 
UDOT that provides the right for amending billboard applications. There is no rule at UDOT 
that makes any such purported amendments retroactive. The entire thing was a scheme and 
artifice to defraud (reflecting mirrors) which Courts of reason cannot, and should not 
condone! 
4. The Court erred in failing to recognize that Reagan's alteration of the R-407 form 
constituted a new application without any retroactive effect. 
In Western Water LLC v. White, 184 P.3d 578 (Utah 2008) the Utah Supreme Court 
held that the applicant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before the State 
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Engineer's Office where it modified its prior application holding that the revised application 
was a new application because it was dramatically different from the original application31. 
Thus, merely requesting reconsideration from the Department was insufficient, and an entirely 
new application and publication process had to be applied. 
In the present case, Reagan's alterations to its 1998 R-407 are so dramatically different, 
both as to location and nature of the advertising billboard, that UDOT should have 
recognized Reagan's Lindal R-407 required a whole new application and could not be 
retroactively amended. Ironically, the State Engineer does have statutory authority to authorize 
amendments or corrections, but only after republication. U.C.A. §73-3-6. UDOT has no 
counterpart, no statute or regulation authorizing permit officers to allow amendments or 
corrections to the applications they receive. To then give retroactive application to the ultra 
vires act of altering the R-407, five years after the fact, is wholly inappropriate. 
5. Republic should have been excused for any failure to exhaust administrative remedies 
with regard to the Wilderness sign, because it was forced to join Reagan as a party to 
its informal administrative appeal. 
Republic did not seek to bring in Reagan as a party defendant, nor did it seek to address 
the Wilderness Homes issue at the District Court level in October 2006. Rather, Republic was 
forced to join Reagan as a party by order of the Court. ( R.702-704) Being thus forced by 
31
 In Western Water LLC the revised water application in fact sought far less 
appropriation than did the original application, just as here the altered R-407 sought a 
permit for a smaller sign than originally applied for in 1998. 
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the Court (Judge Hilder) to sue Reagan regarding Wilderness, Republic was not unmindful 
of the doctrine of res judicata, specifically claim preclusion. The doctrine of res judicata 
serves to bar litigants from relitigating issues previously adjudicated or that could or should 
have been raised in the earlier action. Office of Recovery Services v. V.G.P., 845 P.2d 944, 
946 (Utah App. 1992). Therefore Republic was forced to raise all issues32 it could have raised 
regarding Wilderness or forever be barred. The Court (Judge Trease) then punished Republic 
for raising the Wilderness issues without allegedly exhausting all administrative remedies. 
This Court should find and declare an exception to the exhaustion requirement exists when 
a litigant is forced to prematurely sue another party. See, e.g, Buhl v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 
54 P.3d 1154 (Utah 2002)( a party is excused from exhausting administrative remedies when 
to do so would cause the Plaintiff irreparable harm). 
6. Even if Republic did not fully exhaust all remedies below, Republic qualifies under 
an exception thereto where there is manifest injustice at the administrative level. 
Another exception to the requirement of exhaustion of remedies exists where bias or 
prejudgment by the decision maker can be demonstrated. Owsley Re Idaho Industrial Com yn, 
106 P.3d 435 (Idaho 2005); See also, TDM, Inc. v. Tax Com% 103 P.3d 190 (Utah App. 
2004). 
An exception to the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies as a 
32
 Republic already had appealed at SSL City and it had become apparent the City 
was refusing to reconvene the Board of Adjustment; however, Republic had not yet filed 
anything with UDOT because they were awaiting the SSL appeal, and accordingly were 
forced to prematurely file a request with UDOT as well. (R.733-823). 
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prerequisite to seeking judicial review exists in unusual circumstances where it appears there 
is a likelihood that some oppression or injustice is occurring such that it would be 
unconscionable not to review the alleged grievance or where it appears that exhaustion would 
serve no useful purpose. Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Com X 34 P.3d 180 (Utah 2001). 
In the present case, two different standards are being applied. When Republic applies 
for a billboard permit at Deck Hockey, its application is held in abeyance while the 
Department resolves its issues with Reagan's old 1998 R-407 regarding Lindal. When 
Reagan applies for a permit at Wilderness, Republic's Deck Hockey appeal and billboard 
structure are wholly ignored and Reagan's application is fast track approved. 
Thus UDOT has absolutely no problem resolving appeal issues with Reagan ex-parte 
to Republic, thinking full well that granting Reagan's Lindal permit would be the death nell 
to Republic's Deck Hockey permit33. But, when Republic appeals to the District Court, -
Glory Be- UDOT's primary concern is that Reagan be joined to protect Reagan's sign permit 
interests on Wilderness! 
UDOT's representatives tell Republic's people they cannot attend any hearing 
regarding Reagan's Lindal applications, and even tell them it's a done deal (when in fact 
almost 2 months go by before the Stipulation for partial Settlement and Order is signed) then 
33
 U.C.A. § 63G-4-201(7) provides that: [i]f the purpose of the adjudicative 
proceeding is to award a license or other privilege as to which there are multiple 
competing applicants, the agency may, by rule or order, conduct a single adjudicative 
proceeding to determine the award of that license or privilege." UDOT chose not to 
utilize any such procedure in this case. 
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in Court argue Republic should have intervened in the Reagan proceedings. UDOT advises 
Republic in its informal adjudicatory denial letter that they have 30 days to file with the 
District Court, then in Court argue Republic should have filed a Request for Agency Action 
34
 despite the fact that they couldn't identify one case where that procedure had been used in 
the past and despite the fact that Republic timely appealed ait every step in the application 
process, attended every hearing, requested reconsideration and timely filed its appeal with 
the Court. 
At least one Court has intuitively recognized that the doctrine of exhaustion of 
remedies can be misused by administrative bodies as a shield to protect their own improper 
conduct from judicial review wherein, it noted that if multiple administrative remedies exist, 
only one need be exhausted. See, Davis v Human Rights Comm 'n 676 N. E. 2d 315 (111. App. 
1st Dist. 1997). 
Further, Courts have recognized that bias of an administrative hearing officer can 
34
 UDOT fails to explain how the dual process would work. Republic, having 
already filed a timely appeal to the denial of its permit was supposedly required to also 
file a Request for Agency Action, which isn't going to get done exactly the same time as 
the administrative adjudication on its own mandatory appeal. So if Republic timely files a 
District Court action on its denial of the adjudicatory, its barred from Court for failing to 
exhaust administrative remedies, i.e. wait until the Request for Agency Action is 
completed. If it waits until the Agency Action is done, its barred from appeal for failure to 
timely appeal the adjudicatory. Therefore Plaintiff can never be heard in Court! As was 
stated in Midvale City Corp., v. Haltom, 73 P.3d 334, 353 (Utah 2006) " a procedure that 
creates the possibility of infinite delays in the administrative appeals process and then 
compounds that uncertainty by failing to provide a mechanism that will assuredly 
circumvent the faulty appeals process does not provide the guarantee of a speedy 
administrative determination required by United States Supreme Court precedent". 
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violate a claimant's due process rights. To prove bias of an administrative hearing officer, a 
Plaintiff must make a showing that the hearing officer has prejudged facts that are in dispute. 
Elf v Department of Public Health, 784 A.2d 979 (Conn. App. 2001). One must show more 
than just an adjudicators previous position about law of policy, one must show that the 
adjudicator has prejudged adjudicative facts in dispute. Clisham v Board of Folic Com 'rs, 613 
A.2d 254 (Conn. 1992). In the present case hearing officer David Miles first approves [ex-
parte] Reagan's R-407 and then sits in judgment over Republic challenge to that approval. 
What more "prejudgment" could ever be shown, over the exact same facts? 
UDOT permit officer Shawn Debenham affirmatively states he cannot alter the permit 
once it is signed off on step one (here February 3, 2003) yet for Reagan does precisely that, 
and modifies the permit as to sign size and character, number of poles, etc, on April 3,2003, 
60 days after step one is signed off, and on the last day for final inspection. UDOT has no rule 
allowing for corrections or amendments to billboard permits, yet Debenham assists Reagan 
in making the alterations and then gives it retroactive application, all without any statutory 
authority! 
Even after the alteration (forgery) of the permit, Debenham then waits months to send 
Republic a denial of its application for "no reason" as Debenham puts it. While normal 
applications can be done in a day, or up to a few months if appeals are pending, Republic is 
forced to wait over 14 months just to get its initial denial letter. 
The South Swanson sign Reagan supposedly is "moving' is in fact never moved, rather 
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the Lindal sign is merely added to Reagan's sign inventory. 
Republic is required to go to hearing conducted by the very same hearing officer who 
had previously approved Reagan's partial settlement and ordered the (illegal) permit issued. 
Debenham issues the permit in February, 2003, despite the fact that the SSL city permit was 
not issued on that site until March, 2003, after approval of the UDOT R-407 permit 
application. 
When taken as a whole, the UDOT administrative actions in this case are shocking to 
the conscience of honest men, and cannot be sustained. Neither should this conduct be swept 
under the rug under the guise of' failure to exhaust administrative remedies' .especially when 
Republic did in fact raise all that it knew at the time to the agency, only to have those claims 
fall upon purposefully deaf ears. The Court below misunderstood the thrust of Republic's 
Complaint. True, Reagan should not have been allowed to get away with the mischief and 
defrauding of Republic's priority position. However, the thrust of Republic's complaint is 
directed even stronger at UDOT for its inactions as watchdog of the Outdoor Advertising Act 
and its actions as lap dog to the industry giant. It is, therefore, no great wonder that relief 
requested by Republic can not be obtained from UDOT itself under these circumstances. The 
ruling of the trial court below ignoring this injustice should be reversed. 
7. The Court erred in ruling Republic failed to exhaust administrative remedies with 
South Salt Lake City regarding the Wilderness sign. 
See discussion on failure to move the sign infra. 
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It is unclear on which theory the trial Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
South Salt Lake City, as SSL argued to separate and somewhat inconsistent theories below. 
First, they argued that Republic should have appealed to the City within ten days when 
Republic first became aware the issuance of the Wilderness permit. However, at that time 
Republic had no standing to complain to SSL because the City was not invalidating 
Republic's city permit at Deck Hockey by issuance of the Wilderness permit. Larry Gardner 
specifically acknowledged that in his July 12,2006 letter, stating in relevant part "South Salt 
Lake approved the sign at 2964 South 460 West (Deck Hockey) and has not required Republic 
to remove the sign. The City does not have an issue with Republic having a sign at this 
location, apparently UDOT does ". (R. 1785). Mr. Gardner then goes on to explain how, under 
City ordinances, because the Deck Hockey and Wilderness signs are on opposite sides of 460 
West (Davis Drive) having two billboards within 350 feet of each other is permissible.36 
Thus, unequivocally, Republic had no grounds to appeal at the City level simply based 
on the fact of its pending Deck Hockey UDOT appeal, as the City had approved and stood by 
the approval of the Deck Hockey city permit, Wilderness notwithstanding. The second theory 
SSL pursued below was that once Republic leased a sign site at Network Electric, and 
36
 While that's permitted by SSL City code, it is a violation of both the state law, 
U.C.A. §72-7-505 (3) (a) and the Utah Federal Agreement which provides in §IV that 
"Nothing contained herein shall be construed to abrogate or prohibit a municipality from 
exercising a greater degree of control of outdoor advertising than required or 
contemplated by the act of [sic] from adopting standards which are more restrictive in 
controlling outdoor advertising than the provisions of this agreement."[emphasis added] 
enacted as R-933-5-2. 
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thereafter filed a city application there, Republic did not exhaust administrative remedies in 
pursuit of that permit denial. 
However, Republic aggressively pursued an appeal at SSL, first timely appealing the 
initial denial of the Network application and proceeding to hearing before the SSL Board of 
Adjustments (R. 1726), which resulted in the matter being "held in abeyance letting Republic 
to modify their appeal and to direct staff to investigate the legality of the 3015 south billboard 
(Wilderness) further".(R.1727, 1760)37 
Republic then filed an amended appeal with SSL city, (R.1727, 1762) which appeal 
was ignored, so Republic wrote a detailed letter to SSL about the five issues staff was 
supposed to be investigating, (R. 1728,1766-1781). Thereafter Republic received a response 
letter dated July 12, 2006 from Larry Gardner at SSL, which explained that Reagan had 
appealed the overhanging sign issue to the City and had the ordinance prohibiting 
overhanging signs repealed, and then provided in relevant part that: 
Third issue Reagan Outdoor's failure to remove signs and dearth of 
advertising cap and other issues. 
City Staff is investigating the issues raised and will notify Reagan of 
discrepancies when discovered. Reagan Outdoor has been notified of a lack of 
37In that hearing Republic raised five distinct issues, first the Wilderness sign was 
obtained under pretext that it would be a relocation of a non-conforming sign that was 
impaired by 1-15 construction, which cities must allow special consideration for under 
state law, then after approval Reagan changed its plans and substituted other conforming 
signs instead which had no such special accommodation status (the "bait and switch 
tactic"), that the sign violated SSL's height ordinance at 65 feet, violated the overhang 
ordinance as it was built over a building in direct violation of staff s instruction not to do 
so, that it violated spacing requirements of state law, and violated SSL's setback and cap 
ordinances as well. (.1755-1760) 
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advertising removed (before receipt of your letter) and Reagan is working to 
rectify the issue. (R.1786) 
Thereafter, on August 8,2006, Republic officials met with City staff (Larry Gardner) 
and City Attorney Dave Carlson to inquire as to the status of their appeal and were advised 
that it was still pending "in abeyance" (R. 1728,1788). Nothing further ever happened on the 
City appeal, so when Republic filed its Supplemental Complaint on October 20, 2006, it 
included SSL as a Defendant as well. What more could Republic do? It's city appeal had 
been tabled into infinity. Its modified appeal, as directed by SSL Board of Adjustments was 
ignored. As a general rule, "Parties must exhaust applicable administrative remedies as a 
prerequisite to seeking judicial review." State Tax Comm 'n v Iverson, 782 P.2d 519,524 (Utah 1989). 
"Exceptions to this rule exist in unusual circumstances where it appears that there is a likelihood that 
some oppression or injustice is occurring such that it would be unconscionable not to review the 
alleged grievance or where it appears that exhaustion would serve no useful purpose." Id; See also, 
Johnson v Utah State Ret Office, 621 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980). 
In the present case staff has no incentive to pursue the directives of the Board of Adjustments, 
because "staff is the same person who wrongfully issued the permit to begin with. Staffs interest 
is to ignore the matter. SSL argued to the trial Court that the July 12,2006 letter of Larry Gardner was 
essentially the final determination from which Republic should have appealed to District Court. This 
of course contradicts what SSL official told Republic in August. Moreover, Larry Gardner is not the 
Board of Adjustments, and cannot speak for them. Proper construction of the facts present in this case 
leads to the conclusion that staff merely waylaid Republic's appeal, tabled indefinitely and attempted 
to leave Republic without any remedy at all. This is so because the City cannot deal with the absolute 
fact that the Wilderness sign as built must come down. The reason for this is SSL ordinances 
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themselves. Whether approved by staff or not, the Wilderness permit was void. SSL Ord. Sec. 
17.16.310 B provides that, 
Any permit or license issued for signs which are in conflict with the provisions of this 
chapter shall be null and void whether or not the licence or permit was issued by 
employees of South Salt Lake authorized to issue said permits or licenses, [emphasis 
provided]. 
South Salt Lake City argued in its brief below that essentially compliance with the cap 
provision supercedes the height requirements. Nothing in the cap ordinance itself says that. In fact, 
the SSL Cap Ord. Sec. 17.16.620 provides: 
A. The total number of billboards allowed in the City shall be limited to the number 
of billboards within the City legitimately in existence or for which permits were 
properly issued as of September 1, 2003. 
B. The total combined square footage of advertising area of all billboards in the City 
shall be limited to the total combined square footage of advertizing area of all 
billboards within the City legitimately in existence or for which permits were properly 
issued as of September 1, 2003. 
C. The total combined height of all billboards in the City shall be limited to the total 
combined height of all billboards within the city legitimately in existence or for which 
permits were properly issued as of September 1, 2003. 
D. As the total number of billboards, total combined square footage of advertising 
area of all billboards and/or total combined height of all billboards in the city 
decreases, the cap on the total number, total combined square footage of advertising 
area and total combined height of all billboards within the city shall decrease 
correspondingly. 
The design and construction standards for billboards are governed by § 17.16.650 of the SSL City 
code. That ordinance provides: 
A. Size of advertising area. . . 
B. Height. The highest point of any billboard shall be not higher than 35 feet above 
the existing grade. If the freeway, within 100 feet of the billboard measured from the 
freeway at the point in which the billboard is perpendicular to the freeway is on a 
different grade than the billboard, then the highest point of the billboard may be 25 
feet above the pavement elevation or any barrier wall at the location of the freeway. 
C. Setbacks. All setbacks shall be measured from the closest edge of any portion of 
a billboard to the property line. The minimum yard setback from all property lines 
shall be five feet. The minimum frontage setback for billboards shall be five feet plus 
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one additional foot in height over 25 feet in height, up to the maximum height 
allowed, [emphasis added.] 
In the present case, it is undisputed that the Wilderness sign is 65 feet in height, and was 
allowed by Larry Gardner in excess of the above-cited ordinance, and that remains so today. The 
setback is not 54 feet as required by the ordinance. That was true when the sign was built, and 
is still true today. As a matter of law, the Wilderness SSL city sign permit is void. It was void 
when issued, and remains void today. This Court should reverse the trial Court on this issue 
and direct summary judgment be entered in favor of Republic against SSL. 
8. The Court erred both in ruling that Republic had failed to exhaust administrative 
remedies regarding the Wilderness sign and in not applying proper standards for 
summary judgment. 
Defendant's UDOT and Reagan argued below that Republic did not exhaust its 
administrative remedies at UDOT prior to the filing of the Supplemental Complaint joining 
Reagan as a party and raising the issues concerning the Wilderness sign. However, Republic 
was ordered to join Reagan as a party within ten days of the first summary judgment hearing 
(R.702-04) or have its appeal dismissed. Thus any prematurity in filing is a direct result of 
UDOT's (Second) Motion to Dismiss for failure to join a necessary party. (R.297-308). 
Secondly, Republic did do all that was possible prior to the filing of the Supplemental 
Complaint by filing with UDOT a petition for Declaratory Relief and a Request for Agency 
Action seeking the Wilderness sign permit be voided (R.733-823). While UDOT correctly 
denied the Declaratory Relief under the rules, it stated it would look into Republic's 
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allegations regarding the impropriety of the Wilderness sign permit (i.e. that Republic's Deck 
Hockey permit application was first in time, that Reagan employed a bait and switch tactic to 
obtain the city building permit from South Salt Lake, and that the sign was built in violation 
of several SSL ordinances). In response the Department stated: 
However the Department does take seriously any allegations that outdoor 
advertising permits were issued improperly. Although prohibited from 
investigating your claims by declaratory action, I will direct the Department's 
staff to look into your allegations and take whatever administrative action they 
may find necessary. I have asked them to complete this investigation within 30 
days and report back to me with their findings. (R.806) 
Nothing was ever done in response to that directive. No findings or corrective action 
was ever reported back to Republic if in fact any investigation was even conducted (the 
"staff the Hearing Officer is talking about is Justin Scieli, the same permit officer Republic 
is claiming improperly issued the Wilderness permit in the first place). 
The trial Court below agreed with UDOT and Reagan and dismissed all Republic's 
claims regarding the Wilderness sign. The Court erred in two regards: First, Republic did all 
that was possible within in the time allotted to it (i.e., ten days to file an Amended Complaint) 
and therefor did, in actual fact, exhaust administrative remedies to the best of its ability by 
filing the "Request" for agency action even if UDOT had not yet completed their response to 
that request. Second, by UDOT's inaction, i.e., by doing nothing in response to Republic's 
Request other that the lip service noted above, it was demonstrated that a Request for Agency 
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action was a futile action. Certainly for purposes of Summary Judgment38 against Republic, 
that fact would have to be construed favorably to Republic, and Summary Judgment on that 
issue was improperly granted. 
9. The trial Court erred in permitting Reagan's altered R-407 to stand where it violates 
state law, where the alleged "move" never occurred and the sign was not built as 
permitted. 
U.C.A. §72-7-508 provides in relevant part: 
(1) Outdoor advertising is unlawful when: 
(a) erected after May 9, 1967 contrary to the provisions of this chapter; 
(b) a permit is not obtained as required by this part; 
( c) a false or misleading statement has been made in the application for a 
permit that was material to the obtaining the permit; or 
(d) the sign for which a permit was issued is not in a reasonable state of repair... 
[emphasis added] 
8
 The trial court actually entered findings prepared by defense counsel in its Order and 
Judgment dated October 1, 2008 presuming many facts against the non-moving party Republic, 
including: (1) Republic knew as of May, 2002 that UDOT was considering issuing the Lindal 
Permit to Reagan (§§1.09, 110 R. 3478, 3479) when in fact Republic employees all attested they 
did not know UDOT was considering Reagan's 1998 R-407 until late fall of 2002 (R.62, 1998-
1990); (2) That Republic did not undertake to intervene into Reagan's earlier formal 
administrative proceedings (§1.13 R.3479) which presumes (wrongly) that Republic knew 
Reagan had formally appealed; (3) That the Lindal proceedings were at all times formal 
proceedings (§3.01, R.3482) when in fact there was no hearing ever conducted after remand back 
from the District Court and formal proceedings require a hearing for adjudication, thus the court 
should have reasonably presumed the Reagan proceedings were not formal after remand back to 
UDOT; (4) That Republic did not file a request for agency action within 30 days of when they 
had notice that UDOT issued the permit (§4.02, R. 3484) when there is no time limit at UDOT 
for the filing of a Request for Agency Action; (5) That Republic was required to file an appeal 
with SSL on or before March 10, 2006 (§5.03, R. 3484) when Republic had nothing to appeal at 
the City at that time inasmuch as SSL took the position both Wilderness and Deck Hockey we 
valid signs; and (6) that the Network Electric application was a self inflicted injury constituting 
collateral attack (§5.06, R.3486) when in fact, for summary judgment purposes, the fact is that's 
the first time Republic had standing to attack the Wilderness sign inasmuch as SSL took the 
position Deck Hockey was legal with Wilderness in the same proximity. 
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In the present case, the sign (Lindal Cedar Homes) was both contrary to the provisions 
of the Outdoor Advertising Act and obtained by means of a false statement. The original 
application (R-407) stated that "move sign approx. 300T to south from So. Property line 
of Lindal Homes". However, unequivocally and undisputedly the Swanson sign was never 
moved. It remained standing erect and in place during the entire time the Lindal Cedar Homes 
Sign was in existence, a mere 90 feet from the Lindal sign. This both violates the act and 
makes false the very predicate upon which Reagan's original R-407 was premised. 
U.C.A. §72-7-505(3)( a) clearly requires that no regulated billboard may be "closer 
than 500 feet to an existing off-premise sign adjacent to an interstate highway..." In the 
present case, Reagan's Lindal sign was built 90 feet from its South Swanson sign. South 
Swanson was never used as an on premise sign, and in fact at one point, there was off premise 
advertising on both Swanson and Lindal signs, simultaneously. And what did the Department 
do - nothing? An administrative body is not free to undermine the express intent of the 
legislature. South 51 Develepment Corp., v. Vega, 781 N.E. 2d 528 (111. App. 1st Dist. 2002). 
However, of course, this same prohibition (the 500 feet limitation) is rigidly applied 
by UDOT against Republic, precluding its Deck Hockey application. Moreover, the Swanson 
sign was never moved. Even UDOT's own employees recognize the common sense meaning 
to the word "move", meaning to tear one sign down and erect a different one, not leave one 
in place and add a new one (R.2141-42). This "move" language is absolutely a false 
representation, central to the granting of the permit at Lindal, and in retrospect it's clear 
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Reagan never intended to vacate or demolish its Swanson sign, rather to use Lindal to block 
Republic's application until it could get another permit in place and return to advertising at 
South Swanson. The provisions of the Outdoor Advertising Act were never intended to serve 
as a tool for one billboard company to have a monopoly on the sign business to the detriment 
of competitors. The law is not intended to obliterate free market competition, but rather to 
prevent overcrowding of signs that would impair traffic safety and to allow beautification of 
the roadsides. 
Here, however, Reagan has used the provisions of the Highway Beautification Act39 
to monopolize the industry. UDOT has been a most willing accomplice. They do not require 
Reagan to remove the Swanson sign, in fact they take pictures of the Lindal sign with 
Swanson looming ever present 90 feet away in the background when supposedly "verifying" 
that the proposed sign change has occurred. The R-407 form itself (required to be used by 
R933-2-5( c) of the Administrative Code when relocating a sign) provides in relevant part: 
That the undersigned owner of the conforming outdoor advertising sign 
located on route milepost in county hereby applies for 
approval to alter or change said sign or structure by (show the change of size, 
lighting, height, material, configuration, etc.) from the sign or 
structure as originally inventoried by the Utah Department of Transportation. 
The original sign is square feet and measures x feet and is 
on poles. The new altered sign or structure will be square feet 
and measures x feet and will be on poles, [emphasis 
added] 
IT IS UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED THAT: Altering or changing of 
the sign face, configuration or value and or of the structure has not commenced 
39
 Utah's version, the Utah Federal Agreement for the Control of Outdoor 
Advertising was adopted as Utah Admin Rule R933-5, (R.2078-82) 
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prior to the application. The changing of advertising copy is permitted without 
this application. That failure to comply with said regulation is a violation of the 
Transportation Commission of Utah's regulations. An inspection fee of $50.00 
shall be charged if the sign or structure was changed as provided herein prior 
to or in the process of change at the time of the inspection and prior to 
clearance of Step No. 1 and the permittee shall also be subject to court action 
under Section 27-12-128. The approved changes listed herein must be 
completed within 60 days of the clearance of Step No. 1 below or this clearance 
becomes void. The District Permit Officer must be notified when the change is 
completed in order to make the inspection in Step No. 2 below. [emphasis 
added] 
Thus the form requires that the changes as approved in Step one be completed within 
60 days or the permit becomes void. Here, the "move" was never completed. The permit 
officer certified, on the sixtieth day when the R-407 permit was actually modified to fit the 
sign, rather than the sign conforming to the permit, that: 
I have personally inspected and photographed the sign altering or change 
as completed. The change is as approved herein, [emphasis added] 
This certification is just a furtherance of the falsity. Debenham arrives at the scene, 
realizes that the sign does not conform to the permit, and rather than voiding same as required 
by law, he allows Dewey Reagan to alter (forge) the permit document to fit Reagan's newly 
acquired City permit sign size. 
It is anticipated that UDOT will argue it did not care about the change in the sign size 
alterations to the R-407 application. However, Utah Admin, Rules provide that UDOT should 
care in R933-2-5 (1) which provides that: 
(a) The face of a controlled sign may be removed for maintenance and 
renovation or change of advertising copy using basically the same face material. 
The shape and size of advertising space may not be changed except as provided 
in these rules. Replacement of the sign face must be accomplished within a 60 
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day period from the date of its removal. 
(b).... 
(c) A conforming sign may be reshaped or modified as to height or size, 
or relocated upon proper written request. Form R-407, provided the change is 
in compliance with the Act and these rules. Any change shall be completed 
within 60 calendar days from the date of the approval of the request. A fee of 
$100 shall accompany the R-407 application to change the sign, in addition to 
any applicable fee under Subsection R933-2-4(14). [emphasis added] 
Utah Admin. Rules R933-2-4 (15) provides that: 
Each application for a new permit must be accompanied by the approved 
building permit of the local governing authority or a written statement from the 
authority that building permits are not required under its ordinances. 
[emphasis added] 
Thus, Reagan would have needed as part and parcel of its compliance for the R-407 
permit on the Lindal Cedar Homes a valid building permit from South Salt Lake City, (which 
approved a smaller sign, but would not issue a permit to Reagan for a 14' x 48' billboard on 
the Lindal Cedar Homes property). The significance of the change to the R-407 is not that 
the sign was smaller than the maximum allowed by law, because its true you can apply for a 
larger permit from UDOT and then build a smaller sign so long as you do not exceed the 14f 
x 48' maximum. The significance is that Reagan no longer had a valid South Salt Lake City 
permit at all upon which to base any UDOT permit, until the little sign was approved March 
13,2003 by Bruce Talbot (SSL) well after the initial UDOT application approval [February 
3, 2003]. For UDOT to assert the sign size was irrelevant to the Department is misleading. 
The relevance lies in compliance with local jurisdictions as a predicate to obtaining a UDOT 
permit. 
Finally, the Lindal sign was never built where permitted. The Lindal sign is 90 feet 
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from the South Swanson sign, it's not 300 feet from either the north or south borders of Lot 
2 (Lindal Cedar Homes property), it's not 300 feet from the whole subdivision border, it's not 
300 feet from anything relevant to this matter.40 
In summary, both the spirit and the letter of the law were egregiously violated in 
approving Reagan's altered and false R-407, then confirmed and approved by the Department 
contrary to their own acknowledged policies and powers, and the Trial Court below wholly 
ignored all of this under the guise of "failure to exhaust remedies". This Court should rule as 
a matter of law that Reagan's Lindal Cedar Homes' permit was void ab initio, that the permit 
officer acted ultra vires in ever approving it when he inspected the sign and found that it 
neither conformed to the permit as applied for, nor had any sign been "moved" and 
accordingly denial of Republic's Deck Hockey application was wholly unwarranted. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the Appellate Court should reverse the District Court's 
ruling regarding dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. This Court should 
specifically find that Republic did exhaust those administrative remedies reasonably available 
to it, and that requiring an administrative applicant to pursue "dual process" administrative 
appeals is both impractical and unworkable. This Court should also find that Republic is 
excused from further administrative appeal at South Salt Lake City because its pursuit of 
administrative remedies there became futile. Moreover, the Court should hold, on the 
40
 Again, 300 feet from Lindal Cedar Homes places the sign on Lot 4, right where 
Republic's Deck Hockey sign is built (as approved by SSL). 
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undisputed facts in this record, that the Wilderness city permit is void. Similarly, the court 
should hold that the R-407 Lindal Home's change request, as altered, contains false and 
material representations when compared to the sign as actually located and built, and that 
Reagan never "moved" any sign at all, it simply added a new sign to its inventory. Those 
undisputed facts invalidate the Lindal UDOT permit as well. In any event, Republic was 
entitled to a de novo trial on its Deck Hockey application and, inasmuch as Reagan already 
removed the Lindal sign, there was no impediment to issuance of the Deck Hockey permit. 
Moreover, the Deck Hockey permit has priority over the Wilderness permit as being first in 
time and first in right. The case should be remanded to the District Court for judgment in 
accordance with these findings. 
DATED THIS J / d a y of October, 2009. 
5TEVEN A. WUTHRICH 
Attorney for the Appellant, Republic 
Outdoor Advertising, L.L.C. 
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Findings and Order (Attended) 
Republic Advertising v. UDOT, Region 2 
File 'No. 02-21 
INTRODUCTION 
Republic appeals R egion 2 ss Jul) 3 1 .2003 denial < if an application ft >r a j JCTII lit foi it :« • 
construction of a sign at milepost 306,12 on 1 15 on the west side of the route (Deckhockey). 
Region 2 derried the permit on tb< ; gi punds that the requested 1c H .atit m ft a; u >nl> 415 feet fi omth* 
location of an advertising sign owned by Reagan Outdoor Advertising, The Reagan sign is 
located at property known as Lindel Cedar i ionics, 
BACKGROUND 
On .Pel >ruai ;) 1 i " 1S 98, Reagan 0 utdoor i advertising applied for a permit to place a sign 
at Lindel Cedar Homes. Region 2 denied the request on March 2651998 due to the realignment 
of 1 15. According to a let tei from Region 2 permit office i Mik< ^ Donivan, the reconfiguration of 
the freeway made the requested location a nonconforming area; consequently, no sign could be 
ph« - -I there. 
Reagan appealed the decision to Third District Court. Sometime between that date and 
January, 2003, the disu ici court apparently vacated 'the department's order and remanded the 
case to the department based on a proposed settlement that woulcj^allow Reagan to construct the 
sign Hie settlement ordei was Issued on January 23,2003 and directed Region 2 to immediately 
grant Reagan a permit. 
Based on a request by Region 2, UDOT issues this Amended Findings and Order. The amendment is 
contained in paragraph 3 and does not change the facts upon which the decision is based. Though Region 1 
requested an amendment that would specify when the court order was issued, UDOT decided not to adopt that 
suggestion since the court's order was mver put into evidence in the hearing md h not necessary to the ultimate 
result in any event. The mle that was changed was apparently Utah Admin. Code R933-2. The relevant amendment 
to that rule became effective on May 21, 2002. 
•from the time oi the nppli«/at ion m I WX, f he mailer was always under the jurisdiction 
either of the department or the district court. When Reagan first filed its application n \ si 
also submitted a valid building perm 11 Jmm Smith S;dl k)k< I Huin;i» Hie periderm
 v ui UK, 
adn 11' 11' traf i ve and judicial proceeding, the South Salt Lake permit may have expired for a brief 
period of time. Nevertheless, it appears that Reagan had •., • s -^ 
on hnu;i?\ ?'k .",ltl\ when "the settlement order was signed and issued. 
On or about May 16,2002, Republic filed an application for a permit ,il Ik: 1 kxkljookr v 
propei ty Accoi ding to Region 2 permit officer Shawn Debenham, shortly afterward he 
informed Republic that h*: i <»uld no" take an> aclioo on the application because of the pending 
case with Reagan - ^u -' -*;•*• >^ ' * settlement order, M? Debenham sent a letter 
to Republic formally denying its permit on the grounds that it was less than 500 feet from 
anoibei sign location, i *• , thin bolontfinj/, u» Reagan ;*? the Lmdel Cedar Home$ site. Neither side 
disputed Mr. Debenham"s conclusion that the signs were only 415 feet apart-
AR 01J MI-NT 
Republic now argues that Reagan's building permit lapsed sometime after February 1998 
and, therefore, lis 1WK rtpphuition Un d I, ll>< >1 sign permit was no lougfi valid. Consequently, 
claims Republic, its application for the Deckhockey site should take precedence over Reagan's 
and should be yank tl hi essi IK I\ KL public ulle.yu, that S^4.MII\ South Salt Lake building 
permit had to be valid not only on February 17,1998 (when Reagan initially applied to UDOT), 
bi'l throughout the pendent.) oi (lie adnunislMlTve and fiitliual appeal, as vvcil ,i: on llir nl;i1t" oi 
the final order of settlement on January 23 > 2003. 
Republic' s reading of the Jaw is tmsupportatilc i iiutt 'V, itiun f ode 1WV l-4\ ('> i NH \< 
merely "[e]ach application for a new pennji must be accompanied by the approved building 
permit of the local governing authority " This is the sole provision regarding the iitnf b >t ,i 
• 2 
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building permit and it expressly states that the building permit must accompany the sign 
application and be "approved," i.e., valid. Nothing in the rules or state statute requires that the 
building petxnit be consistently renewed throughout the pendency of any appeal. 1 am not 
inclined to impose such a requirement after the fact? Since Reagan's 1998 application was 
accompanied by a valid South Salt Lake building permit, UDOTs administrative rules were 
fully satisfied. 
ORDER 
Region 27s denial of the permit is affirmed. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46^15, 
Republic may petition for review of this order by filing a complaint with the Third District 
Court. The complaint must be filed within 30 days of the issuance of this Amended Final Order. 
Alternatively, Republic may petition for reconsideration following the procedures set forth in 
Utah Admin. Code R907-1-5 (2002). A petition for reconsideration will not preclude Republic 
from filing in the district court within 30 days of UDOTs decision on reconsideration. 
DATED THIS 30th day of January 2004 
David K. Miles 
Operations Engineer 
Administrative Hearing Officer 
2
 Additionally, UDOT is of the view that once Reagan appealed the 1998 denial of the permit application, the 
facts as then existing were, in a sense, frozen. Once the district court vacated the department's initial denial of 
March 1998, that denial became null and void. Boguslavsky y, Sovth Richmond Securities, Jnc7 725 F_3d )277130, 
n-5 (2nd Cir. 2000) (a judgment vacating a previous order replaces the original judgment). When a judgment is null 
and void, it returned to its original status. Id. n.5; Merrill Lynch v Commodities Inc. v. Richal Shipping Corp., 581 
F_ Supp. 933 (D.C. N. Y. 1984). Frorn this, h is appropriate to conclude that the sign permit issued as a result of the 
January 23; 2003 settlement order had the same legal effect as if it had, in fact, been issued on February ] 8,1998 
(the day after Reagan*s initial application). Legally, therefore, Region 2 had no choice but to deny Republic's 
application siicc Reagan already had a valid permit for the Lindcl Cedar Homes property. 
3 
Amended Deckhockey Property - Republic >>. Region 2, File No. 02-21 
Tab 5 
juL-u/-2uub hKi iu:ia m FAX NO. 
REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION 
File #2003-4)2-21 
Republic Outdoor Advertising v. UDOT, Region 2 
Pursuant to Utah Admin. Code §907-1-5 (2002), Republic Outdoor Advertising 
requests reconsideration of the Utah Department of Transportation decision regarding the 
Salt Lake Deckhockey Property (UDOT File 2003-02-21). The basis of this request for 
reconsideration is the apparent misunderstanding of the case facts, Republic's arguments, 
and the applicable law, 
MISUNDERSTOOD FACTS 
UDOT appears to be confused about the validity of Reagan's 1997 South Salt 
Lake building permit (which accompanied Reagan's 1998 UDOT permit application). In 
UDOT's amended order, fourth paragraph, UDOT states, 
"When Reagan first filed its application in 1998, it also submitted 
a valid building permit from South Salt Lake. During the pendency of the 
adrainistrative and judicial proceeding, the South Salt Lake permit may 
have expired for a brief period of time. Nevertheless, it appears that 
Reagan had a valid South Salt Lake building permit on January 23,2003, 
when the settlement order was signed." 
The first sentence of that paragraph is true. The last paragwipk would be true 
were it not for the implication created by the second sentence. The implication is that 
Reagan, had permission in 1998 from South Salt Lake ("SSL") to build a sign, which sign 
South Salt Lake still permitted to be built on January 23,2003. That implication is false, 
as explained in the hearing testimony and exhibits. Reagan had a SSL building permit for 
an entirely different sign in 1998 than it had on January 23,2003. 
Region 2 submitted as evidence the original SSL building permit, Exhibit S-1, 
which explains by a handwritten note above the signature the permit is valid for 365 days. 
Republic submitted, as its first piece of evidence, the 1998 extension of the 1997 permit, 
1 
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dated almost one year after the 1997 SSL permit application, to demonstrate the finality 
of the j>eimit on 9-3-99, which date was written on the 1998 SSL permit extension in the 
''comment* area, No evidence contradicted the fact the permit expired on 9-3-99. 
Both Region 2 and Republic introduced copies of Reagan's May 16,2002 SSL 
building permit Shawn Debenham testified UDOT gave Reagan a permit for the Lindel 
Cedar Homes Property based on the 2002 SSL building permit and not for the sign 
applied for in 1998. Republic also introduced Reagan's 1998 UDOT application, which 
plainly shows the application was for a 672 square feet sign measuring 14 feet by 48 feet 
on 2 poles. 
UDOT must necessarily grant a permit for a sign the same size and location as 
indicated in the accompanying city building permit (otherwise, no point would be served 
by requiring an accompanying city building permit). Obviously, therefore, the 1997 SSL 
building permit (in effect in 1998 when Reagan applied to UDOT) was for a 672 square 
feet sign measuring 14 by 48 feet on two poles, meaning Reagan received permission 
from South Salt Lake to move the 672 square feet sign from the south side of the 
Swanson Property onto the Lindel Cedar Homes Property, 
That same 1998 UDOT application was changed on February 3,2003 and 
granted, The change is significant Instead of approving the moving of the 14 by 48 two-
pole sign, UDOT approved the building of a monopole sign 6 feet by 12 feet measuring 
72 total square feet. That sign was built (as shown by the photographs introduced by 
Region 2), which meant Reagan had a different SSL building permit in 2003 than it had 
in 1993, 
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Besides showing a difference in the size and construction* of (he signs applied for 
in 1998 and 2002, the evidence (see the photographs introduced by Region 2) showed a 
difference in where the sign was placed, Originally planned to be moved 300 feet to the 
south, to the south property line of Lindel Cedar Homes (see Reagan's UDOT 
application), the sign was built just a few feet south of the existing Swanson Property 
sign to the north property line of Lindel Cedar Homes. 
MISUNDERSTOOD ARGUMENT 
UDOT states, in its amended order dated January 30 ,2004, "Republic now argues 
that Reagan's building permit lapsed sometime after February 1998 and, therefore, its 
1998 application for a UDOT sign pennit was no longer valid.*' Although Republic did 
argue Roagan's 1997 building permit (which accompanied Reagan's 1998 UDOT 
application) lapsed, which was not disputed, Republic did not intend to argue the lapse 
caused the 1998 UDOT application to become invalid. Any statements made suggesting 
such m argument were unintentional and in error. 
Republic argues, rathe?, that because Reagan's 1998 city building permit lapsed, 
Reagan could no longer build the sign it applied for in 1998 (as more fully explained 
below). Therefore, UDOT wrongfully decided to grant Reagan a permit based on 
Reagan's 2002 SSL building permit instead of the 1998 SSL building permi t 
Republic agrees with UDOT's footnote 2 in its Order that the facts as existing in 
1998 were frozen in time and the January 23,2003 settlement order had the same legal 
effect as if it had, in fact, been issued on February 18,1998. Being such, UDOT was not 
at liberty to grant a permit for a sign other than the one applied for in 1998, especially not 
for a s i p Reagan had not applied for and would not apply for until four yeais later. Yet 
3 
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UDOT granted Reagan a permit for the sign applied for in 2002—a different sign on a 
different part of the Lindel Cedar Homes Property. 
UDOT will not grant Reagan a permit based on the 1998 application because 
Reagan no longer has the right to build the sign it applied for in 1998. Certain legal facts 
must be understood to fully appreciate what is happening in this case. 
1. New UDOT permit applications must be accompanied by an approved city 
building pennit 
2. UDOT obviously requires an accompanying city building pennit because 
the city has the right to determine within limits what can be built and where. 
3. City building permits have time limits but can be extended by the city at 
the request of the applicant 
4. UDOT has no authority to extend city building permits. 
5. Litigation over a UDOT application denial may extend the UDOT 
application, but it does not extend the city building permit In other words, a resolution 
concerning an appeal of a UDOT application denial dates the decision back to the date 
the appKcation was submitted, but the resolution has no effect on the underlying city 
building permit. 1'irst, UDOT has no control over the city building permit, and second, in 
this case, the approval of the city building permit was not at issue in the UDOT appeal. 
6. Provided a valid city building permit accompanied the UDOT pennit *.ffC*i*At'*<\j 
UDOT may grant a pennit even if the city building permit later expires. Nevertheless 
UDOT has no authority to force a city to renew a lapsed city building permit 
7. If an applicant wants to protect itself, should UDOT or the courts approve 
a previously-denied UDOT application, the applicant has only to renew the underlying 
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city building permit. If the applicant negligently allows the city building permit to lapse, 
that applicant, and not later applicants, must bear the consequences. The latter applicants 
cannot be prejudiced by the negligent inactions of the previous applicant 
Thus, even though UDOT could grant Reagan a permit based on Reagan's 1998 
application since Reagan had a valid city building permit when it applied in 1998, to do 
so would be meaningless since Reagan no longer has, nor had after 1999, approval from 
the city to build that sign. Reagan allowed the city building permit to expire. 
Consequently, Reagan applied with South Salt Lake on May 16,2002 for a 
smaller sign1 in a new location, which, after being revised by Reagan (see Republic's 
sixth hearing exhibit), South Salt Lake granted. As explained above, it was this SSL 
building permit that was valid on January 23,2003 when UDOT issued its settlement 
order in the Reagan matter. 
Republic, though, had received a SSL building permit for the Deckhockey 
Property and had applied to UDOT for a permit (produced by Region 2 at the hearing) on 
May 13,2002, three days before Reagan applied for its SSL building permit Because the 
two UDOT applications conflicted due to the 500 feet spacing rule, only one permit could 
be granted. By UDOT Rules and constitutional provisions, UDOT is required to grant a 
permit to the fir9t applicant. To do otherwise is to unlawfully discriminate. In this case, 
UDOT could either grant Reagan the permit it requested in 1998 (for a sign on the south 
eud of the Lindel Cedar Homes Property measuring 14 by 48 feet on two poles) or, if that 
was not an option pursuant to its settlement with Reagan and the reasons stated above, 
1
 As the testimony showed, Reagan could apply only for a small sign on the nor* end of the Lindel Cedar 
Homes Property because South Salt Lake regulations prohibit larger signs from "being wHiin 500 feet of an 
existing sign (in this case Republic's Deckhockey sign which is 415 feet away from the north end of the 
Lindel Cedar Homes Property) but allow small signs to be as close as 300 feet from an existing sign. 
5 
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grant Republic's 2002 UDOT application for the Deckhockey property. UDOT was not 
at liberty to grant Reagan's UDOT application that was based on Reagan's 2002 SSL 
building permit. 
MISAPPLIED LAW 
Another reason UDOT cannot grant a permit to Reagan based on Reagan's 1998 
application is, the law that allows Reagan to place a sign on the Lindel Cedar Homes 
Property did not take effect until May 2002 (See, Hearing Testimony and Mark Burns' 
proposed correction to UDOT's original order in this matter). As UDOT correctly points 
out the facts at issue in the 1998 Reagan appeal are frozen in time at 1998. The January 
23, 2003 settlement order had the same legal effect as if it had, in fact, been issued on 
February 18,1998. 
Likewise, the applicable law is frozen as of 1998, when Reagan initiated its 
appeal, "It is a 'well-established rule that statutory enactments which affect substantive 
or vested rights generally operate only prospectively,' and 'the substantive law to be 
applied throughout an action is the law in effect at the date the action was initiated™ 
State Ex Rel.TJvL 2003 UT App 191, f l7 ,73 P,3d 959,963-4 (Utah app. 2003), 
quoting State v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998,1000 (Utah 1982), Thus, a 2002 law change can 
have no effect on an action started in 1998, More specifically, UDOT cannot apply the 
2002 law to the 1998 action involving Reagan to give Reagan rights it did not have in 
1998. 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, because UDOT did not grant Reagan a permit based on the 1998 
application, UDOT must ignore that application in detetmining to whom it should grant a 
L-UI-OJUO r i u iu-du Hi'i FAX NO. 
permit The first UDOT application to be considered in the relevant area after the 1998 
application was Republic's. Therefore, Republic is first in line for a UDOT permit and 
should have received one. Reagan applied for its 2002 permit after Republic and has no 
valid argument why its 2002 permit should be given precedence. 
DATED this / ? - ^ d a v of J££>„„^, . 2004 
Preston S. Ho 
Attorney for Republic Outdoor Advertising 
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Article I General Provisions 
17.16.010 Puirpose and intent 
A. The regulations of this chapter are designed and intended to further the goals and policies of the city 
by: 
1. Implementing portions of the city's general and master plans; 
2. Creating a distinctive appearance; 
3. Contributing to enhancing the city's character; 
4. Furthering the purposes and intents of the city's regulations; 
5. Fostering economic prosperity; and 
6. Limiting and reducing visual clutter along streets within the city. 
B- The requirements herein are created to promote the public health, safety and general welfare of the 
citizens of South Salt Lake by: 
1. Eliminating potential hazards to motorists and pedestrians by requiring that signs are designed, 
constructed, instal led and maintained in a manner that promotes public safety and traffic safety; 
2. Safeguarding and enhancing property values; 
3. Protecting public and private investment in buildings and open space; and 
4. Reducing confusion and inattentive driving habits. 
C. The standards established in this chapter are meant to encourage signs that, by their good design, are 
integrated and harmonious with the buildings and sites, including landscaping, which they occupy. The 
restrictions are crafted to encourage sign legibility through the elimination of excessive and confusing 
sign displays, thus reducing driver inattention or confusion, 
D. The restraints designated herein are intended to preserve and improve the appearance of the city as a 
place in which to live and to work, to create an attraction to nonresidents to come to visit or trade and to 
allow each individual business to clearly identify itself and the nature of its business in such a manner as 
to become the hallmark of the business. (Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
17,16.020 Conformity of signs. 
No sign shall be erected, raised, moved, placed, reconstructed, extended, enlarged or altered except in 
conformity with the regulations specified in this chapter. The regulations in Article 1 apply to all signs 
and locations in the city regardless of type or zone. (Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16-030 Maintenance. 
All signs shall be properly maintained. Exposed surfaces shall be cleaned and painted as required. 
Defective and damaged parts shall be replaced promptly. The ground space wi&in a radius often feet 
from the base of any detached sign shall be kept free and clear of all weeds, rubbish and inflammable 
material. (Ord, 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.040 Traffic and pedestrian hazards prohibited. 
^ ? u g E l ^ a 1 1 hu "^f d m *** * m a n n e r ° r i n s u c h a l o o a t i o" ™t0 <**™* ^ « * dear vision; or at 
any location where, by reason of its position, shape, color or words, it may interfere with, obstruct the 
view of or be contused with any authorized traffic sign, signal or device or block visibility for driveway 
ingress or egress. No sign shall be erected in such a manner or in such a location where, by reason of its 
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position, shape, color or words, it may interfere with or obstruct the view of traffic devices or create any 
confusion or impediment to pedestrian or vehicular movement or travel 
No sign shall be erected or located in any manner that would create a safety hazard to pedestrians or 
vehicular traffic. (Ord. 200343 (part)) 
17.16.050 Sign removal 
Signs identifying a discontinued use on the property shall be removed from the property within thirty 
(30) calendar days of the time the use was discontinued, (Ord 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.060 indemnification and insurance. 
All persons involved in the maintenance, installation, alteration, or relocation of signs near or upon any 
public right of way or property shall agree to 
hold harmless and indemnify the city, its officers, agents and employees against any and all claims of 
negligence resulting from such work. All such persons involved shall maintain all required insurance 
and shall file with the state a satisfactory certificate of insurance to indemnify the state, county, or city 
against any form of liability. Proof of such filing shall be provided to the city upon demand. (Ord, 
2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.070 Exempt signs and sign-related activities. 
A. For signs or activities listed in this section, permits are not required, nor is the area of such signs to be 
included in any computation of the total allowed sign area permitted for a particular parcel or use. All 
such signs must still meet the maintenance, removal and safety standards of this title as well as the size, 
location, height and other standards of this title to the extent possible as determined by the department 
B. Exempt signs shall not be located on property in a manner that constitutes a safety or visibility 
problem. 
C. The signs listed in this section may be limited or restricted by the department as deemed appropriate 
to meet the intent of this chapter and the city's general or master plans. The department may limit the 
placement, location, size, height, number, lighting and other factors of signs usage. 
D. Any exempt sign which becomes a nuisance, as determined by the department, may be required by 
the department to be removed, relocated, modified in size or height or other requirements designed to 
eliminate the nuisance. 
E. The following signs and sign-related activities shall be exempt from the provisions of this chapter to 
the extent indicated herein: 
1. Directional or Instructional Signs. Signs which provide direction or instruction and are located 
entirely on the property to which they pertain and exceed neither four square feet in area nor four feet in 
height. These signs include, without limitation, signs which identify rest rooms, public telephones or 
walkways or may provide direction such as parking lot entrance and exit signs and those of a similar 
nature. 
2. Memorial Signs or Tablets. Memorial signs or tablets, names of buildings and dates of building 
erection when embedded or cut into the surface or facade of a building. 
3. Public Notices. Official notices posted by public officers or employees in the performance of their 
duties. 
4; Governmental Signs. Governmental signs for control of traffic and other regulatory purposes, street 
signs, danger signs, railroad crossing signs, and signs of public sendee companies indicating danger and 
aids to service or safety. 
5. Real Estate Signs. Real estate signs that are temporary in nature and have no visible connection to a 
sign, light pole, tree or other items and are not placed on roofs. Such signs shall not be allowed on road 
pavement, sidewalk, gutter areas or park strips. 
6. Flags. The Hags, emblems or insignias of any nation or political subdivision subject to the restrictions 
as found herein, those of this chapter and as allowed by special exception. 
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a. Flags shall be restricted in size, except when allowed as a special exception, to a maximum of 
seventy-two (72) isquare feet in size. 
7. Symbols or Insignias. Religious symbols, commemorative plaques of recognized historical agencies 
or identification emblems of religious orders or historical agencies, provided that no such symbol, 
plaque or identification emblem may exceed four square feet in area, and provided further that all such 
symbols, plaques and identification emblems shall be placed flat against a building or on low profile 
signs. 
8. Interior Signs. Signs located within the interior of any building or stadium, or within an enclosed 
lobby or court of ;*ny building, and signs for and located within the inner or outer lobby, court or 
entrance of any theater. 
9. Temporary Event Signs. Temporary signs not exceeding sixty-four (64) square feet in area pertaining 
to drives or events of civic, philanthropic, educational or religious organizations, provided that said signs 
are posted only during said drive and are removed within fifteen (15) days after said event 
10. House Numbers and Name Plates. A building or house numbers sign shall be limited to one per 
street address. A building numbers sign shall not be greater in size than two percent of the building 
facade on which located, 
1L Political and Campaign Signs. Political or campaign signs on behalf of candidates for public office 
or measures on election ballots are allowed, provided that the signs are not be erected in such a manner 
as to constitute a ioof sign, are not located on property in a way that constitutes a safety or visibility 
problem and are not erected on utility poles, street signs or in public rights-of-way. 
12. Holiday Decorations. Signs of a decorative nature, clearly incidental and customary and commonly 
associated with any national, local or religious holidays are permitted, Such signs may be of any type, 
number, area or illumination and shall be placed so as to avoid confusion with authorized traffic lights 
and signals and shall conform to traffic safety standards, 
13. Building Plaque Sign A building plaque sign shall be limited to one per address and shall not exceed 
four square feet in area. 
14. Building Security Sign. A building security sign whose sign face is limited to no more than one 
square foot in area. Building security signs shall be limited to no more than four signs per lot. 
15. Gas pump signs, provided the sign is an integral part of the pump. 
16. Public Event Signs and Banners. A public event sign or banner authorized by the city for a specific 
event, 
17. Routine Maintenance of Sign. Routine sign maintenance or changing of lettering or parts of signs 
designed to be regularly changed. 
18. Warning Signs. Private warning signs shall be no more than six square feet in area and shall be 
limited to one such sign per parcel unless a special exception is obtained from the department 
19. Incidental signs. (Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16,080 Prohibited signs. 
Unless specifically allowed otherwise in this title, no person may erect, alter or relocate any sign of the 
type or nature specified in this section. 
A. Animated and intensely lighted signs. 
L Animated signs are not permitted, except as allowed as an electronic display sign and excluding 
public service signs. 
2. No sign is permitted which, because of its intensity of light, size, configuration, elevation or location, 
institutes a nuisance or hazard to vehicular traffic, pedestrians or adjacent properties. 
B Moving Signs. No moving sign or any portion thereof may rotate or repeat a pattern of motion more 
man eight complete repetitions every sixty seconds, 
C Roof signs of any type, except where allowed as a special exception under the provisions of this tide, 
and except location signs or numbers designed to be visible from the airways only and intended for 
public safety purposes. 
D, Miscellaneous Signs and Posters. Except where expressly allowed by this chapter, the tacking, 
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painting, pasting or otherwise affixing of signs or posters of a miscellaneous character, visible from a 
public way, located on the walls of buildings, barns, sheds, on trees, poles, posts, fences or other 
structures is prohibited. 
E. Snipe signs of any type are prohibited except as posted by a government agency 
F. A-frame, pedestal and other portable signs of any nature, except as allowed as a special exception by 
the department for limited temporary usage. 
G. Portable trailer or flashing signs, 
H. Flashing or scintillating lights. 
L Spot lights, except as allowed as a special exception by the department, 
J. Parking of advertising vehicles. 
1. No person shall park, on any property in the city, any vehicle or trailer which has attached thereto or 
located thereon any sign or advertising device for the basic purpose of providing advertisement of 
products or directing people to a business or other activity. 
2. It is the intent of this section to restrict advertising in residential areas of the city and to standard signs 
in business areas. This section is not intended to apply to standard advertising or identification practices 
where such signs or advertising devices are painted on or permanently attached to a business or 
commercial vehicle used to deliver or pick up merchandise or materials for such business. 
a. Such a vehicle may not be parked, except for brief visiting or delivery purposes, on residential zone 
streets or at a residential property not resided in by the operator of said vehicle and must meet all other 
requirements of city ordinances. Such a vehicle at the residence of the operator may not be parked on the 
street and must be parked on private parking areas, to the fullest extent such area allows, so that the 
vehicle is the least: visible from the street. 
K. Sound, Odor, or Visible Matter. No advertising sign or device shall be permitted which emits audible 
sound, odor or visible substance. 
L. Painted Wall Signs. Except as allowed as a special exception, no sign may be painted directly on any 
building, wall, fence or pole. (Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.090 Construction standards. 
A. Applicable Regulations. 
1. All signs erected in the city shall comply with the current standards of the building and construction 
codes adopted by the city. 
X All signs shall comply with all provisions of this chapter, any other applicable provisions of this 
chapter or other applicable regulations, 
3. All electric sign component parts shall be approved and labeled as conforming to the standards of the 
United States Bureau of Standards, the Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc. or other similar institution of 
recognized authority. 
B. Engineering Required. All signs shall be engineered to conform with applicable code provisions and, 
where required by the department, applications for permits shall be accompanied by an engineering 
drawing stamped and signed by a structural engineer licensed by the state of Utah attesting to the 
adequacy of the proposed construction of the sign and its supports. 
C. General Standards. Except for banners, flags, temporary signs and window signs conforming in all 
respects with the requirements of this ordinance, all signs shall be constructed of permanent material and 
shall be permanently attached to the ground, a building or another structure or be a direct attachment to a 
rigid wall, frame or structure. 
D. Detached Signs:. All detached sign structures or poles shall be self-supporting structures erected on 
and permanently attached to concrete foundations. Such structures or poles shall be fabricated only from 
painted steel or such other materials as may be approved by the department. 
E. Signs on Architectural Projections. Signs may be placed below and may be supported by an 
architectural projection of a building when the projection is designed to carry the additional weight of 
the sign. Any sign attached to or located on an architectural projection may not be located less than eight 
feet above a walkway, surfaced area or ground level below the sign. (Ord. 200343 (part)) 
17.16.100 Signs on or over public property. 
A. Insurance Required, No sign on or over public property shall be erected, re-erected5 located or 
relocated or enlarged or modified structurally or changed in ownership without first receiving the 
approval of the department and submitting a certificate of insurance as specified by the department. 
1. The city must be named as an insured party. 
2. A thirty-day written notice to the city of South Salt Lake of cancellation or expiration must be 
included in the insurance certificate. 
3. The name of the owner of the projecting sign must be clearly identified on the permit as an official 
corporation, partnership or sole proprietorship with appropriate names of individuals involved. 
B. Permission Required. No sign shall be located on or over publicly owned land or inside street 
rights-of-way, except signs erected by permission of an authorized public agency and meeting the 
requirements of this chapter. (Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16-110 Illumination. 
For the protection of community appearance and to minimize light pollution and traffic hazards caused 
by glare, lights and illuminated signs shall be subject to the conditions found herein. 
A. Any light used for the illumination of a sign shall be shielded so that the beams or rays of light wilt 
not shine directly onto surrounding areas* 
B. Neither the direct nor the reflected light from any light source shall create a traffic hazard or 
distraction to operators of motor vehicles on public thoroughfares. 
C. No portion of the sign, including any frame, bracing or support structure, shall be constructed of a 
reflective surface. 
D. Signs Illuminated from an Exterior Light Source. No light source shall be directly visible to any 
motor vehicle or pedestrian located in a public right-of-way or street or from any residential area within 
a distance of three hundred (300) feet measured from the light source. 
E. Signs Illuminated from an Interior Light Source. The light source shall not be visible from the 
exterior of the sign. 
F. Lights or Lighted Signs Not to Create a Nuisance. No spotlight, floodlight or lighted sign shall be 
installed in any way which will permit the rays of light to penetrate beyond the property on which such 
light or lighted sign is located in such a manner as to constitute a nuisance. 
G. Lights or signs alleged to be a nuisance by reason of light by the neighboring property owners or 
tenants shall be subject to review by the department to consider the validity of the nuisance complaint. If 
the illumination of the light or sign is determined by the department to be a nuisance, the owner or 
person having control or interest of the light or sign shall be required by the department to take 
appropriate corrective action. Any person adversely affected by a decision of the department may appeal 
the decision to the board of adjustment as provided for appeals of administrative decisions. (Ord. 
2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.120 Repair of facades* 
A building facade damaged as the result of the removal, repair, replacement or installation of any sign 
shall be repaired by the property owner within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of the damage. 
(Ord, 2003-13 (part)) 
17,16,130 Multi-frontage lots. 
A. On-site signs may be placed on each frontage of a lot or parcel in the number, area, size and height 
allowed by this chapter for one frontage, except that: 
1. Maximum allowances may not be transferred in whole or hi part from one frontage to another for 
purposes of computing any limitation using frontage as a factor; and 
2. The maximum area for a sign placed at a street intersection corner of the parcel and turned at an angle 
to be visible from both streets is computed using ihc longer of the frontages. (Ord, 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.140 Signs for nonconforming businesses. 
In order to encomage changes to eliminate nonconforming uses and noncompliant sites, signs for 
nonconforming businesses and businesses occupying noncompliant sites shall be limited as found 
herein. 
A. Conditional Use. All signs for nonconforming businesses and businesses occupying non-compliant 
sites shall be a conditional use. 
B Businesses Located in Residential Zones. Signs lor businesses in residential zones shall be limited to 
attached signs. 
t \ Nonconforming Businesses. Signs lor such businesses may be limited to fifty (50) percent of the 
normal sign al low ances. 
IX Businesses Noncompliant as to Bulk (Site) Requirements, Signs for such businesses may be limited 
to seventy-five (75) percent of the normal sign allowances. (Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.150 Signs in landscaping. 
All detached signs (for billboards sec Article VI) are to be located in a landscaped area. All landscaped 
areas are subject to design review standards. The "normal" minimum landscaped area is defined as an 
area equal to twice the si/e of the area of the sign or an aiea of four hundred (400) square feet, 
whichever is smaller. (Old. 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16,160 Signs in flood hazard areas. 
No detached sign shall be located in a flood hazard area except as approved by the planning commission 
as a special exception and only if constructed to withstand Hood hazards as dctcnnincd by the city, (Ord, 
2003-13 (part)) 
Article II Definitions 
17.16.210 Word usage and interpretation. 
Scope of Definitions. In ihis chapter, the terms, phrases, words and their derivatives shall have the 
meanings as sLated and defined in this section Various sign types shall have the definitions normally 
associated with such a sign, as dclcnuiiicd by the department, based on common industry and municipal 
usages. The woul "shall" is always mandatory and not merely directory. Words not defined in this 
section, or not defined by the department as stated above but defined elsewhere in adopted city codes, 
shall be construed as defined in those codes oi ordinances. (Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.210 Defined terms, 
l;or purposes of tins chapter, sign types and iclated terms shall be defined as follows: 
^Abandoned or non-maintained sign" means any of the following: 
1. A sign that no longer identifies or advertises a current, active business located on the property on 
which the sign is situated; 
2. A sign for which no legal owner can be found; 
3. Signs for which required licenses have not been maintained for a one year or greater period; 
4. A sign in pooi condition displaying peeling paint, rust, and or other evidence of neglect; or 
5. Signs considered abandoned or non-maintained as defined by the state of Utah. 
"Active business" means a business holding a current South Salt Lake business license. 
^Alterations" means change or rearrangement in the structural parts or its design, whether by extending 
on a side, by increasing in area or height or in moving from one location or position to another. 
"Animated sign" means any sign which uses movement or change ol lighting to depict action or to 
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create a special effect or scene (compare with "flashing sign"). 
''Attached sign" means any sign which is fastened, attached, connected or supported in whole or in part 
by a building or building component and includes, but is not limited to, the following: 
L Awning signs; 
2. Canopy signs; 
3. Extended signs; 
4. Flat signs; 
5. Marquee signs; 
6. Roof signs (allowed only as a special exception); 
7. Window signs; and 
8. Painted wall signs (allowed only as a special exception). 
"Billboard sign" means a detached sign that is designed or intended to direct attention to a business, 
product or service that is not sold, offered or existing on the property where the sign is located. A 
billboard is an outdoor advertising structure as defined by state statutes. The following shall also apply 
to billboard signs: 
1. "Nonconforming billboard" means an existing billboard which is located in a zoning district or 
otherwise situated, sized or constructed in a way which would not be permitted by the provisions of this 
chapter. 
2. "Embellishment" means an extension of the billboard resulting in increased square footage as part of 
an artistic design to convey a specific message or advertisement. 
"Department" means the community development department of the city of South Salt Lake. 
"Detached sign" means any sign not attached to a building or building component and supported 
permanently upon the ground by poles or braces. A detached sign may consist of more than one sign 
panel, provided all such sign panels are attached to one common integrated sign structure. The total area 
of all such panels may not exceed the maximum allowable sign area specified for the location for 
detached signs. Detached signs include but are not limited to: 
L Pole signs; 
2. Ground signs; and 
3, Low-profile signs. 
"Directional sign, off-premise" means a sign containing no more than a logo, a name and directions to 
the institution or business, which sign is located on property other than that on which the institution or 
business is located. 
"Electronic message center" means a mechanism or device which uses a combination of lights or lighted 
panels which sire controlled electrically and electronically to produce words, symbols or messages which 
may flash, travel or scintillate within a given panel area. 
"Festoons'* means a string or series of ribbons, tinsel, small flags or pinwheels. 
"Frontage" means all portions of a lot adjacent to a public or private right-of-way designated as a road 
for vehicular use to which the lot has or could have direct access. This would not include the freeway 
system but would include all other federal, state and local streets, roads or alleys. 
"Incidental signs" means a small sign, emblem or decal informing the public of goods, facilities or 
services available on the premises, e.g. a credit card sign or a sign indicating hours of business. Such 
signs may also include residential signs such as 'Welcome Home", "It's a Boy!" or other such special 
event announcements if of a limited and temporary nature. 
"Nonconforming sign" or "nonconforming sign structure" means a sign or a sign structure or portion 
thereof lawfully existing at the time this chapter became effective which does not conform to all height, 
location, placement, construction standards, area and yard regulations prescribed in this chapter and in 
the zone in which it is located. 
"Roof sign" means a sign erected partly or wholly on or over the roof of a building, including detached 
signs that rest on or overlap twelve (12) inches or more. 
"Sign" means and includes every advertising message, announcement, declaration, demonstration, 
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display, illustration, insignia, surface or space erected or maintained in view of the observer thereof for 
identification, advertisement or promotion of the interests of any person, entity, product or service. The 
definition of sign shall also include the sign structure, supports, lighting system and any attachments, 
ornaments or other features used to draw the attention of observers. Tliis definition does not include any 
flag, badge or ensign of any government or governmental agency erected for and used to identify said 
government ot governmental agency. 
"Sign area'* means the area of a sign that is used for display purposes, excluding the minimum frame and 
supports. 
Sign Area Computation. The measured area of a sign shall be the entire area within a single continuous 
perimeter of not more than eight straight lines enclosing the extreme limits of a writing, representation, 
emblem or any figure of similar character, together with any material or color forming an integral part of 
the display or used to differentiate a sign designed with more than one exterior surface. The supports, 
uprights or structure on which any sign is supported shall not be included in determining the sign area 
unless such supports, uprights or structure are designed in such a manner as to form an integral 
background of the display. Where a sign has two or more display faces, the area of all faces shall be 
included in detennining the area of the sign, 
L In computing sign area, only one side of a back-to-back or double-face sign covering the same subject 
shall be computed when the signs are parallel or diverge from a common edge by an angle of not more 
than forty-five (45) degrees. 
2. For signs that do not have a frame or a separate background, sign area shall be computed on the basis 
of the least rectangle, triangle or circle large enough to frame the display. 
3. Where a sign message consists of separated or individual letters, modules or symbols, each portion of 
the sign message shall not be considered as a one-sign panel. In such cases, a single continuous 
perimeter completely surrounding the sign message shall be utilized to determine its sign area. 
4. When more than one use or business occupies a lot, the lot or building frontage is to be used to 
calculate the sign sizes for a combined total of a detached or attached sign, not for each use. The total 
may then be divided between the uses, 
5. There may be any number of signs provided their total does not exceed the maximum sign area 
allowed for such signs. 
'Temporary sign" means and includes any sign, with or without frames, intended to be displayed out of 
doors for a short; period of time and shall be limited to the following: 
!. A banner, pennant, valance or advertising display constructed of paper, cloth, canvas, light fabric, 
cardboard, wall board or other light materials; 
2. Balloons; 
3. Festoons; arid 
4. Any sign not permanently attached to a support or building as required by this chapter. 
"Wall sign, painted" means a sign that is either painted on a wall or its facing or is painted in such a way 
that it gives the visual appearance of being painted on a wall or facing by not having a frame or 
separation from the wall or facing. 
"Window sign" means a sign either attached to or painted on a window or door or located within a 
building so as to be visible through a window or door by people outside of the building. (Ord. 2003-13 
(part)) 
Article III Permits and Enforcement 
17.16-310 Sign permit required. 
A. It is unlawful for any person whether acting as owner, occupant or contractor, or otherwise to erect, 
construct, reconstruct enlarge, locate or alter any sign or change the text of any sign within South Salt 
Lake contrary to any provisioas of this chapter or without first obtaining a sign permit from the 
department. No sign shall be erected, constructed, reconstructed, located or altered until the plans for 
such sign have been approved and a permit issued by the department Exempt signs and temporary signs 
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conforming to the provisions of this chapter may be erected without such approval or permit 
B. Any permit or license issued for signs which are in conflict with the provisions of this chapter shall 
be null and void whether or not the license or permit was issued by employees of South Salt Lake 
authorized to issue said permits or licenses. 
a Permits shall be issued only to State licensed contractors unless specifically exempted by the state. 
D. The department may require additional permits for specified construction elements such as electrical 
components, footings, unique construction methods and other such items as determined by the 
department. 
E. All permits issued for sign construction shall expire in ninety (90) days unless completed. No 
extensions may be granted. New applications are required for signs not completed in the required time. 
Billboards have differing requirements found in Article VL 
F. Applications and permits are not transferable. 
G. The following changes shall not require a sign permit. These exceptions shall not be construed as 
relieving the owner of the sign from the responsibility of its erection and maintenance in compliance 
with the provisions of this chapter or any other law or ordinance regulating the same. 
1. The changing of the advertising copy or message of signs specifically designed for the use of 
replaceable copy; or the changing of advertising copy or message where no electrical components or 
structural modifications are involved. 
2. Electrical maintenance, repainting or cleaning maintenance of a sign. 
3. The repair of a sign. (Ord, 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.320 Revocable sign permit. 
A. All rights and privileges acquired under the provisions of this chapter permitting the erection or 
maintenance of marquees or signs over sidewalks or public rights-of-way are mere licenses. They are 
revocable at any time without compensation with or without cause by the department, whether or not 
such permits contain this provision. 
BL Notice of Revocation. If the department elects to revoke such license, the department shall give notice 
of such revocation to the permittee or owner of the property on which the marquee or sign is situated and 
shall afford such person a period of not less than ninety (90) calendar days within which to remove the 
marquee or sign or to reconstruct it in such a manner that it does not extend over the public right-of-way. 
(Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.330 Applications, 
A. Applications for a sign permit shall be on forms provided by the community development department 
and be accompanied by plans and information as required by the department to appropriately review the 
application for compliance with the requirements of this chapter and other ordinances, rules or 
regulations. 
B. Applications shall be accompanied by the appropriate fees as set forth in the fee schedule of the city. 
All such permit fees are considered application fees and are not refundable but shall be applied toward 
the required permit fee if granted. 
C. Double Fee Required. In the event that work is started prior to obtaining a permit, the fee for a sign 
permit shall be doubled. The payment of such double fee shall not relieve any persons from fully 
complying with die requirements of this chapter in the execution of the work, nor from any other 
penalties prescribed herein. 
D. Expiration of Application. An application for which no permit is issued after sixty (60) days 
following the date of application, due to inaction by the applicant, shall empire. Applications and plans 
submitted may thereafter be dewStroyed by the department The department may extend the time for 
action by the applicant for a period not exceeding a total of ninety (90) days from the date of application 
upon written request by the applicant showing the circumstances beyond the control of the applicant that 
have prevented action from being taken. In order to renew action on an application after expiration, the 
applicant shall resubmit plans and pay new fees. (Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.340 Enforcement 
A. The department shall be vested with the duty of enforcing these sign regulations. In the performance 
of that duty, the department shall be authorized and directed to perform the following: 
1. To issue permits to construct, alter or repair signs which conform to the provisions of this chapter. 
2. To ascertain that all signs, construction, and all reconstructions or modifications of existing signs are 
built or constructed or modified in conformance with the provisions of these sign regulations and all 
other regulations incorporated herein by reference. 
3. To make inspections. The department may make inspections at any stage of the construction process 
as deemed appropriate by the department, including prior to footings being poured on a detached sign 
and upon the completion of construction, erection, re-erection or remodeling of any sign for which a 
permit has been issued. The permit holder shall be responsible to schedule inspections with the 
department. The department may conduct an inspection of signs at any time. If the department finds any 
sign which is in need of repair or violates any provision of this chapter, the department may take the 
necessary legal action, as specified in this title, to bring the sign into compliance. 
4. To issue citations and/or file complaints against violators of these sign regulations. 
5. To perform abatement activities in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. 
6. To remove signs on public property or within rights-of-way. 
B. The department may take any appropriate action or institute any proceeding in any case where any 
sign is erected., constructed, reconstructed, altered, repaired, converted or maintained, or in any case 
where any siga is used in violation of these sign regulations or any other city ordinance. 
C. Notice of Violation. Except for signs on public property or within rights-of-way and snipe signs, 
notice of violation shall be given by written notice of violation sent by registered mail or delivered in 
person to the owner of the property where the sign is located or to the person having charge or control or 
receiving the benefit of any sign found by the department to be unsafe or dangerous or in violation of 
these sign regulations or of any other city ordinance, 
D. Non-maintained or Abandoned Signs. The department may require each non-maintained or 
abandoned sign to be removed from the building or premise when such sign has not been repaired or put 
into use within thirty (30) calendar days after notice of non-maintenance or abandonment is given. If 
such signs are not removed within thirty (30) working days after the department gives notice, the 
department may abate and remove the sign, and the owner or person having charge, control or benefit of 
any such sign shall pay to the city the costs incurred the same as established for an unsafe sign. 
E. Unsafe or Dangerous Signs. A property owner or occupant may not maintain or allow any sign which 
is dangerous or defective on any premises he/she owns, occupies or controls. 
1 • If an unsafe or dangerous sign is not repaired or made safe within five working days after the 
department gives notice pursuant to this chapter, the department may abate and remove the sign, and the 
person having charge, control or benefit of any such sign shall pay to the city the costs incurred in such 
removal, including an administrative fee* as established in the fee schedule of the city, and any legal 
expenses within tliirty (30) calendar days after written notice is mailed to such person. 
F. Illegal Signs. If an illegal sign is not brought into compliance with the provisions of these sign 
regulations within thirty (30) working days after the department gives notice, the department may abate 
and remove the sign, and the owner or person having charge, control or benefit of any such sign shall 
pay to the city the costs incurred the same as established for an unsafe sign. 
G„ Confiscation of Signs. The department may immediately confiscate any sign located on public 
property, sidewalks or within rights of way in violation of these sign regulations or any other city 
ordinances. A sign located on a sidewalk or in a public right-of-way is a nuisance per se and may be 
removed at any time without prior notice to the owner. 
1. Confiscated! signs shall be stored at a location determined by the department for a period of fourteen 
(14) days, during which time the owner or person having charge, control or benefit of the confiscated 
sign may redeem the sign after payment of civil penalties as established in the fee schedule of the city. 
2. The city shall be held harmless for any damages incurred to signs as a result of their confiscation. 
3. In addition to civil penalties, sign owners and responsible persons shall be liable for any damages 
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caused to public property, public facilities or public utilities by reason of the placement, attachment 
and/or removal of such unlawful signs. 
4. Signs not redeemed within fourteen (14) days shall be deemed to be the property of the city and may 
be destroyed or otherwise disposed of by the city. (Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
17,16,350 Nonconforming signs (other than billboards). 
A. Moving, Extensions or Alterations. 
1. A nonconforming sign shall not be reconstructed, raised, moved, replaced, extended, altered or 
enlarged unless the sign is changed so as to conform to all provisions of this chapter. 
2. Alteration shall not include the changing of copy or panels containing copy so long as the structure 
remains the same. 
3. Repair or maintenance shall not be considered an alteration. 
4. Removal of portions of a sign shall not be a violation of this section if such removal brings the sign 
more closely in compliance with the provisions of the chapter. 
B. Termination of nonconforming signs shall be: 
L By Abandonment. Abandonment of a nonconforming sign shall terminate immediately the right to 
maintain such sign. 
2. By Violation of Ordinance. Any additional (besides nonconformance) violation of this ordinance or 
other city ordinances shall terminate immediately the right to maintain a nonconforming sign. 
3. By Destruction, Damage or Obsolescence. The right to maintain any nonconforming sign shall 
tenninate and shall cease to exist whenever the sign is damaged or destroyed from any cause 
whatsoever, or becomes obsolete or substandard under any applicable ordinance of the city to the extent 
that the sign becomes a hazard or a danger. 
4. By Change in Status of the Property. Any of the conditions of subsection C below shall result in loss 
of nonconforming status and subject the sign to removal or changes to be brought into conformance. 
C. Compliano3 Required- A nonconforming sign shall be brought into conformance upon the occurrence 
of any one of the following: 
1. Any action that increases the floor area of the premises by more than twenty-five (25) percent, 
2. For a lot located in a commercial or industrial zone, any change in use to a more intensive use when a 
new certificate of occupancy is required. 
3. Any change in use from a nonconforming to a conforming use. 
D. Any nonconforming sign erected or displayed prior to the effective date of this ordinance that is 
defined as a '"temporary sign" under this chapter shall be removed immediately upon notice by the 
department 
E. A special exception may be requested of the planning commission for unusual circumstances. (Ord. 
2003-13 (part)) 
17,16.360 Nonconforming billboards. 
Av Moving, Extensions or Alterations. 
1 < A nonconforming billboard shall not be reconstructed, raised, moved, replaced, extended, altered or 
enlarged except m conformance with Article VI of this chapter, 
2. Alteration shall not include the changing of copy or panels containing copy so long a$ the structure 
remains the same. 
3. Repair or maintenance shall not be considered an alteration. 
4. Removal of portions of a billboard shall not be a violation of this section if such removal brings the 
sign more closely in compliance with the provisions of the chapter. 
5. Billboards nonconforming as to site requirements (setbacks, heights, landscaping, size, etc.) may be 
modified or relocated on site if such relocation or modifications brings the billboard into compliance 
with the requirements of this chapter. 
B. Termination of nonconforming billboards shall be after notice and a hearing as established by State 
Statute 10-9^408. (Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
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17.16-370 Violation/penalty. 
A. Any person, whether acting as owner or occupant of the premise involved, contractor or otherwise, 
who violates or refuses to comply with any of the provisions of the chapter shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor and> upon conviction, shall be punished as provided in this title. 
B. Civil penalties, as established by the city council in the fee schedule, shall apply as set forth in this 
chapter. 
C. A separate offense shall be deemed to be committed on each day an offense occurs or continues. 
(Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.380 Apjpeals. 
Appeals of the orders, administrative decisions or interpretations arising out of the provisions of this 
chapter, and any request for variances to the standards of this chapter, shall be to the board of adjustment 
as provided in this title, (Ord- 2003-13 (part)) 
Article IV General Regulations 
17.16.410 General requirements. 
A. All signs shall be subject to the requirements and restrictions found herein for the zone or area in 
which located and shall be subject to design review standards of this title. 
B. All signs shall be classified by the department^  and subject to the specific requirements of that 
classification, as well as the general provisions and general regulations of this chapter, as one of the six 
types found herein: 
1. Attached; 
2. Detached; 
3. Billboards; 
4. Temporary; 
5. Exempt; or 
6. Prohibited. 
C. Signs Adjacent to Residential Zones. Where any property on which a sign is to be located is adjacent 
(within one hundred (100) feet of) any residential zone, additional requirements may apply as found 
elsewhere in this chapter. 
D. Specific Zone Requirements. The requirement of the city's zone district shall apply to all signs, 
notwithstanding the requirements found in this chapter, and such requirements shall rule. (Ord. 2003-13 
(part)) 
17.16.420 Residential zones. 
Within any residential zone, signs may be allowed as contained herein. 
A. All signs shall comply with the specifications of the specific type as found in this article or elsewhere 
in this chapter, 
B. One civic sign is not to exceed sixteen (16) square feet in sign area, 
C. Development/construction/subdivision signs, as allowed in this chapter. 
D. One residential sign is not to exceed two square feet in area for the purpose of identifying the address 
and occupants of the residence. 
E. Each multifamiiy residential use shall be allowed one sign per street frontage for the purpose of 
identifying the name and address of the use to which it is appurtenant. Said sign shall not exceed six feet 
in height above ground level, shall not exceed ten square feet per sign face with a maximum total sign 
area of fifteen (15) square feet and shall be set back a minimum of fifteen (15) feet 
F. Signs described above must be located on the property to which they pertain. 
G. Other special use signs as specifically allowed in this chapter. Low profile identification signs may be 
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allowed in residential districts only as a special use sign subject to the provision therein. 
H. Heights. Unless specifically allowed otherwise, no sign in a residential zone may exceed a 
height of six feet. 
I. Home Occupation Signs. One sign not exceeding two square feet in area may be allowed for 
a permitted home occupation. Such sign must be placed on or against the dwelling. 
J. Illumination. Illuminated signs in residential districts shall only be allowed as a special exception and 
are discouraged except for unusual circumstances. (Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
17-16.430 Commercial and industrial zones. 
In commercial and industrial zones, signs indicating the business, commodities, service, industry or 
other activity sold, offered or conducted on the premises may be allowed as found herein. 
A. All signs allowed in residential zones may be allowed, 
B. There may be any number of attached or detached signs provided their total does not exceed the 
maximum square footage of sign area allowed for the type of sign and the location unless a special 
exception is granted for unusual circumstances. Except as otherwise specified, the department may 
determine special exceptions in this section. 
C. Detached on-premise signs may be allowed as follows: 
1. Detached signs may be located, subject to the standards of this chapter, anywhere on the parcel. 
However, the total square footage allowed is based solely on lot frontage. 
2. Size. One and one-half square foot of sign area for each lineal foot of street frontage. Except for 
freeway oriented signs (see subsection D below), those signs subject to "adjacent to residential" 
requirements (see Section 17.16.450), and where granted a special exception for unusual circumstances, 
no sign may exceisd two hundred (200) square feet of total sign area. When more than one use or 
business occupies a lot, the lot frontage is to be used to calculate the sign sizes for a combined total of all 
detached signs, not for each use. The total may then be divided between the uses. 
3. Billboards $;igns shall not count toward the total sign area allowed on a parcel for detached signs. 
D. Freeway-Oriented Detached Sign. Businesses may request on-premise freeway-oriented detached 
signs as a conditional use and subject to the requirements as found herein. 
1. Must be located on property which i$ within three hundred (300) feet of the freeway. 
2. Sign Area. The area of the sign shall be subject to the size limitation based on lot frontage whether 
located in front or another location except such signs may, if the planning commission finds conditions 
that warrant such sizes, be up to three hundred (300) square feet maximum. 
3. All such signs shall be subject to "adjacent to residential" regulations found elsewhere in this chapter. 
4. Such signs shall not be allowed on any parcel of property east of those parcels with frontage on State 
Street 
R Attached on-premise signs may be allowed as follows: 
1. Signs may be placed, subject to the standards of this chapter, on any side of a building. However, the 
total sign area allowed will be based solely on the building front. 
2. Size. On-premise attached signs may not exceed a total of three square feet of sign area for each lineal 
foot of building frontage, unless, for unusual circumstances, a special exception is granted. The area of 
any one sign shall not exceed one hundred fifty (150) square feet, unless, for unusual circumstances, a 
special exception is granted. 
3. When more than one use or business occupies a building, the lineal footage of the building is to be 
used to calculate lie sign sizes for a combined total of all attached signs, not for each use. The total may 
then be divided between the uses, 
F. Businesses in free standing buildings containing more than one nonresidential use and businesses 
located on lots containing more than one nonresidential building and more than one nonresidential use, 
may request a special exception for additional signs or sign area. 
G, Off-premise directional signs may be allowed as found elsewhere in this chapter. Other than 
off-premise directional signs, off-premise signs may be allowed only as found in Section 17.16.570 and 
as billboards as found in Article VI. 
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H. Billboards may be allowed only as found elsewhere in this chapter and are prohibited or restricted in 
certain locations. 
I. Low-profile signs as defined in this chapter may be allowed in conformity with the following 
provisions: 
1. Low-profile signs must not violate the clear view ordinance of this title; 
2. Low-profile signs must not cross the property line; 
3. Low-profile signs must be incorporated into a landscaped area, which area is subject to design review 
standards; 
4. Low-profile signs shall be limited to a maximum of six feet in height from finished grade; and 
5. Low-profile signs shall contain no animation unless granted a conditional use by the planning 
commission. 
J. Roof signs shall not be allowed except as a special exception under the provisions of this chapter and, 
if allowed, must conform to the following standards: 
L The height of the sign face of roof signs shall not exceed twenty (20) percent of the height of the 
building or ten feet, whichever is less; 
2. Roof signs shall not be animated; 
3. No visible guy wires, braces or secondary supports shall be used; 
4. Roof signs shall be designed to appear as extensions of the exterior building wall; 
5. Roof signs shall not exceed the maximum permitted height for the zoning district in which located.; 
6. Detached signs may not overhang any portion of the roof of a building. Attached signs may not 
overhang any portion of the same or any other building; and 
7. Height Regulations for Signs on Parapet Walls, Sloping and Shed Roofs. The following regulations 
apply to the location and height of signs on parapet walls and various roof structures: 
a. Parapet Wall. A sign attached to a parapet wall may project above the top of the parapet wall no more 
than one fourth of the sign height, except that the maximum projection allowed is four feet. 
b. Sloping Roof. A sign attached to the fascia or located on the sloping roof of a structure, may not 
extend more than four feet above the lower edge or the fascia of the sloping roof. 
c. Shed Roof A sign attached to the fascia of a shed roof may not be located so as to extend more than 
four feet above the lower edge of the fascia* 
K. Menu boards for drive in restaurants may be allowed as detached or attached signs provided there are 
no more than two free-standing or wall-mounted menu boards per business and such are located not less 
than twenty (20) feet from the street property line. 
L. Painted wall signs as defined by this chapter are allowed only as specifically approved by the 
planning commission as a special exception and provided such signs are designed so as to achieve 
community goals related to improving appearance and are located on walls where attached signs would 
be less desirable or more difficult to attach. 
M Permanent Window Signs* For each ground floor occupancy of a building not more than two 
permanent signs may be painted on or otherwise displayed from the inside or outside surface of any 
window, showcase or other similar facility. These signs are allowed in addition to those signs permitted 
elsewhere in tliis chapter. The total area of each such sign, however, may not exceed a maximum sign 
area of four square feet, (Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.440 Transit-oriented development (TOD) overlay district special requirements. 
The standards herein shall apply to all areas of the TOD district. 
A. All signs within the TOD district are conditional and must be approved by the planning commission. 
B. Where the building orientation is with the front of the business toward the light rail corridor, business 
standards may be applied. 
C. Where the building orientation is with the back or side toward the light rail corridor, any signs along 
the corridor shall be limited to attached signs and low-profile signs. (Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.450 Heights. 
Heights of signs shall be regulated as found herein. 
A. For the purpose of determining height on detached signs (including billboards), measurement of the 
vertical distance shall be from the elevation of the nearest public sidewalk within twenty-five (25) feet 
or, if there is no sidewalk within twenty-five (25) feet, from the lowest point of the finished grade on the 
lot upon which the sign is located and within twenty-five (25) feet of the sign, to the uppermost point on 
the sign or sign structure. 
B. Pole and Ground Signs, Pole and ground signs shall be limited to a maximum height of thirty-five 
(35) feet, except for freeway oriented signs, unless granted a special exception by the department for 
unusual circumstances. 
C Freeway-Oriented Detached Signs. Such signs are a conditional use requiring planning commission 
approval. Upon a finding by the planning commission of conditions that warrant such heights, such signs 
may be allowed greater heights up to a maximum of twenty-five (25) feet above the grade of the 
adjacent freeway or barrier wall. 
D. Low-Profile Signs. Low profile signs shall be limited to a maximum height of six feet. 
B, Billboards. See requirements elsewhere in this chapter. 
F. Special Use Signs. See requirements elsewhere in this chapter. 
G. Height of Attached Signs. The height of attached signs shall conform to the following provisions: 
1. When a building has more than one level, the wall on which the sign is installed will govern. 
2. Awning Signs. Awning signs shall not be located above the second floor level of the building, 
3. Flat Signs. Flat signs may extend a maximum of two feet above the roofline or parapet wall of the 
building on which they are located. 
4. Marquee and Canopy Signs. Marquee and canopy signs shall not be located above the main entry 
level of the premise. 
5. Nameplates. Nameplates shall not be located above the first floor level of the building. 
6. Projecting Signs. A projecting sign shall not extend above the top of the vertical building wall on 
which it is located. 
7. Roof Signs. See requirements found elsewhere in this chapter. 
8. Window Signs. Window signs shall not be located above the second floor. (Ord- 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.460 Setbacks. 
Signs shall conform to the setback requirements as specified herein and as found elsewhere in this 
chapter. 
A. For the purposes of determining set back distances, measurements shall be taken from the edge or 
surface of the sign or sign structure which is closest to the property line from which the sign is to be set 
back. 
B. Front or Corner Side. Signs on corner lots or at the intersection of any driveway, parking lot, entrance 
or exit with any street, shall meet clear view requirements of this title. 
C. Pole and Ground Signs (Including Billboards). All such signs shall have a minimum setback of five 
feet from any property line. Frontage setbacks shall be a minimum of five feet and one additional foot of 
setback for each foot of height over twenty-five (25) feet, up to the maximum allowed. 
D. Low-Profile Signs. Low-profile signs shall have a minimum setback of one foot. 
E. Signs appurtenant to any multifamily residential use shall be set back a minimum of fifteen (15) feet 
from any property line adjacent to a street (Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16*470 Projection and clearance requirements. 
A. Clearance Standards, 
1. No sign or sign structure shall be erected in such a manner that any portion of its surface or supports 
will interfere in any way with the free use of any fire escape, exit or standpipe. 
2. No sign shall obstruct any openings to such an extent that light or ventilation is reduced to a point 
below that required by the city. 
3. Clearance Between Sign and Ground, 
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a. Generally, pole and ground signs must not be located in or hang over areas of vehicular or pedestrian 
traffic. 
b. If no other location is reasonably available, pole signs must have a minimum clearance often feet 
between the bottom of any pole or overhanging sign and the ground or sign base, Pole signs which have 
a maximum clearance of four feet may be excepted. 
c. All ground signs shall have a maximum clearance of four feet. 
& Signs projecting over a sidewalk or public right-of-way may not be Jess than eight feet above the 
sidewalk or right-of-way. 
B. Projection of Signs. Signs may be allowed to project from buildings or structures in conformance 
with the following general provisions: 
1. Across Property Lines. Detached signs shall not be allowed to project over any property lines and 
must meet minimum setback requirements. Attached signs may be allowed to cross into public 
rights-of-way (bur. not alleys) subject to the requirements as found elsewhere in this chapter. 
2. Over Alleys. No sign or sign structure shall project into any public alley. 
3. Projecting signs may be allowed to extend even with the roof line or parapet wall of a building. 
4. When a building has more than one level, the wall on which the sign is installed will govern. 
5. Marquee Signs.. Signs attached to an approved marquee, as specified in this chapter, may extend over 
public property, with no copy on the sides, a maximum of twelve (12) inches from the face of the 
marquee. Signs placed within or below the ceiling of a marquee shall not extend beyond the marquee 
face and shall be placed within the vertical plane of the marquee. 
6. Flat Signs. Signs placed flat against a building must be erected parallel thereto and the outside face of 
the sign may not extend more than one foot from the wall of the buildings. Flat signs may project over a 
public right-of-way but may not be less than eight feet above the sidewalk. Flat signs may have no copy 
visible from the sides. 
7. Canopies or Awnings. Canopies or awnings may extend from buildings subject to the provisions 
found herein. 
a. Canopies or awnings over sidewalks or public property shall maintain a minimum eight-foot clearance 
above the sidewalk or public property. Approval of the public agency is required as is insurance as found 
elsewhere in this chapter. 
b. Canopies or awnings may extend a maximum of twelve (12) feet from the building but not more than 
six feet into a public right-of-way. 
a Canopies or awnings shall not create any traffic or pedestrian hazards as found in this chapter. 
8. Attached signs, other than flat signs, marquees, canopies or awnings (which have specific 
requirements),, may project no more than six feet from the building and may not cross property lines. 
Such signs must maintain a minimum clearance often feet over pedestrian ways and fourteen (14) feet 
over vehicular ways. (Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
Article V Special Regulations 
17.16.510 Usas adjacent to residential zones. 
Where any property on which a sign is to be located is adjacent (within one hundred (100) feet of) any 
residential zone, the requirements found herein shall apply as well as those found elsewhere in this 
chapter. 
A. Detached Signs, Including Freeway-Oriented, Such signs shall be located at the extreme distance 
away from the* residential zone as the property on which located will allow. Such signs shall be limited 
to twenty-five (25) feet in height, be one hundred (100) square feet or less in size, and meet the 
illumination and other location requirements of this chapter. 
B. Illuminated. Signs, Any sign illuminated by any means must be equipped with a timer and shut off the 
illumination between the hours often p.m. and seven a,m. 
C. Closeness of Signs. Except for directional signs, no sign not mounted on a building shall be located 
any closer to a residential zone than thirty-five (35) feet. 
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D. Limits on Heights of Detached and Attached Signs, No sign shall be above the height of fifteen (15) 
feet if located within fifty (50) feet of a residential zone. 
E. Billboards have specific requirements found elsewhere in this chapter. (Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.520 Special use signs. 
The signs listed in this section may be approved by the department on a case-by-case basis. The 
department may limit or restrict these signs as deemed appropriate to meet the intent of this chapter and 
the city's general and master plans. The department may limit the placement, location, size, height, 
number, lighting and other factors of signs usage. 
A, Neighborhood Identification Signs. In any zone, a sign, masonry wall, landscaping and other similar 
materials or features may be combined to form a display for neighborhood or tract identification. 
B. Construction Signs. In any zone, one unlighted sign per development may be allowed on the lot or 
attached to the outside of a building during its construction period. The sign may identify only the 
project, its developer, architects, engineers, designers, contractors or other persons or groups 
participating in the project, 
C Subdivision/Development Signs. 
1. The department may issue a permit for a development sign in any zone in connection with the 
marketing of lots or structures in a subdivision, subject to the following conditions: 
a. Time Limit. Such permits may be issued for a period not to exceed one year. The department may 
renew such permits for additional periods of up to one year for each permit upon written application at 
least thirty days prior to its expiration 
b. Type of Sign, Sign as used in this section refers to all types of signs except those prohibited in this 
chapter. 
a Location. Subdivision signs must be located and set back from property lines sufficiently to eliminate 
any safety visibility obstructions as authorized by the department. A subdivision/development sign may 
be located at each entrance in the subdivision and, in addition, one interior sign may be located within 
the subdivision as. approved by the department, 
2. Severely limited off-premise subdivision/development signs may be approved by the department for 
isolated or difficult to locate developments. 
D. Nonexempt signs for direction or instruction. 
1. Signs which provide direction or instruction to the public are allowed in any zone, provided such 
signs are located entirely on the property to which they pertain and the number, size and location thereof 
has been approved by the department. 
2. In addition, the department may authorize the placing of directional signs at appropriate street 
intersections or other locations for the convenience of the motoring public; such signs must pertain to 
places of general interest such as schools, hospitals, public buildings, airports, fair grounds and other 
similar public sendees or institutions. (Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.530 Sexually oriented business signs. 
Sexually oriented business signs are limited as found herein. 
A. No more than one detached and no more than one attached sign is allowed per business. 
B. No sign may exceed thirty-two (32) square feet in area 
C. No descriptive art or designs depicting any activity related to or implying, the nature of the business 
is allowed Signs may contain alphanumeric copy only. 
D. Other than the signs specifically allowed by this section, a sexually oriented business may not use any 
temporary sign, banner, light or other device designed or intended to draw attention to the business 
location. (Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.540 localised alternative sign district 
A. Purpose, Large scale land uses (such as a shopping center, an office park, a special district such as an 
RDA project, or large institutions such as universities or medical centers having a multi-building 
campus) have common design elements that can be complemented and enhanced through the use of 
special signage. Localized alternative sign districts allow for the creation of special sign regulations to 
meet the needs of these situations. 
EL Applicability. These regulations shall be applicable in all commercial or industrial districts. In order 
to give effect to the purpose set foith herein, a localized alternative sign district pertaining only to a 
particular center, campus or district may be proposed as an alternative to the sign regulations that would 
otherwise be applicable under this chapter 
C. Effect of Overlay District. If a localized alternative sign district is established, the sign standards and 
limitations established within that district shall govern, 
D. Application and Hearing Procedure. 
L Persons seeking to establish a localized alternative sign district pursuant to this section shall submit 
the regulations proposed for the district to the department, together with any additional material the 
department requests. 
2. Such application shall be considered a special exception subject to a public hearing by the planning 
commission, following adoption of the district by the commission, the regulations of the district shall 
apply uniformly to all properties located within the boundaries of the overlay district. 
3. Changes to Approved Localized Alternative Sign Districts. An alternative localized s ip district may 
be amended or modified only upon submission and approval of another application pursuant to this 
section. (Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.550 Temporary signs. 
Temporary signs may be allowed, without requirements for a permit, in all business and industrial zones. 
Temporary signs are considered an exception to the rules and are therefore allowed only so long as they 
do not violate the intent of this chapter and the goals of the city's general and master plans. No rights for 
displaying any temporary sign is implied or intended. The following standards shall apply to temporary 
signs: 
A. General Restriction. Temporary signs shall be limited in duration of display. To this extent, the 
department may determine any reasonable time frame for display using the following as a guide: 
L Normal display periods should not exceed twenty-one (21) consecutive days or sixty-three (63) days 
per calendar year. 
B. Size, height, location, duration of display and other items may be limited or extended by the 
department to meet the intent of this chapter and the general and master plans of the city. 
C. Nuisances. If any temporary sign becomes a nuisance, as determined by the department, such signs 
may be subject to removal or relocation or other actions to eliminate the nuisance. 
D. Temporary signs shall meet all other general or specific type sign requirements. (Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.560 Marquee requirements. 
A marquee may be allowed in all business or industrial zones of the city. 
A. All marquees shall conform to the provisions found herein. Where specifications as outlined in this 
chapter are different from the provisions of the building codes as adopted by the city, the more 
restrictive shall apply, 
B. Design Standards, 
h A marquee, in order to provide pedestrian shelter, shall have its first six feet of projection form a 
rectangle with the sides ninety (90) degrees to the building face and the plane at least six feet from the 
building parallel vrith the front property line. The remaining projection of the marquee can assume a 
configuration compatible with the architecture of the building. 
2, Height Limitation. A marquee shall not be located on any floor above the main entry level of the 
premise, 
3. Thickness. A marquee shall have a vertical face height or cross section dimension not exceeding six 
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feet. 
4. Clearance. A marquee shall have a clearance of at least ten feet above the sidewalk. 
5. Projection. A marquee may extend a maximum often feet from the face of the building but must not 
project closer than two feet to the back of the curb. 
6. Location. A marquee shall be so located as to not interfere with the operation of any exterior 
standpipe or to obstruct the clear passage of stairways or exits from the building. 
C. Insurance Required. No marquee projecting over city property shall be erected, re-erected, located or 
relocated or enlarged or modified structurally or change ownership without first receiving approval from 
the department and submitting a certification of insurance with the following provisions: 
L The city of South Salt Lake must be named in the certificate of insurance as an additional insured. 
2. A thirty-day written notice to South Salt Lake of cancellation or expiration must be included in the 
certificate of insurance. 
3. Identification. The name of the owner of the marquee must be clearly identified on the application for 
a permit as an official corporation, partnership or sole proprietorship with appropriate names of 
individuals involved. 
D. Marquee S:igns. A permanent sign or letters may be attached to the top of, or fascia of, or within or 
below the ceiling of an approved marquee, subject to the following provisions 
L Vertical Dimension. Overall vertical dimensions of the combined sign and marquee shall not exceed 
ten feet 
2. Height of Sign. The height of the sign or letters shall not exceed four feet. 
3. No Side Copy. Signs attached to marquees shall have no copy on the side portion of the sign. 
4. Clearance. Signs attached to marquees shall maintain the minimum tea-foot clearance required for the 
marquee. 
5. Insurance Required. Marquee signs shall meet the same requirements for insurance as marquees. (Ord. 
2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.570 Off-promise business signs. 
A. Businesses located in the city may be granted, by the department* a special exception for off premise 
directional signs subject to the following: 
L Sign Area. Maximum area for off-premise business directional signs is thirty-two (32) square feet. 
2. Height. Maximum height is four feet unless located on an existing sign pole. If located on an existing 
or shared sign pole, the off-premise business directional sign must adhere to all standards and 
restrictions for detached signs. 
3. General Restrictions. 
a. All new off-premise business directional signs must be constructed as a low profile monument style 
sign unless located on an existing or shared sign pole. 
b. The sign must be located completely on private property at least five feet behind any public 
right-of-way and meet all requirements for detached signs 
c. Off-premise business directional signs are allowed only on 2100, 2700,3300 and 3900 South, State, 
Main and West Temple streets, and on 300, 500, 600,700, and 900 West 
B. Special purpose directional signs may be allowed as a special exception granted by the department 
when warranted due to unusual circumstances and to further the economic viability of the city. 
C- Businesses located in the city may be granted, by the planning commission, a special exception for an 
off-premise advertising sign, such as a painted wall sign, an attached sign or a sign shared with another 
business located in the city, which would not otherwise be allowed as a billboard or off-premise sign. 
(Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.580 Electronic message centers. 
Electronic message centers require conditional use permit approval from the planning commission in all 
zones. In addition to the restrictions found in this chapter and the other chapters that apply to the zones 
mentioned above, electronic message centers are subject to the following restrictions: 
A. Electronic message centers are not allowed off premise, except on billboards. 
B. All electronic message centers must have an automatic dimmer to reduce sign intensity after dark. 
C. Light intensity may not exceed that produced by fifty-four (54) watts of incandescent lighting for 
daytime usage. An automatic dimmer must be installed to reduce nighttime intensity to that produced by 
thirty (30) watts of incandescent lighting. Light emitting diodes, magnetic discs and other lighting types 
may be used if the light intensity is not greater than that produced by incandescent lighting. 
D. An electronic message center may not flash or scintillate except to change the displayed wording to 
different wording. 
E. Any display on the electronic message center must remain lighted for at least two seconds. 
F. An electronic message center located within five hundred (500) feet of a residential area, or as 
otherwise determined by the planning commission, may not operate between the hours often p^ m. and 
six a.m. of the following day. 
G. For a minirnum of five percent of the time the sign is in use7 the electronic message center shall be 
devoted to public service messages. (Ofd. 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.590 Electric awning signs. 
The following requirements apply to electric awning signs: 
A. All frames shall be made of tubular or structurally shaped steel or aluminum with finishes or coatings 
as required to ensure against corrosion. 
B. Vinyl fabric coverings shall be fourteen (14) ounces per yard minimum weight with certification as to 
tensile strength and flame resistance to meet adopted building and fire code standards. 
C Fastenings and/or structural attachments to buildings be attached to structural members and of 
sufficient size and strength to meet adopted building code standards. 
D. Letter copy on electric awning signs shall be applied with manufacturer approved processes and may 
not exceed forty-five (45) percent of the total face area. 
E. Electric awning signs conform to the size and area requirements of this chapter, except that only the 
copy area of an electric awning sign is used to compute these limitations* The remaining portion is 
considered awning area only. 
R Electric awning signs are restricted to single-story buildings or to the first level only of multi-story 
buildings. 
G. Back lighting shall be sufficient to light the sign and provide down lighting, but may not be so bright 
as to obstruct adjoining and surrounding signs. 
H. Awning signs shall be architecturally compatible with their surroundings as determined by the 
department. Any applicant denied a permit on the basis of incompatibility may appeal that decision to 
the board of adjustment. 
L An electric awning sign may project over a public right-of-way no more than two feet, except that the 
sign may not project more that four feet from the face of the building 
J. Minimum awning clearance from grade to the bottom of the awning is eight feet. (Ord 2003-13 (part)) 
Article VI Billboards 
17.16.610 Purpose and intent 
A. It is the pui-pose and intent of this section to limit the number of billboards in the city. This article and 
chapter provides for the reasonable regulation of billboards with the following intentions: 
1. Limiting negative impacts and providing for the protection of property values 
2. Implementing goals and policies promoting pedestrian and traffic safety 
3. Maintaining the desired gateway areas of the city. 
4. Protecting the views and vistas that enhance the city. 
5. Creating esithetically pleasing streetscapes, commercial districts and freeway connections, and 
enhancing the aesthetics of existing billboards. 
6. Encouraging business location. 
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7. Furthering the applicable elements of the city's general and master plans. (OrdL 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16-620 Cap. 
A. The total number of billboards allowed in the city shall be limited to the number of billboards within 
the city legitimately in existence or for which permits were properly issued as of September 1,2003. 
B. The total combined square footage of advertising area of all billboards in the city shall be limited to 
the total combined square footage of advertising area of all billboards within the city legitimately in 
existence or for which permits were properly issued as of September 1,2003. 
C. The total combined height of all billboards in the city shall be limited to the total combined height of 
all billboards within the city legitimately in existence or for which permits were properly issued as of 
September 1,2003. 
D. As the total number of billboards, total combined square footage of advertising area of all billboards 
and/or total combined height of all billboards in the city decreases, the cap on the total number, total 
combined square footage of advertising area and total combined height of all billboards within the city 
shall decrease correspondingly. (Or& 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16-630 Peirmits-
A. Permits are required for all billboard construction including modifications, relocations and initial 
construction. Construction shall not commence without all required permits. 
B. Except as found in subsection C below, all permits issued for billboard construction expire ninety 
(90) days after issuance. Renewals or extensions to issued permits are not allowed. Work not completed 
in the prescribed time frame requires a new permit. 
C. State Permits. If, in addition to a city permit, a state permit is required, the state pennit must be 
obtained within one hundred twenty (120) days of issuance of the city pennit or the city permit shall 
expire. The city permit shall expire ninety (90) days after the issuance of the state pennit. 
D. Relocation of Billboards. Conforming and nonconforming billboards may be relocated only to sites 
within the city allowed pursuant to provisions of this chapter and in compliance with all other 
restrictions in this chapter. Prior to relocation of a billboard, a permit to remove an existing confonning 
or nonconforming billboard must be obtained. A permit may be issued for construction of a billboard at 
the relocation site only after completion of the removal of the existing billboard. 
E. Permits Involving Modifications. To eliminate nonconformity, visual clutter and antiquated 
billboards, existing billboards may be modified in accordance with this section, 
1. Conforming Billboards. Modifications to conforming billboards shall be made consistent with the 
requirements of this chapter. Consistent with the cap imposed on the total square footage of advertising 
area and billboard height set forth in Section 17.16,620, if the confonning billboard is of lesser height 
and/or contains less advertising area than is allowed under this chapter, the height or advertising area of 
the billboard may be increased to the maximum limits allowable only in exchange for the elimination of 
a nonconforniing billboard within the city or a corresponding reduction in square footage of advertising 
area and/or height of a nonconforming billboard within the city. In addition, if a billboard sign owner 
removes a nonconforming billboard from a surface street, the footage may be used to increase the size of 
a conforming or nonconforming billboard on the interstate provided that the modified interstate billboard 
does not exceed six hundred seventy-five (675) square feet in size exclusive of embellishments. 
2. Nonconfonnmg Billboards. Modifications to nonconforming billboards may not increase the 
nonconformity with the exception of relocating square footage from a billboard on a surface street to a 
billboard on the interstate. If a nonconforming billboard exceeds the height and/or advertising area limits 
of this chapter, any modification to the nonconforming billboard shall bring it into compliance with the 
current height and advertising area limits. If the nonconforming billboard is of lesser height and/or 
contains less advertising area than is allowed under this chapter, the height or advertising area of the 
billboard may be increased to the maximum limits allowable only in exchange for the elimination of a 
different nonamforming billboard within the city or a corresponding reduction in square footage of 
advertising area and/or height of a nonconforming billboard within the city. 
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3. Billboards Affected by Road Construction. Billboards affected by road construction may be modified 
in accordance with state law and this chapter. 
F. Removal by the City, Hie city may remove billboards as provided by state law without taking out a 
permit. (Qrd. 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.640 Location. 
A- Billboards may be allowed only as found herein. 
1. Billboards may be allowed in CC, CB, CG and LI zones, 
2. Prohibited Areas. Billboards are not allowed in the following areas of the city, regardless of the 
underling zone: 
a. Within one hundred fifty (150) feet of any residential zone. 
b. Within one hundred fifty (150) feet of any part of the 1-15/1-80 interchange. The interchange shall be 
that area which is one hundred fifty (150) feet from the freeway property and lies within the area west of 
West Temple, east of 600 West, south of 2100 South and north of 2600 South. 
a Five hundred (500) feet from any direction of the M 5/3300 South interchange. 
& Five hundred (500) feet from any direction of the SR 201/900 West interchange, 
e. Five hundred (500) feet from any direction of the I-80/State Street interchange. 
I Within the transit-oriented overlay zone, 
g. 3300 South from the Jordan River to 900 West. 
h. 2100 South from the Jordan River to 300 West. 
i. East of 200 East 
B. Separation. The minimum distance between billboards shall be five hundred (500) feet along the 
same side of the street. (Qrd. 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.650 Design and construction standards. 
A. Size of Advertising Area. 
1. Billboard advertising shall not exceed six hundred seventy-five (675) square feet in area, sixty (60) 
feet in width or twenty (20) feet in height along freeways (within one hundred (100) feet of the freeway 
property). Billboard advertising shall not exceed three hundred (300) square feet in area, twenty-five 
(25) feet in width or fifteen (15) feet in height in other locations or areas of the city. 
2. The maximum size and height of the advertising area is exclusive of embellishments. 
a. Along freeways, embellishments may be allowed provided the embellishment does not exceed thirty 
(30) percent of the advertising face of any billboard and does not extend more than five feet above or to 
the side of the billboard structure. 
b. In other areas of the city, embellishments may be allowed provided the embellishment does not 
exceed fifteen (15) percent of the advertising face of any billboard and does not extend more than five 
feet above or to the side of the billboard structure. 
B. Height. The highest point of any billboard shall be no higher than thirty-five (35) feet above the 
existing grade. If the freeway, within one hundred (100) feet of the billboard measured from the freeway 
at the point at which the billboard is perpendicular to the freeway, is on a different grade than the 
billboard, then the highest point of the billboard may be twenty-five (25) feet above the pavement 
elevation or any barrier wall at that location of the freeway. 
C. Setbacks. All setbacks shall be measured from the closest edge of any portion of a billboard to the 
property line. The; minimum yard setback from all property lines shall be five feet. The minimum 
frontage setback for billboards shall be five feet plus one additional foot for each foot in height over 
twenty-five (25) feet in height, up to the maximum height allowed. 
D. Lighting. Lighting shall be confined to the sign face and not illuminate the night sky. Such lighting 
shall also conform to the illumination provisions of this chapter. 
E. Supports. All billboards shall be detached signs. Monopole construction is required unless the 
department determines that special design or safety considerations exist that warrant differing support 
systems. 
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F. Maintenance. All billboards shall be continuously maintained both structurally and copy. 
G. Landscaping. All billboards are to be located in a landscaped area. All landscaped areas are subject to 
design review standards. The "normal minimum'* landscaped area is defined as an area equal to the size 
of the advertising area of the sign or four hundred (400) square feet, whichever is the lesser amount. 
(Ord. 2006-14: Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
17,16.660 Nonconforming billboards. 
A. Moving, Extensions or Alterations. 
1. A nonconforming billboard shall not be reconstructed, raised, moved, replaced, extended, altered or 
enlarged except in conformance with applicable requirements of this chapter. 
2. Alteration shall not include the changing of copy or copy panels so long as the structure remains the 
same. 
3. Repair or maintenance shall not be considered an alteration. 
4. Removal of portions of a billboard or extension of a billboard adjacent to the freeway, subject to ^  
permit approval, shall not be a violation of this section if such removal brings the sign more closely in 
compliance with the provisions of the chapter and any extension does not increase the cap limits of 
Section 17.17,620. 
5. Billboards nonconforming as to site requirements only (setbacks, landscaping, height etc) may be 
modified or relocated on site, after receiving appropriate permits, if such relocation or modifications 
brings the billboard into compliance with the requirements of this chapter. 
B. Termination of nonconforming billboards shall be after notice and if the sign owner has failed to 
bring the billboard in question into compliance with this chapter in a reasonable amount of time and a 
hearing as established by State Statute 10-9-408. (Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16-670 Rellocation. 
A. The owner of an existing billboard may remove the existing billboard and relocate to an approved 
location only after permits are obtained as set forth in this chapter and other provisions of this chapter 
are complied with.. 
EL Billboards moved to approved locations shall conform to all requirements of the new location and this 
chapter. 
C. Any relocation must not increase the cap limits as set forth in Section 17.16.620. 
D. Relocations may be allowed as a result of road widening, development proposals or voluntary 
request (Ord, 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.680 Billboards a business. 
A. In order to equalize competition, to encourage business success, and to impose appropriate 
requirements and fees, all billboards shall be considered a separate business and shall be subject to 
obtaining a business license and paying the required fee as established in the fee schedule of the city. 
Companies or individuals with multiple locations may license as a single unit with a fee for each 
location. 
B. The city considers billboards to operate as a separate business due to the following factors: 
1. Advertising space is rented/leased on each billboard separately. 
2. Each billboard is erected at a separate location requiring a separate rent/lease agreement. 
3. Billboards require regular inspections to assure continued compliance. 
4. Billboards create other administrative costs such as zoning approvals and enforcement activities. (Ord, 
200343 (part)) 
Article VII Special Exceptions 
17.16.710 Purpose and intent. 
A. A special exception is an activity or use incidental to or in addition to the principal use(s) permitted 
in a zoning district or an adjustment to a fixed dimension standard permitted as exceptions to the 
requirements of this chapter which requires a careful review of such factors as location, design, 
configuration and/or impacts to determine the desirability of authorizing its establishment on any given 
site. 
B. A special exception may or may not be appropriate in a particular location depending on the local 
impacts, and consideration of ways to minimize adverse impacts through special site planning and 
development techniques. 
C. It is the intent of the allowances for special exceptions to foster fairness and flexibility in the 
regulations while yet maintaining the integrity of the purposes and intentions of the city's general and 
master plan and the zoning and other regulations of the city. (Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.720 Review. 
A. Except for (hone specifically allowed to be reviewed by the department, the planning commission 
shall review applications for special exceptions as allowed in this chapter. Only those signs specifically 
enumerated in this chapter a$ eligible shall be considered for a special exception. 
B. Appeals of determinations of the city regarding special exceptions shall be reviewed by die Board of 
Adjustment 
C Special exceptions shall be limited to a time period as detennined by the city. However, unless 
specifically approved otherwise by the city, actions in accordance with such approvals must be 
completed within six months of the date of approval Failure to complete all actions approved, according 
to the conditions of approval, within the required time shall result in loss of the approval and subject the 
applicant/owner to the enforcement provisions of this ordinance. Applicants/owners may request one 
and only one extension by filing such request with the department prior to the expiration date, The 
department shall review the reasons for the request and may grant, for any term not to exceed six 
months, or deny the requested extension. 
D. Special exceptions reviewed by the planning commission shall be reviewed following the 
requirements for a conditional use. (Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16.730 Conditions on special exceptions. 
A. The city may impose conditions and limitations as may be necessary or appropriate to prevent or 
minimize adverse effects upon other property and improvements in the vicinity of the special exception 
or upon public facilities and services. 
B. Conditions may include but are not limited to, conditions concerning use, construction, size and 
height, lighting, location, landscaping, screening and other matters relating to the purposes and 
objectives of this chapter. 
C. Conditions shall be expressly set forth in the granting of the special exception. 
D. Compliance with Standards. The proposed exception shall comply wilJh all additional standards 
imposed. (Ord 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16 J40 Violation of conditions. 
Violation of any condition or limitation imposed shall be a violation of this chapter and shall constitute 
grounds for revocation of the special exception. (Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
17.16750 Applications. 
An application may be made by the owner of the subject property or the owner's authorized agent to the 
department and must include such information as the department determines is needed to adequately 
review the request. (Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
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17-16 J60 Decisions. 
A. The city may approve the special exception, approve the special exception subject to specific 
conditions or deny the special exception. In making its determination, the city shall consider the items 
found herein and others as deemed appropriate for the request. 
B. Appropriateness, No application for a special exception shall be approved unless it is determined that 
the proposed special exception is appropriate in the location proposed based upon its consideration of 
the standards of this chapter, other appropriate regulations and standards, the specific conditions for 
certain special exceptions and the ramifications related to the city's general and master plans. 
C. Compliance With Ordinance and District Purposes. The proposed exception shall be in harmony with 
the general and specific purposes for which this chapter was enacted and for which the regulations of the 
district were established. 
D. No Substantial Impairment of Property Value. The proposed exception shall not substantially 
diminish or impair the value of the property within the neighborhood in which it is located. 
E. No Undue Adverse Impact. The proposed exception shall not have a material adverse effect upon the 
character of the area or the public health, safety and general welfare. 
R Compatible with Surrounding Development. The proposed exception shall be constructed, arranged 
and operated so as to be compatible with the use and development of neighboring property in accordance 
with the applicable district regulations. 
G. No Destruction of Significant Features. The proposed exception shall not result in the destruction, 
loss or damage of natural, scenic or historic features of significant importance. 
H. No Material Pollution of Environment The proposed exception shall not cause material air, water, 
soil or noise pollution or other types of pollution. 
L Compliance willi Design Review. The proposed exception shall be in compliance with the purpose, 
intentions and standards of the design review elements of the city. 
J. Unusual Circumstances. In reviewing exceptions for unusual circumstances, the city may consider the 
following factors and others as the circumstances warrant: 
1. Lot or building size in relationship to others in the area. 
2. The potential impact of the style and size of the sign. 
3. The special features of the location in relationship to the general area m which located. 
4. The long tenn effect on the purposes and intentions of the regulations and general and master plans of 
the city. (Ord. 2003-13 (part)) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REPUBLIC OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, L.C., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTA-
TION; R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., and CITY OF 
SOUTH SALT LAKE 
Defendants. 
O R D E R 
AND JUDGMENT 
DISMISSING ALL CLAIMS AND ISSUES 
CONCERNING THE LINDAL, SSL AND RUSSELL 
PERMITS 
Civil No. 040905336 AA 
Judge Vernice Trease 
On December 14, 2007, the issue of the Court's subject matter jurisdiction came on for hearing 
before the Court pursuant to separate Motions for Summary Judgment brought by defendants Utah 
Department of Transportation ("UDOT"), the City of South Salt Lake ("SSL"), and R.O.A. General, Inc. 
("Reagan"). In particular, the Court heard argument on its subject matter jurisdiction to consider the 
propriety of certain permits issued by UDOT and SSL to Reagan, as raised in UDOT's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, SSL's Motion for Summary Judgment, Reagan's First Dispositive Motion (Motion 
for Summary Judgment on All Counts of the First Amended Complaint), and Reagan's Second 
P h d - k ^ o i + i x ^ \/f^+^~ /A/T~4.:_~ C- o 
Complaint"). Given the jurisdictional nature of the issues raised in Defendants' motions, the Court 
determined to resolve the question of its subject matter jurisdiction before considering Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment which was also set for hearing on December 14, 2007. 
Representatives of the Plaintiff, Republic Outdoor Advertising, L.C. ("Republic") were present 
and represented by counsel, Steven A. Wuthrich, representatives of UDOT were present and represented 
by counsel, Mark E. Burns of and for the Utah Attorney General's office, SSL was represented by its 
counsel, Dave Carlson, and representatives of Reagan were presented and represented by their counsel, 
Leslie Van Frank, of and for Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C. The Court having reviewed the pleadings, 
motions and memoranda filed in connection therewith, having heard the argument of counsel, and for 
good cause appearing, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The Court finds that the following facts relating to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction 
are undisputed: 
1.01. On or about May 13, 2002, Republic applied to UDOT for an outdoor advertising 
permit in connection with a proposed billboard on property known in this litigation as the "Deck Hockey 
property." 
1.02. UDOT's permits officer denied Republic's application on July 31, 2003, on the 
basis that the proposed location was within 500 feet of a sign location that several months earlier had 
been permitted to Reagan (the "Lindal" permit or the "Lindal" sign), and that the Deck Hockey permit 
would not be allowed under the spacing requirements of Utah law governing outdoor advertising. 
1.03. After an informal hearing on Republic's appeal of that denial, UDOT's 
administrative hearing officer upheld the permits officer's denial of Republic's application for the Deck 
Hockey permit. Republic appealed to this Court. 
1.04. Republic asserts, inter alia, that UDOT improperly issued the Lindal permit to 
Reagan. 
1.05. In February 1998, Reagan submitted applications to move three billboards in the 
vicinity north of the Deck Hockey property. One of those applications concerned the Lindal permit. 
UDOT's permits officer had denied those applications and Reagan invoked UDOT's appellate 
procedures to challenge that denial. 
1.06. On September 22, 1998, UDOT's administrative hearing officer issued an order 
stating that further proceedings regarding Reagan's appeal "shall be conducted formally according to 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-6 through 63-46b-l 1." That order was never revoked. 
1.07. On February 1, 1999, UDOT's administrative hearing officer issued an order 
upholding the permits officer's denial of Reagan's applications. Reagan appealed that decision to the 
Third District Court. 
1.08. On March 8, 2000, pursuant to stipulation between UDOT and Reagan, the 
district court vacated the February 1, 1999 UDOT order and remanded the case to facilitate settlement 
negotiations between UDOT and Reagan. 
1.09. As of May 2002, Republic knew that UDOT was considering issuing the Lindal 
permit to Reagan, but had not yet done so. 
1.10. Republic also knew in May 2002 that UDOT had taken the position that it would 
consider Reagan's application for the Lindal permit before it would consider an application from 
Republic within 500 feet. 
1.11. In May 2002, Republic believed that the original building permit Reagan had 
received jfrom SSL for the Lindal sign had expired, and that another SSL building permit that Republic 
held in the area would preclude UDOT from issuing the Lindal permit. 
1.12. Republic knew no later than November 2002 that a decision to grant Reagan's 
Lindal application would automatically be a decision to deny Republic's Deck Hockey application. 
1.13. Republic did not undertake any action to formally request to intervene in UDOT's 
proceedings concerning Reagan's application for the Lindal permit ("Lindal proceedings"). 
1.14. On January 23, 2003, pursuant to stipulation between UDOT and Reagan, 
UDOT's administrative hearing officer issued an "Order on Partial Settlement," finding that Reagan's 
application for the Lindal permit was not precluded by law, and ordering UDOT to immediately issue a 
permit to Reagan. 
1.15. UDOT issued the Lindal permit, and then denied Republic's application for the 
Deck Hockey permit on July 31, 2003. 
1.16. On September 21, 2005, Reagan applied for and received from SSL a permit to 
erect a billboard on property known as Wilderness Log Homes (the ctWLH Property"), which is 
approximately 500 feet to the south of the Lindal billboard. 
1.17. On October 24, 2006, Reagan applied for and received a permit from UDOT to 
erect the billboard on the WLH Property. 
1.18. Reagan built the WLH billboard in January 2006, and removed the Lindal 
billboard. 
1.19. The WLH sign was within 500 feet of the location where Republic proposed to 
build the Deck Hockey sign. 
>r^K2°' Sometiiwm February 2006, a representative of Republic went to SSL offices and 
"ranted angrily to a number of staff about the City issuing a permit to Reagan to build a billboard at the 
Wilderness sjte^(July 5, 200?Vffidavit of Larry Gardiner). 
1.21. On February 28, 2006, Republic submitted a GRAMA request to SSL, asking for 
copies of Reagan's permit application for the WLH billboard. 
1.22. Republic did not file an appeal of SSL's decision to issue the WLH permit at any 
time within the next 10 days. 
1.23. Republic did not file an appeal of UDOT's decision to issue the WLH permit at 
any time within the next 30 days. 
1.24. In a hearing on October 3, 2006 regarding a Motion to Dismiss brought by UDOT 
and a Motion for Summary Judgment brought by Republic, this Court (Judge Hilder) ordered Republic 
to amend its complaint within ten days to join Reagan. The order on that hearing was signed entered on 
October 24, 2006. 
1.25. On October 10, 2006, Republic sent UDOT a letter demanding that UDOT revoke 
Reagan's WLH permit and the permit for another Reagan sign that is across the freeway (the "Russell 
sign" or the "Russell permit"). The letter also demanded that UDOT make certain declarations regarding 
the Russell sign, and also that UDOT declare that the Deck Hockey application preceded the WLH 
application and that the WLH permit was void on the basis of various allegations. 
1.26. During briefing and oral argument on the current motions, Republic conceded that 
it had no standing to make any challenge to the Russell sign or permit. 
1.27. On October 26, 2006, Republic amended its Complaint and filed its Supplemental 
Complaint in this litigation, bringing both Reagan and SSL in as defendants. 
1.28. On October 31, 2006, UDOT responded to Republic's October 10th demand, 
stating that "the statute prohibits us from initiating declaratory proceedings.. . . Although prohibited 
from investigating your claims by a declaratory action, I will direct the Department's staff to look into 
your allegations and take whatever administrative action they may find necessary. I have asked them to 
complete their investigation within 30 days and report back to me with their findings." 
1.29. On December 14, 2006, Republic filed with this Court a pleading entitled "Notice 
of Filing of Documents re: Exhaustion of Remedies on Wilderness Log Homes Sign and Supplemental 
Documents Concerning Lindal Cedar Homes Sign." (hereafter "Notice re: Exhaustion of Remedies"). In 
that document, Republic stated, "More than 30 days have elapsed since the receipt of the October 31st 
letter and . . . no action has been taken to either correct or revoke the Reagan permits." 
1.30. Republic did not file or ask leave to file any new complaint until March 5, 2007. 
2. Based upon the undisputed facts, the Court renders the following general conclusions of 
law concerning the permits that UDOT issued for the Lindal and WLH signs: 
2.01. This matter is on appeal to this Court pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. §72-7-508(4)(a), which grants the district courts "jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final 
orders of [UDOT] under this part resulting from formal and informal adjudicative proceedings." 
2.02. This matter is also on appeal to this Court pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-15, which grants the district courts "jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final 
agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings.. . ." 
2.03. A review by trial de novo allows the Court to review anew all legal and factual 
issues which were or which could have been presented to UDOT's administrative hearing officer at the 
time he made his decision to uphold the permits officer's rejection of Republic's Deck Hockey 
application. 
2.04. A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all available administrative 
remedies available. 
2.05. The requirement of exhaustion of remedies is excused under certain circum-
stances; those Republic argued are (i) when exhaustion would serve no useful purpose, (ii) where the 
agency has positively stated what its ruling will be in a particular case, and (iii) where bias or 
prejudgment by the decision maker can be demonstrated. 
3. Based upon the undisputed facts, the Court renders the following conclusions of law 
regarding the permit that UDOT issued for the Lindal sign: 
3.01. The Lindal proceedings were formal proceedings at all times after UDOT's 
administrative hearing officer entered his September 22, 1998 order. 
3.02. Republic had a right to intervene in the Lindal proceedings, but could do so only 
by filing a signed written petition with UDOT before UDOT's administrative hearing officer issued his 
order requiring UDOT to issue the Lindal permit to Reagan. 
3.03. Since Republic did not intervene in the Lindal proceedings, Republic did not 
exhaust its available administrative remedies. 
3.04. Republic has failed to present sufficient evidence to raise any genuine issue of 
material fact that would that demonstrate that any of the exceptions to the exhaustion of remedies 
requirements applies. 
3.05. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider Republic's claims 
concerning the Lindal permit. 
4. Based upon the undisputed facts, the Court renders the following conclusions of law 
regarding the permit that UDOT issued for the WLH sign: 
4.01. Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), if the decision being 
challenged is an application, then "the request for agency action seeking review must be filed with the 
agency within the time prescribed by the agency's rules." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(4). Incorporating 
from Utah Admin. Code R907-1-3 the only appeals period prescribed by UDOT's rules, UAPA requires 
that a request to review a UDOT decision to grant or deny an application must be submitted within 30 
days. Though UDOT's rules might not specifically spell out a time limit for third parties to request the 
review of the grant of an application, UAPA fills in the gap. 
4.02. Republic did not file a request for agency action seeking review of UDOT's 
decision to issue the WLH permit within 30 days after UDOT granted the permit, or within 30 days after 
Republic undisputedly had notice of the permit. 
4.03. The letter that Republic sent to UDOT on October 10, 2006, demanding that 
UDOT make certain declarations and also revoke the WLH permit did not operate to extend Republic's 
time to request that UDOT review its decision to issue the WLH permit. 
4.04. UDOT's October 31, 2006 letter denying the requests for declaratory relief in 
Republic's October 10, 2006 letter constituted final agency action regarding those requests. 
4.05. UDOT's failure to take any action to revoke the WLH permit within the 30 days 
stated in its October 31, 2006 letter constituted final agency action regarding Republic's request to 
revoke the WLH permit. 
4.06. Republic's Amended Complaint and Supplemental Complaint, filed with the 
Court on October 20, 2006, was premature and did not operate as an appeal of UDOT's final agency 
actions regarding Republic's October 10th letter. 
4.07. Republic's December 14, 2006 Notice re: Exhaustion of Remedies was not a 
petition for judicial review that would satisfy the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 or Utah 
Admin.CodeR907-l-16. 
4.08. Republic failed to timely pursue or appeal the administrative remedies that were 
available to it to challenge UDOT's issuance of the WLH permit. 
4.09. Republic has failed to present sufficient evidence to raise any genuine issue of 
material fact that would that demonstrate that any of the exceptions to the exhaustion of remedies 
requirements applies. 
4.10. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider Republic's claims 
concerning the WLH permit that UDOT issued. 
5. Based upon the undisputed facts, the Court renders the following conclusions of law 
regarding the permit that SSL issued for the WLH sign: 
5.01. In this litigation, Republic has admitted that its interests in the Deck Hockey 
location were adversely affected by SSL's decision to issue the WLH permit, in that "if this Court 
upholds the validity of the [WLH] sign, then the Deck Hockey sign would be within 500 feet of [WLH] 
and would not be a permissible application. Thus, Republic clearly has standing to challenge the 
issuance of the [SSL] permit, as well as the UDOT permit, on the [WLH] site. The violation of the 
height and setback requirements allowed the sign to be placed where it should not have been placed, 
within proximity of 500 feet of Republic's sign." (Reply Memorandum to Reagan's Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment Motion, p. 25). 
5.02. Republic was obligated to exhaust its administrative remedies before filing suit in 
district court challenging SSL's decision to issue the WLH permit. 
5.03. To exhaust its administrative remedies, Republic was obligated to file an appeal 
with the SSL Board of Adjustment on or before March 10, 2006, which is ten days after the latest date 
on which Republic undisputedly had notice of SSL's decision to issue the WLH permit. 
5.04. Since Republic did not file such an appeal, Republic did not exhaust its available 
administrative remedies. 
5.05. Republic has failed to present sufficient evidence to raise any genuine issue of 
material fact that would that demonstrate that any of the exceptions to the exhaustion of remedies 
requirements applies. 
5.06. Republic attempted to collaterally attack the permit that SSL issued for the WLH 
sign by submitting a new application for a billboard ("Network Electric") even closer to WLH than the 
Deck Hockey proposed location; but a self-inflicted injury does not confer standing, nor can it extend the 
time for appeal. 
5.07. On appeal of SSL's denial of the Network Electric application, SSL's Board of 
Adjustment directed Republic to appeal the WLH permit, but the Board of Adjustment has no legal 
authority to extend the time to appeal. 
5.08. Subsequent demands that Republic made to SSL to revoke the WLH permit also 
did not operate to extend the time to appeal. 
5.09. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider Republic's claims 
concerning the WLH permit that SSL issued. 
6. Because Republic failed to timely or properly exhaust its administrative remedies, the 
Court hereby dismisses, with prejudice, all claims of Republic concerning (a) the Lindal UDOT permit, 
(b) the WLH UDOT permit, and (c) the WLH SSL permit. 
7. Because Republic lacks standing to make any challenge whatsoever to the Russell permit 
or sign, the Court hereby dismisses, with prejudice, all claims of Republic referring or relating to the 
Russell permit or sign. 
8. The only issue/remaining for trial or further summary proceedings is whether^as of July 
H, 2003, then was a pcmiiUcd-gign location within 500 feet M Republic's proposed billboard site on 
^1 -t-MDcek Ifoeke 
nr*w 
HHfoc cy property. The deadline for submitting further briefing on this narrow issue is extended 
to Monday, January 14, 2008. 
DATED this S * day of 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Steven A. Wuthrich 
Attorney for Republic 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
MARK SHURTLEFF, UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Mark Bums 
Attorney for UDOT 
SOUTH SALT LAKE CITY ATTORNEY 
Dave Carlson 
Attorney for SSL 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed, by first class 
U.S. postage prepaid, this 21st day of December, 2007. 
Steven A. Wuthrich 
1011 Washington, Ste. 101 
Montpelier, ID 83254 
Attorney for Republic 
Mark E. Bums, Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-0857 
Attorneys for UDOT, Region II 
Dave Carlson, City Attorney 
Janice Frost, Deputy City Attorney 
220 East Morris Avenue, 2nd Floor 
South Salt Lake, Utah 84115-3200 
Attorneys for City of South Salt Lake 
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Assistant Attorney General 
Mark L.Shurtleff (#4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Utah Department of Transportation 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
Telephone: (801) 366-0353 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REPUBLIC OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, 
L.C, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, Division II; R.O.A. 
GENERAL, INC., a Utah corp.; CITY OF 
SOUTH SALT LAKE, a municipality; 
Defendants. 
FINAL ORDER 
AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 040905336AA 
Judge Vernice S. Trease 
Defendant Utah Department of Transportation's (UDOT) Motion for Summary Judgment 
re: Spacing Prohibitions under the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act was argued to the Court on July 
30, 2008. Representatives of the Plaintiff, Republic Outdoor Advertising, L.C. (Republic) were 
present and represented by counsel, Steven A. Wuthrich, representatives of UDOT were present 
and represented by counsel, Assistant Attorney General Mark E. Burns and R.O.A. General, Inc. 
(Reagan) was represented by counsel, Leslie Van Frank of and for Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, 
P.C. 
The Court having reviewed the pleadings, motions and memoranda filed in connection 
therewith, having heard the argument of counsel, and for good cause appearing, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The issue in this de novo appeal is whether UDOT's hearing officer properly 
upheld the denial of Republic's billboard application. The Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 72-7-501 to -516 (West 2004 and Supp. 2008), grants the district court jurisdiction 
to review by trial de novo all final orders issued by UDOT under Title 72, Chapter 7, Part 5 
resulting from formal and informal adjudicative proceedings. 
2. Viewing all reasonable inferences in favor of Republic as the non-moving party, 
the Court finds there is no genuine dispute as to the following material facts related to this 
motion: 
A. On or about May 13, 2002, Republic applied to UDOT for an outdoor 
advertising permit for a new sign on property that has been referred to in this litigation as the 
"Deck Hockey property". 
B. On July 31, 2003, UDOT denied Republic's outdoor advertising permit 
application. 
C. UDOT denied Republic's application because permit officer Shawn 
FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Republic Outdoor v. UDOT, et al. 
Case No. 040905336 
Page 2 of5 2 
Debenham determined that Republic's proposed location would be within 500 feet of an existing 
permitted sign location. 
D. The existing sign at the time of the denial of Republic's application was 
owned by Reagan and was located at the north end of real property referred to in this litigation as 
the "Lindal property". 
E. The distance between the proposed Deck Hockey sign location and the 
Lindal sign location was closer than 500 feet. 
F. The Lindal sign was built in its permitted location. 
3. The Utah Outdoor Advertising Act prohibits UDOT from issuing outdoor 
advertising permits in two circumstances relevant to this case. The first is when another sign is 
physically within 500' of the applicant's proposed location. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-
505(3)(a) (a sign "may not be closer than 500 feet to an existing off-premise sign"). The second 
is when UDOT has issued another permit for a sign location within 500 feet of the proposed 
location. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-507(6) (UDOT may not "issue any permit to erect or 
maintain outdoor advertising within 500 feet of a permitted sign location except to the permit 
holder..."). 
4. The undisputed facts show that the proposed location for Republic's proposed 
new sign on the Deck Hockey property was within 500 feet of the location of the Reagan sign. 
Thus, the hearing officer properly denied Republic's application for a permit. 
FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Republic Outdoor v. UDOT, et al. 
Case No. 040905336 
Page 3 of 5 3 
5. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact and UDOT is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment is therefore granted. 
DATED this 1L(I day of _ 
_, 200£_. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BY THE COURT 
Hon. Y^hke Trease 
Distric^Court Judge 
Steven A. Wuthnch 
Attorney for Republic 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Leslie Van Frank 
Attorneys for Reagan 
APPROVED AS TO FORM. 
jt-dh/L^ 
t)avidM Carlson 
Attorneys for South Salt Lake City 
FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Republic Outdoor v UDOT, et al 
Case No 040905336 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINAL ORDER AND 
JUDGMENT was served by delivering the same, first-class, postage prepaid, this Monday of 
October, 2008, to: 
Steven A. Wuthrich 
1011 Washington St., Suite 101 
Montpelier, Idaho 83254 
Leslie Van Frank 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
257 East 200 South, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David M. Carlson 
SOUTH SALT LAKE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
220 East Morris Ave. 
South Salt Lake, Utah 84115 
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72-7-510 TRANSPORTATION CODE 
72-7-510. Existing outdoor advertising not in conformity 
with part — Procedure — Eminent domain — 
Compensation — Relocation. 
(1) As used in this section, "nonconforming sign" means a sign that has been 
erected in a zone or area other than commercial or industrial or where outdoor 
advertising is not permitted under this part. 
(2) (a) The department may acquire by gift, purchase, agreement, ex-
change, or eminent domain, any existing outdoor advertising and all 
property rights pertaining to the outdoor advertising which were lawfully 
in existence on May 9, 1967, and which by reason of this part become 
nonconforming. 
(b) If the department, or any town, city, county, governmental entity, 
public utility, or any agency or the United States Department of Trans-
portation under this part, prevents the maintenance as defined in Section 
72-7-502, or requires that maintenance of an existing sign be discontin-
ued, the sign in question shall be considered acquired by the entity and 
just compensation will become immediately due and payable. 
(c) Eminent domain shall be exercised in accordance with the provision 
of Title 78, Chapter 34, Eminent Domain. 
(3) (a) Just compensation shall be paid for outdoor advertising and all 
property rights pertaining to the same, including the right of the land-
owner upon whose land a sign is located, acquired through the processes 
of eminent domain. 
(b) For the purposes of this part, just compensation shall include the 
consideration of damages to remaining properties, contiguous and non- ] 
contiguous, of an outdoor advertising sign company's interest, which i 
remaining properties, together with the properties actually condemned, ] 
constituted an economic unit. I 
(c) The department is empowered to remove signs found in violation of j 
Section 72-7-508 without payment of any compensation. 1 
(4) Except as specifically provided in this section or Section 72-7-513, this I 
part may not be construed to permit a person to place or maintain any outdoor J 
advertising adjacent to any interstate or primary highway system which is I 
prohibited by law or by any town, city, or coimty ordinance. Any town, cityl 
county, governmental entity, or public utility which requires the removal, I 
relocation, alteration, change, or termination of outdoor advertising shall pay! 
just compensation as defined in this part and in Title 78, Chapter 34, Eminent! 
Domain. 1 
(5) Except as provided in Section 72-7-508, no sign shall be required to bea 
removed by the department nor sign maintenance as described in this sectio™ 
be discontinued unless at the time of removal or discontinuance there arejH 
sufficient funds, from whatever source, appropriated and immediately avail* 
able to pay the just compensation required under this section and unless a f l 
that time the federal funds required to be contributed under 23 U.S.C., Secfl 
131, if any, with respect to the outdoor advertising being removed, have b e e n 
appropriated and are immediately available to this state. jH 
(6) (a) If any outdoor advertising use, structure, or permit may not b f l 
continued because of the widening, construction, or reconstruction alodH 
an interstate, federal aid primary highway existing as of June 1, 1991, c H 
national highway systems highway, the owner shall have the option u H 
relocate and remodel the use, structure, or permit to another location: H 
676 
PROTECTION OF HIGHWAYS 72-7-510 
(i) on the same property; 
(ii) on adjacent property; 
(iii) on the same highway within 5280 feet of the previous location, 
which may be extended 5280 feet outside the areas described in 
Subsection 72-7-505(3)(c)(i)(A), on either side of the same highway; or 
(iv) mutually agreed upon by the owner and the county or munici-
pality in which the use, structure, or permit is located. 
(b) The relocation under Subsection (6)(a) shall be in a commercial or 
industrial zoned area or where outdoor advertising is permitted under this 
part. 
(c) The county or municipality in which the use or structure is located 
shall, if necessary, provide for the relocation and remodeling by ordinance 
for a special exception to its zoning ordinance. 
(d) The relocated and remodeled use or structure may be: 
(i) erected to a height and angle to make it clearly visible to traffic 
on the main-traveled way of the highway to which it is relocated or 
remodeled; 
(ii) the same size and at least the same height as the previous use 
or structure, but the relocated use or structure may not exceed the 
size and height permitted under this part; 
(iii) relocated to a comparable vehicular traffic count. 
(7) (a) The governmental entity, quasi-governmental entity, or public utility 
that causes the need for the outdoor advertising relocation or remodeling 
as provided in Subsection (6)(a) shall pay the costs related to the 
relocation, remodeling, or acquisition. 
(b) If a governmental entity prohibits the relocation and remodeling as 
provided in Subsection (6)(a), it shall pay just compensation as provided in 
Subsection (3). 
History: L. 1967, ch. 51, § 11; 1971, ch. 61, 
§ 9; 1981, ch. 136, § 9; 1989, ch, 22, § 7; 1992, 
ch. 30, § 61; 1997, ch. 263, § 10; C. 1953, 
27-12-136.11; renumbered by L. 1998, ch. 
270, § 212; 1999, ch. 21, § 95. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
ment, effective May 5, 1997, added Subsection 
(1); redesignated and subdivided former Sub-
sections (1) through (3) as Subsections (2) 
through (4); added the exception language at 
the beginning of Subsection (4); redesignated 
the second paragraph of Subsection (4) as Sub-
section (5); added Subsections (6) and (7); and 
ANALYSIS 
Immediate occupancy. 
Nonconforming use. 
Immediate occupancy. 
Department of Transportation's action to con-
demn certain outdoor advertising signs did not 
establish entitlement to immediate occupancy; 
the right to condemn did not flow automatically 
made stylistic changes throughout. 
The 1998 amendment, effective March 21, 
1998, renumbered this section, which formerly 
appeared as § 27-12-136.11; throughout the 
section substituted "this part" for "this chapter" 
or for "this act," and made changes to conform 
to the creation of Title 72; at the end of Subsec-
tion (4) added "Eminent Domain", and in Sub-
section (5) made a stylistic change. 
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, 
inserted the fourth "or" in Subsection (2)(b) and 
substituted "Subsection (6)(a)" for "Subsection 
(a)" in Subsection (6)(b). 
into a right of immediate occupancy; the re-
quirements of § 78-34-9 had first to be met. 
Utah DOT v. Hatch, 613 R2d 764 (Utah 1980). 
Nonconforming use. 
State road commission could not compel re-
moval of outdoor advertising sign on ground 
that sign violated these provisions because ad-
vertising had established prior nonconforming 
use and sign in question substantially complied 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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principle that, before an error is considered on 
appeal, an agency should have a chance to 
correct it. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n, 861 P.2d 414 (Utah 1993). 
Review of tax commission order. 
A petitioner's time limit for filing for judicial 
review of a final tax commission order is pre-
scribed by Subsection (3) of this section and not 
§ 59-1-504, which governs petitions for rede-
termination of deficiencies before the commis-
sion and not petitions for judicial review. 
Dusty's, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 842 P.2d 868 
(Utah 1992). 
Time limits. 
Although the district court has general juris-
diction to review agency adjudicative proceed-
ings, the court must comply with the require-
ments of this section, which sets clear time 
limits for administrative appeals to the district 
courts. Gilley v. Blackstock, 2002 UT App 414, 
61 P.3d 305. 
Driver whose license was suspended without 
notice by Driver License Division after she 
refused to submit to a chemical test and who 
failed to make a timely appeal under this 
section was not entitled to a trial de novo in the 
district court. Gilley v. Blackstock, 2002 UT 
App 414, 61 P.3d 305. 
Untimely appeal. 
Any jurisdictional challenge in district court 
beyond the time limit of this section must be 
made as an extraordinary writ. Gilley v. 
Blackstock, 2002 UT App 414, 61 P.3d 305. 
Cited in Lopez v. Career Serv. Review Bd., 
834 P.2d 568 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Buczynski 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 917 P.2d 552 (Utah 
1996); L.C. v. Utah State Bd. of Educ, 57 F. 
Supp. 2d 1214 (D. Utah 1999); Viktron/Lika 
Utah v. Labor Comm'n, 2001 UT App 8,18 P.3d 
519. 
63G-4-402. Judicial review — Informal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) (a) The district courts have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all 
final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings, 
except that the juvenile courts have jurisdiction over all state agency 
actions relating to: 
(i) the removal or placement of children in state custody; 
(ii) the support of children under Subsection (l)(a)(i) as determined 
administratively under Section 78A-6-1106; and 
(iii) substantiated findings of abuse or neglect made by the Division 
of Child and Family Services, after an evidentiary hearing, 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall 
be as provided in the statute governing the agency or, in the absence 
such a venue provision, in the county where the petitioner resides or 
maintains the petitioner's principal place of business. 
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceeding 
shall be a complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
shall include: 
(i) the name and mailing address of the party seeking judicii 
review; 
(ii) the name and mailing address of the respondent agency; 
(iii) the title and date of the final agency action to be review^ 
together with a copy, summary, or brief description of the agem 
action; 
(iv) identification of the persons who were parties in the info] 
adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action; 
(v) a copy of the written agency order from the informal proceed 
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party seeking judicial review 
entitled to obtain judicial review; 
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the type and extent of reli 
requested; and 
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(viii) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to 
relief. 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of 
fact and law and any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings. 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this 
section. 
History: C. 1953,63-46b-15, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, § 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 25; 1990, 
ch. 132, § 1; 1994, ch. 121, § 1; 1996, ch. 1, 
§ 18; 1999, ch. 164, § 6; 2001, ch. 120, § 1; 
2001, ch. 138, § 19; 2008, ch. 3, § 203; re-
numbered by L. 2008, ch. 382, § 1392. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2008 amend-
ment by ch. 3, effective February 7, 2008, 
substituted "Section 78A-6-1106" for "Section 
78-3a-906" in (l)(a)(ii). 
The 2008 amendment by ch. 382, effective 
May 5, 2008, renumbered this section, which 
formerly appeared as § 63-46b-15. 
This section has been reconciled by the Office 
of Legislative Research and General Counsel. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Final agency action. 
Function of district court. 
Review by juvenile court. 
Review by trial de novo. 
Right to judicial proceeding. 
Standard of review. 
Cited. 
Final agency action. 
Industrial Commission's determination of 
wrongful discharge was not final, and so not 
reviewable under this section, because the com-
mission and the parties had not resolved the 
issue of reimbursement for lost wages and 
benefits as required by § 34-28-19(2). Parkdale 
Care Ctr. v. Frandsen, 837 P.2d 989 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 
1993). 
Function of district court. 
The only appellate jurisdiction statutorily 
delegated to the district court is to review 
informal agency adjudicative proceedings. In re 
Topik, 761 R2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); State 
v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
Review by juvenile court. 
This section provides for a trial de novo in 
juvenile court for both substantiated and un-
substantiated findings of abuse or neglect de-
termined after an informal hearing. Depart-
ment of Human Servs. v. B.R., 2002 UT App 25, 
42 P.3d 390. 
Review by trial de novo. 
Review by trial de novo, as used in Subsec-
tion (l)(a), means a new trial with no deference 
to the administrative proceedings below. Ar-
cher v. Board of State Lands & Forestry, 907 
P.2d 1142 (Utah 1995). 
Technical procedural errors in the adminis-
trative proceeding, if any, were cured by the 
trial de novo; the trial de novo did not rely on 
the administrative proceeding. (Unpublished 
decision.) Goodrich v. Div. of Child & Family 
Servs., 2005 UT App 418. 
Right to judicial proceeding. 
District court erred in declining a de novo 
review of a dentist's claim to licensure by reci-
procity, where there had been no proceeding on 
his application that was sufficiently judicial in 
nature, and he had not yet had the licensing 
agency's action reviewed in a "trial-type hear-
ing." Kirk v. Division of Occupational & Profes-
sional Licensing, 815 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
This section requires that the district court's 
review of informal adjudicative proceedings be 
accomplished by holding a new trial, not just by 
reviewing an informal record; thus, the district 
court erred in failing to conduct a trial de novo 
of proceedings of the Department of Public 
Safety relating" to suspension of driving privi-
leges. Cordova v. Blackstock, 861 P.2d 449 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
District court does not have discretion to 
review an informal adjudicative proceeding by 
any method other than a trial de novo; this rule 
guarantees the district court the opportunity to 
correct any deficiencies that may arise because 
of the informal nature of administrative pro-
ceedings and provides an adequate record for 
future review. Archer v. Board of State Lands & 
Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1995). 
Standard of review. 
The reviewing court applies differing stan-
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63G-4-202. Designation of adjudicative proceedings as 
informal — Standards — Undesignated proceed-
ings formal. 
(1) The agency may, by rule, designate categories of adjudicative proceed-
ings to be conducted informally according to the procedures set forth in rules 
enacted under the authority of this chapter if: 
(a) the use of the informal procedures does not violate any procedural 
requirement imposed by a statute other than this chapter; 
(b) in the view of the agency, the rights of the parties to the proceedings 
will be reasonably protected by the informal procedures; 
(c) in the view of the agency, the agency's administrative efficiency will 
be enhanced by categorizations; and 
(d) the cost of formal adjudicative proceedings outweighs the potential 
benefits to the public of a formal adjudicative proceeding. 
(2) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (3), all agency adjudicative 
proceedings not specifically designated as informal proceedings by the agency's 
rules shall be conducted formally in accordance with the requirements of this 
chapter. 
(3) Any time before a final order is issued in any adjudicative proceeding, 
the presiding officer may convert a formal adjudicative proceeding to an 
informal adjudicative proceeding, or an informal adjudicative proceeding to a 
formal adjudicative proceeding if: 
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the public interest; and 
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not unfairly prejudice the rights of 
any party. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-4, enacted by L. ment, effective May 5, 2008, renumbered this 
1987, ch. 161, § 260; renumbered by L. section, which formerly appeared as § 63-
2008, ch. 382, § 1381. 46b-4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2008 amend-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Kirk v. Division of Occupational & son-Bowles Co. v. Department of Commerce, 
Professional Licensing, 815 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. 829 P.2d 101 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Southern 
App. 1991); Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attor- Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Board of State 
ney, 818 P.2d 23 (Utah Ct App. 1991); John- Lands & Forestry, 830 P.2d 233 (Utah 1992). 
63G-4-203. Procedures for informal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) If an agency enacts rules designating one or more categories of adjudi-
cative proceedings as informal adjudicative proceedings, the agency shall, by 
rule, prescribe procedures for informal adjudicative proceedings that include' 
the following: 
(a) Unless the agency by rule provides for and requires a response, na 
answer or other pleading responsive to the allegations contained in the 
notice of agency action or the request for agency action need be filed. 
(b) The agency shall hold a hearing if a hearing is required by statute^ 
or rule, or if a hearing is permitted by rule and is requested by a party| 
within the time prescribed by rule. 
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(c) In any hearing, the parties named in the notice of agency action or 
in the request for agency action shall be permitted to testify, present 
evidence, and comment on the issues. 
(d) Hearings will be held only after timely notice to all parties. 
(e) Discovery is prohibited, but the agency may issue subpoenas or 
other orders to compel production of necessary evidence. 
(f) All parties shall have access to information contained in the agency's 
files and to all materials and information gathered in any investigation, to 
the extent permitted by law. 
(g) Intervention is prohibited, except that the agency may enact rules 
permitting intervention where a federal statute or rule requires that a 
state permit intervention. 
(h) All hearings shall be open to all parties. 
(i) Within a reasonable time after the close of an informal adjudicative 
proceeding, the presiding officer shall issue a signed order in writing that 
states the following: 
(i) the decision; 
(ii) the reasons for the decision; 
(iii) a notice of any right of administrative or judicial review 
available to the parties; and 
(iv) the time limits for filing an appeal or requesting a review, 
(j) The presiding officer's order shall be based on the facts appearing in 
the agency's files and on the facts presented in evidence at any hearings, 
(k) A copy of the presiding officer's order shall be promptly mailed to 
each of the parties. 
(2) (a) The agency may record any hearing. 
(b) Any party, at the party's own expense, may have a reporter 
approved by the agency prepare a transcript from the agency's record of 
the hearing. 
(3) Nothing in this section restricts or precludes any investigative right or 
power given to an agency by another statute. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-5, enacted by L. ment, effective May 5, 2008, renumbered this 
1987, ch. 161, § 261; 1988, ch. 72, § 17; re- section, which formerly appeared as § 63-
numbered by L. 2008, ch. 382, § 1382. 46b-5, and made a stylistic change. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2008 amend-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Driver License Services hearing. Brinkerhoff v. 
^ , , Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587 (Utah Ct. App. 
Procedural errors. loom 
Cited. 1990}-
Procedural errors. Cited in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance 
Trial de novo cured any technical procedural v ' B o a r d o f S t a t e L a n d s & Forestry, 830 P.2d 
errors occurring at an informal Division of ^33 (Utah 1992). 
63G-4-204. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceed-
ings — Responsive pleadings. 
(1) In all formal adjudicative proceedings, unless modified by rule according 
to Subsection 63G-4-20K5), the respondent, if any, shall file and serve a 
written response signed by the respondent or the respondent's representative 
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73-3-6. Publication of notice of application — Corrections 
or amendments of applications. 
(1) (a) When an application is filed in compliance with this title, the state 
engineer shall publish once a week for a period of three successive weeks 
a notice of the application informing the public of the contents of the 
application and the proposed plan of development. 
(b) (i) The state engineer shall publish the notice in a newspaper pub-
lished within the county near the water source from which the appro-
priation is to be made. 
(ii) If no newspaper is published within the county, the state engi-
neer shall publish the notice in a newspaper having general circula-
tion near the water source from which the appropriation is to be 
made. 
(c) Clerical errors, ambiguities, and mistakes that do not prejudice the 
rights of others may be corrected by order of the state engineer either 
before or after the publication of notice. 
(2) After publication of notice to water users, the state engineer may autho-
rize amendments or corrections that involve a change of point of diversion, 
place, or purpose of use of water, only after republication of notice to water 
users. 
History: L. 1919, ch. 67, § 46; R.S. 1933, section; in Subsection (2), deleted the former 
100-3-6; L. 1935, ch. 105, § 1; 1939, ch. I l l , last sentence which read "Any person ag-
§ 1; C. 1943, 100-3-6; L. 1945, ch. 134, § 1; grieved by an order of the state engineer au-
1949, ch. 97, § 1; 1955, ch. 160, § 1; 1959, ch. thorizing or denying any alteration of an appli-
137, § 1; 1987, ch. 161, § 291. cation may file an action for plenary review 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- thereof as provided by § 73-3-14"; and made 
ment, efifective January 1, 1988, designated minor changes in phraseology and punctuation 
the previously undesignated provisions of this throughout the section. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Republication of amended application. correct application without republication 
While this section requires republication of where there was mere conflict in description 
amended application to appropriate where and ambiguity as to proposed point of return, 
amendment involves change of point of diver- Whitmore v. Welch, 114 Utah 578, 201 P.2d 
sion, place or purpose of use of water, state 954 (1949), construing this section pnor to 
engineer had authority to require applicant to 1945 amendment. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 93 C.J.S. Waters § 180. 
Key Numbers. — Waters and Water 
Courses «» 128. 
73-3-7. Protests. 
(1) Any person interested may, at any time within 30 days after notice is 
published, file a protest with the state engineer. 
(2) The state engineer shall consider the protest and shall approve or reject 
the application. 
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History: C. 1953, 63-46b-2.1, enacted by section, which formerly appeared as § 63-46b-
L. 2004, ch. 344, § 1; renumbered by L. 2 1 
2008, ch. 382, § 1378. Effective Dates. — Laws 2004, ch 344 
Amendment Notes. — The 2008 amend- became effective on May 3, 2004, pursuant to 
ment, effective May 5, 2008, renumbered this Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
63G-4-105. Transition procedures. 
(1) The procedures for agency action, agency review, and judicial review 
contained in this chapter are applicable to all agency adjudicative proceedings 
commenced by or before an agency on or after January 1, 1988. 
(2) Statutes and rules governing agency action, agency review, and judicial 
review that are in effect on December 31,1987, govern all agency adjudicative 
proceedings commenced by or before an agency on or before December 31, 
1987, even if those proceedings are still pending before an agency or a court on 
January 1, 1988. 
History: C. 1953,63-46b-22, enacted by L. ment, effective May 5, 2008, renumbered this 
1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 5, § 1; 1991, ch. 5, § 69; section, which formerly appeared as § 63-46b-
renumbered by L. 2008, ch. 382, § 1379. 22 
Amendment Notes, — The 2008 amend-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in USX Corp v. Industrial Comm'n, MCI Telecommunications Corp v. Public Serv. 
781 P.2d 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Salt Lake Comm'n, 840 P.2d 765 (Utah 1992), Holland v. 
County ex rel County Bd of Equalization v. Career Serv Review Bd., 856 P.2d 678 (Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 819 P.2d 776 (Utah 1991); Ct App. 1993). 
PART 2 
ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
63G-4-20L Commencement of adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) Except as otherwise permitted by Section 63G-4-502, all adjudicative 
proceedings shall be commenced by either: 
(a) a notice of agency action, if proceedings are commenced by the 
agency; or 
(b) a request for agency action, if proceedings are commenced by 
persons other than the agency. 
(2) A notice of agency action shall be filed and served according to the 
following requirements: 
(a) The notice of agency action shall be in writing, signed by a presiding 
officer, and shall include: 
(i) the names and mailing addresses of all persons to whom notice 
is being given by the presiding officer, and the name, title, and mailing 
address of any attorney or employee who has been designated to 
appear for the agency; 
(ii) the agency's file number or other reference number; 
(iii) the name of the adjudicative proceeding; 
(iv) the date that the notice of agency action was mailed; 
(v) a statement of whether the adjudicative proceeding is to be 
conducted informally according to the provisions of rules adopted 
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under Sections 63G-4-202 and 63G-4-203, or formally according to the 
provisions of Sections 63G-4-204 through 63G-4-209; 
(vi) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, a statement that 
each respondent must file a written response within 30 days of the 
mailing date of the notice of agency action; 
(vii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, or if a hearing is 
required by statute or rule, a statement of the time and place of any 
scheduled hearing, a statement of the purpose for which the hearing 
is to be held, and a statement that a party who fails to attend or 
participate in the hearing may be held in default; 
(viii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be informal and a hearing 
is required by statute or rule, or if a hearing is permitted by rule and 
may be requested by a party within the time prescribed by rule, a 
statement that the parties may request a hearing within the time 
provided by the agency's rules; 
(ix) a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which 
the adjudicative proceeding is to be maintained; 
(x) the name, title, mailing address, and telephone number of the 
presiding officer; and 
(xi) a statement of the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding and, 
to the extent known by the presiding officer, the questions to be 
decided. 
(b) When adjudicative proceedings are commenced by the agency, the 
agency shall: 
(i) mail the notice of agency action to each party; 
(ii) publish the notice of agency action, if required by statute; and 
(iii) mail the notice of agency action to any other person who has a 
right to notice under statute or rule. 
(3) (a) Where the law applicable to the agency permits persons other than 
the agency to initiate adjudicative proceedings, that person's request for 
agency action shall be in writing and signed by the person invoking the 
jurisdiction of the agency, or by that person's representative, and shall 
include: 
(i) the names and addresses of all persons to whom a copy of the 
request for agency action is being sent; 
(ii) the agency's file number or other reference number, if known; 
(iii) the date that the request for agency action was mailed; 
(iv) a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which 
agency action is requested; 
(v) a statement of the relief or action sought from the agency; and 
(vi) a statement of the facts and reasons forming the basis for relief 
or agency action. 
(b) The person requesting agency action shall file the request with the 
agency and shall mail a copy to each person known to have a direct 
interest in the requested agency action. 
(c) An agency may, by rule, prescribe one or more forms eliciting the 
information required by Subsection (3)(a) to serve as the request for 
agency action when completed and filed by the person requesting agency 
action. 
(d) The presiding officer shall promptly review a request for agency 
action and shall: 
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(i) notify the requesting party in writing that the request is granted 
and that the adjudicative proceeding is completed; 
(ii) notify the requesting party in writing that the request is denied 
and, if the proceeding is a formal adjudicative proceeding, that the 
party may request a hearing before the agency to challenge the denial; 
or 
(iii) notify the requesting party that further proceedings are re-
quired to determine the agency's response to the request. 
(e) (i) Any notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(ii) shall contain the 
information required by Subsection 63G-4-203(l)(i) in addition to 
disclosure required by Subsection (3)(d)(ii). 
(ii) The agency shall mail any notice required by Subsection (3)(d) 
to all parties, except that any notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(iii) 
may be published when publication is required by statute. 
(iii) The notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(iii) shall: 
(A) give the agency's file number or other reference number; 
(B) give the name of the proceeding; 
(C) designate whether the proceeding is one of a category to be 
conducted informally according to the provisions of rules enacted 
under Sections 63G-4-202 and 63G-4-203, with citation to the 
applicable rule authorizing that designation, or formally accord-
ing to Sections 63G-4-204 through 63G-4-209; 
(D) in the case of a formal adjudicative proceeding, and where 
respondent parties are known, state that a written response must 
be filed within 30 days of the date of the agency's notice if mailed, 
or within 30 days of the last publication date of the agency's 
notice, if published; 
(E) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, or if a hearing 
is to be held in an informal adjudicative proceeding, state the 
time and place of any scheduled hearing, the purpose for which 
the hearing is to be held, and that a party who fails to attend or 
participate in a scheduled and noticed hearing may be held in 
default; 
(F) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be informal, and a 
hearing is required by statute or rule, or if a hearing is permitted 
by rule and may be requested by a party within the time 
prescribed by rule, state the parties' right to request a hearing 
and the time within which a hearing may be requested under the 
agency's rules; and 
(G) give the name, title, mailing address, and telephone num-
ber of the presiding officer. 
(4) When initial agency determinations or actions are not governed by this 
chapter, but agency and judicial review of those initial determinations or 
actions are subject to the provisions of this chapter, the request for agency 
action seeking review must be filed with the agency within the time prescribed 
by the agency's rules. 
(5) For designated classes of adjudicative proceedings, an agency may, by 
rule, provide for a longer response time than allowed by this section, and may 
provide for a shorter response time if required or permitted by applicable 
federal law. 
(6) Unless the agency provides otherwise by rule or order, an application for 
a package agency, license, permit, or certificate of approval filed under 
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authority of Title 32A, Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, is not considered to be 
a request for agency action under this chapter. 
(7) If the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding is to award a license or 
other privilege as to which there are multiple competing applicants, the agency 
may, by rule or order, conduct a single adjudicative proceeding to determine 
the award of that license or privilege. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-3, enacted by 
1987, ch. 161, § 259; 1988, ch. 72, § 16; 2001, 
ch. 138, § 13; 2006, ch. 162, § 10; 2007, ch. 
306, § 72; renumbered by L. 2008, ch. 382, 
§ 1380. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2006 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 2006, rewrote Subsec-
tion (6), which read: "Unless the agency pro-
vides otherwise by rule or order, applications 
for licenses filed under authority of Title 32A, 
Chapters 3, Packaging Agencies, 4, Public Li-
ANALYSIS 
Applicable law. 
Defect in notice. 
—Waiver. 
Dismissal. 
Emergency actions. 
Notice. 
Presiding officer. 
Cited. 
Applicable law. 
The reference to "law applicable" in Subsec-
tion (3)(a) is a reference to an agency's enabling 
statute as adopted by the legislature, not an 
agency's rules as adopted by the agency. Niel-
son v. Division of Peace Officer Stds. & Train-
ing, 851 P.2d 1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Defect in notice. 
—Waiver. 
Motorist's failure to object to the manner of 
notice or type of hearing at the beginning of a 
driver's license suspension hearing, when he 
was clearly informed that the proceeding would 
be conducted informally, precluded him from 
complaining, on appeal, that the original notice 
of hearing sent to him did not advise hirn 
whether the hearing was to be formal or infor-
mal. Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 
587 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Dismissal. 
Dismissals without prejudice are authorized 
under Subsection (3)(d)(iii). Doubletree, Inc. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 797 P.2d 464 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
quor License, and 5, Private Club Liquor Li-
cense are not considered to be a request for 
agency action under this chapter." 
The 2007 amendment, effective April 30, 
2007, substituted "through" for "to" in Subsec-
tions (2)(a)(v) and (3)(eXhi)(C). 
The 2008 amendment, effective May 5, 2008, 
renumbered this section, which formerly ap-
peared as § 63-46b-3, and updated references 
to conform to the recodification of Title 63. 
Emergency actions. 
Immediate suspension of defendant's driver's 
license for a DUI violation qualified as an 
emergency action under § 53-3-221 and former 
§ 63-46b-20 (renumbered as § 63G-4-502, and 
therefore the State was exempt from the re-
quirements of this section in suspending defen-
dant's license. Hess v. Blackstock, 2003 UT App 
37, 65 P.3d 305. 
Notice. 
Due process did not require notice to a car 
dealership before a fine of $135,000 was levied 
against it for its egregious failure to comply 
with the licensing statutes. The tax commission 
sent letters informing the dealership of exactly 
what statutes it had violated and of the fine 
that was to be assessed. The dealership also 
had the opportunity to be heard in two separate 
administrative proceedings. Brent Brown 
Dealerships v. Tax Comm'n, 2006 UT App 261, 
139 P.3d 296. 
Presiding officer. 
A part-time staff attorney within the Divi-
sion of Environmental Response and Remedia-
tion, whose duties were structurally segregated 
from the branch of the division conducting 
investigations and prosecutions of under-
ground storage leaks, could preside at a formal 
hearing to decide whether a petitioner before 
the Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board 
failed to remediate leakage from one of its 
underground storage tanks. V-l Oil Co. v. De-
partment of Envtl. Quality, 939 P.2d 1192 
(Utah 1997). 
Cited in Black's Title, Inc. v. State Ins. 
Dep't, 1999 UT App 330, 991 P.2d 607. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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"interstate system," making related changes in 
subsection designation. 
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3,1999, 
substituted "part" for "act" in Subsection (22). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Commercial or industrial zone. 
Outdoor advertising corridor. 
Purpose. 
Cited. 
Commercial or industrial zone. 
Even though an area zoned for commercial or 
industrial use in a city or town need not actu-
ally have commercial development on it to 
satisfy the definition in Subsection (2)(a), such 
property may still be excluded from use for 
outdoor advertising if the zoning violates Sub-
section (3). Thus, where plaintiff's three signs 
represented the only commercial development 
on the property, the trial court erred in conclud-
ing that the zoning met the requirements of the 
Act. Kunz & Co. v. State DOT, 913 P.2d 765 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
The trial court erred in concluding that this 
section applies only to areas outside incorpo-
rated cities and towns; outdoor advertising is 
prohibited in any location zoned for the "pri-
mary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising.n 
Kunz & Co. v. State DOT, 913 R2d 765 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996). 
Outdoor advertising corridor. 
In the former definition of "outdoor advertis-
ing corridor," the provision for an extension of 
the 100-foot corridor applied only when a "natu-
ral or created usage" prevented an applicant 
from using such corridor. R.O.A. Gen., Inc. v. 
Utah DOT, 966 P.2d 840 (Utah 1998). 
Purpose. 
Allowing outdoor advertising in areas with-
out other business or highway services in the 
vicinity would violate essential purposes of the 
Outdoor Advertising Act, which was enacted in 
part to promote the "convenience and enjoy-
ment of public travel, to protect the public 
investment in such highways, to preserve the 
natural scenic beauty of lands bordering on 
such highways, and to ensure that information 
in the specific interest of the traveling public is 
presented safely and effectively." Accordingly, if 
a zoning body designates specific land as "com-
mercial" for the primary purpose of allowing 
outdoor advertising on that land, then Subsec-
tion (3) prohibits the use of billboards on the 
land regardless of whether the zoning body also 
intends to "reserve" the land for other commer-
cial use. Kunz & Co. v. State DOT, 913 P.2d 765 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Cited in Utah Sign, Inc. v. Utah DOT, 896 
P.2d 632 (Utah 1995); Kunz & Co. v. State, 
DOT, 949 P.2d 763 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
72-7-503. Advertising — Permit required — Penalty for 
violation. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to place any form of advertising upon any 
part of the public domain, or within 300 feet of a public highway, except within 
the corporate limits of a city or town, and except upon land in private 
ownership situated along the highway, without first receiving a permit from 
the department, if a state highway, or from the county executive, if a county 
road. 
(2) Any person who violates this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 136; 1991, ch. 
137, § 46; 1993, ch. 227, § 310; C. 1953, 
27-12-136; renumbered by L. 1998, ch. 270, 
§ 205. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
ment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered 
this section, which formerly appeared as § 
27-12-136, and in Subsection (2) deleted "any 
provision of" after "Any person who violates." 
Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Highways, 
Streets, and Bridges §§ 324, 568. 
C.J.S. — 40 C.J.S. Highways § 239. 
AX.R. — Billboards and other outdoor ad | 
vertising signs as civil nuisance, 38 A.L.R.3d| 
647. l 
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appeared as § 27-12-1^6.7, and in Subsection 
(6) substituted "Section 72-7-508" for "Section 
27-12-136.9." 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Application. 
Conditional permit. 
Application. 
Regardless of whether certain signs were 
found to be located in a valid commercial or 
industrial zone, the signs were still illegal and 
subject to removal, where plaintiff had not 
obtained valid permits for the signs. Kunz & 
Co. v. State DOT, 913 P.2d 765 (Utah Ct. App 
1996). 
Conditional permit. 
The Department of Transportation had an 
thority to require that an applicant acquire i 
means of safe and lawful access to the proper 
as a condition to a sign permit. Utah DOT ^j 
ROA Gen., Inc., 927 R2d 666 (Utah Ct. Appf 
1996). 
72-7-508. Unlawful outdoor advertising — Adjudicative 
proceedings — Judicial review — Costs of rel 
moval — Civil and criminal liability for damaj 
ing regulated signs — Immunity for Departmei 
of Transportation. 
(1) Outdoor advertising is unlawful when: 
(a) erected after May 9,1967, contrary to the provisions of this chapt 
(b) a permit is not obtained as required by this part; 
(c) a false or misleading statement has been made in the application: 
a permit that was material to obtaining the permit; or 
(d) the sign for which a permit was issued is not in a reasonable st 
of repair, is unsafe, or is otherwise in violation of this part. 
(2) The establishment, operation, repair, maintenance, or alteration of *< 
sign contrary to this chapter is also a public nuisance. 
(3) Except as provided in Subsection (4), in its enforcement of this sectk 
the department shall comply with the procedures and requirements of Title ( 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. 
(4) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de nci 
all final orders of the department under this part resulting from for 
and informal adjudicative proceedings. 
(b) Venue for judicial review of final orders of the department shall be 
the county in which the sign is located. 
(5) If the department is granted a judgment, the department is entitled 
have any nuisance abated and recover from the responsible person, firing 
corporation, jointly and severally: 
(a) the costs and expenses incurred in removing the sign; and 
(b) $10 for each day the sign was maintained following the expiratio| 
ten days after notice of agency action was filed and served under Sec 
63-46b-3. 
(6) (a) Any person, partnership, firm, or corporation who vandalizes, 
ages, defaces, destroys, or uses any sign controlled under this chs 
without the owner's permission is liable to the owner of the sign for 1 
the amount of damage sustained and all costs of court, includ 
reasonable attorney's fee, and is guilty of a class C misdemeanor. 
(b) This subsection does not apply to the department, its agent 
employees if acting to enforce this part. 
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History: L. 1967, ch. 51, § 9; 1971, ch. 61, 
§ 8; 1981, ch. 136, § 7; 1987, ch. 161, § 67; 
1990, ch. 300, § 4; 1997, ch. 263, § 8; C. 1953, 
27-12-136.9; renumbered by L. 1998, ch. 
270, § 210. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
ment, effective May 5, 1997, deleted "the" be-
fore "Administrative Procedures Act" in Subsec-
tion (3) and substituted "act" for "section" in 
Subsection (4)(a). 
ANALYSIS 
Applicability. 
Permit. 
Time to take appeal. 
Applicability. 
An appeal from an order of the Department of 
Transportation denying plaintiff sign compa-
ny's application for a permit to erect a sign on 
the ground that the application was for a loca-
tion that was not lawful was not covered by this 
section since it deals with existing structures 
that are being used for advertising; the judicial 
review provisions of the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act governed plaintiff's appeal. 
Utah Sign, Inc. v. Utah DOT, 896 R2d 632 
(Utah 1995). 
History: L. 1967, ch. 51, § 10; 1981, ch. 
136, § 8;1992,ch.30,§ 60; 1997, ch. 263, § 9; 
C. 1953, 27-12-136.10; renumbered by L. 
1998, ch. 270, § 211. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
ment, effective May 5, 1997, inserted the Sub-
section (1) designation and added Subsection 
(2). 
, The 1998 amendment, effective March 21, 
; 1998, renumbered this section, which formerly 
, appeared as § 27-12-136.9; in Subsections 
(l)(b), (l)(d), (4)(a), and (6)(b) substituted "this 
part" for "this chapter" or for 'this act"; and in 
 Subsections (3) to (5) deleted "of Transporta-
 tion" after "department." 
Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
1
 meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
Permit. 
Regardless of whether certain signs were 
found to be located in a valid commercial or 
industrial zone, the signs were still illegal and 
subject to removal, where plaintiff had not 
obtained valid permits for the signs. Kunz & 
Co. v. State DOT, 913 P.2d 765 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996). 
Time to take appeal. 
Time for taking appeal began to run three 
days after notice of the commission's decision 
was mailed, pursuant to Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, Rule 6. Reagan Outdoor Adv., Inc. v. Utah 
DOT, 589 R2d 782 (Utah 1978). 
The 1998 amendment, effective March 21, 
1998, renumbered this section, which formerly 
appeared as § 27-12-136.10; in Subsection (1) 
substituted "May 9,1967" for "the effective date 
of this act"; in Subsection (2) substituted "this 
part" for "this act"; and made changes to con-
form to the creation of Title 72. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
72-7-509. Existing outdoor advertising not in conformity 
with part — When removal required — When 
relocation allowed. 
(1) Any outdoor advertising lawfully in existence along the interstate or the 
primary systems on May 9, 1967, and which is not then in conformity with its 
provisions is not required to be removed until five years after it becomes 
nonconforming or pursuant to the provisions of Section 72-7-510. 
(2) Any existing outdoor advertising structure that does not comply with 
Section 72-7-505, but that is located in an industrial and commercial area, an 
unzoned industrial and commercial area, or an area where outdoor advertising 
would otherwise be permitted, may be remodeled and relocated on the same 
property in a commercial or industrial zoned area, or another area where 
outdoor advertising would otherwise be permitted under this part. 
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History: L. 1967, ch. 51, § 4; 1971, ch. 61, ment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbe 
§ 3; 1981, ch. 136, § 2; 1989, ch. 144, § 1; this section, which formerly appeared as 
1991, ch. 137, § 47; 1994, ch. 120, § 39; C. 27-12-136.4, and in Subsection (4) suhstitu 
1953, 27-12-136.4; renumbered by L. 1998, "Sections 72-7-506 and 72-7-507" for uSecti 
ch. 270, § 206. 27-12-136.6 and 27-12-136.7." 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Kunz & Co. v. State DOT, 913 P.2d 
765 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Construction and application of 
restrictive covenants to the use of signs, 61 
A.L.R.4th 1028. 
72-7-505. Sign size — Sign spacing — Location in outdo 
advertising corridor — Limit on implement 
tion. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2), a sign face within the state m 
not exceed the following limits: 
(i) maximum area — 1,000 square feet; 
(ii) maximum length — 60 feet; and 
(iii) maximum height — 25 feet. 
(b) No more than two facings visible and readable from the s 
direction on the main-traveled way may be erected on any one s" 
structure. Whenever two facings are so positioned, neither shall ex 
the maximum allowed square footage. 
(c) Two or more advertising messages on a sign face and double-fa 
back-to-back, stacked, side-by-side, and V-type signs are permitted as 
single sign or structure if both faces enjoy common ownership. 
(d) A changeable message sign is permitted if the interval betw 
message changes is not more frequent than at least eight seconds and 
actual message rotation process is accomplished in three seconds or 1 
(2) (a) An outdoor sign structure located inside the unincorporated area 
a nonurbanized county may have the maximum height allowed by 
county for outdoor advertising structures in the commercial or indus 
zone in which the sign is located. If no maximum height is provided for 
location, the maximum sign height may be 65 feet above the ground or 
feet above the grade of the main traveled way, whichever is greater. 
(b) An outdoor sign structure located inside an incorporated munici 
ity or urbanized county may have the maximum height allowed by 
municipality or urbanized county for outdoor advertising structures in 
commercial or industrial zone in which the sign is located. If no maxim 
height is provided for the location, the maximum sign height may be 
feet above the ground or 25 feet above the grade of the main traveled 
whichever is greater. 
(3) Except as provided in Section 72-7-509: 
(a) Any sign allowed to be erected by reason of the exceptions set fi 
in Subsection 72-7-504(1) or in H-l zones may not be closer than 500 
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to an existing off-premise sign adjacent to an interstate highway or limited 
access primary highway, except that signs may be erected closer than 500 
feet if the signs on the same side of the interstate highway or limited 
access primary highway are not simultaneously visible. 
(b) Signs may not be located within 500 feet of any of the following 
which are adjacent to the highway, unless the signs are in an incorporated 
area: 
(i) public parks; 
(ii) public forests; 
(iii) public playgrounds; 
(iv) areas designated as scenic areas by the department or other 
state agency having and exercising this authority; or 
(v) cemeteries. 
(c) (i) (A) Except under Subsection (3)(c)(ii), signs may not be located 
on an interstate highway or limited access highway on the 
primary system within 500 feet of an interchange, or intersection 
at grade, or rest area measured along the interstate highway or 
freeway from the sign to the nearest point of the beginning or 
ending of pavement widening at the exit from or entrance to the 
main-traveled way. 
(B) Interchange and intersection distance limitations shall be 
measured separately for each direction of travel. A measurement 
for each direction of travel may not control or affect any other 
direction of travel. 
(ii) A sign may be placed closer than 500 feet from the nearest point 
of the beginning or ending of pavement widening at the exit from or 
entrance to the main-traveled way, if: 
(A) the sign is at least 500 feet but not more than 2,640 feet 
from the nearest point of the intersecting highway of the inter-
change; or 
(B) the sign is replacing an existing outdoor advertising use or 
structure which is being removed or displaced to accommodate 
the widening, construction, or reconstruction of an interstate, 
federal aid primary highway existing as of June 1, 1991, or 
national highway system highway, and it is located in a commer-
cial or industrial zoned area inside an urbanized county or an 
incorporated municipality. 
(d) The location of signs situated on nonlimited access primary high-
ways in commercial, industrial, or H-l zoned areas between streets, roads, 
or highways entering the primary highway shall not exceed the following 
minimum spacing criteria: 
(i) Where the distance between centerlines of intersecting streets, 
roads, or highways is less than 1,000 feet, a minimum spacing 
between structures of 150 feet may be permitted between the inter-
secting streets or highways. 
(ii) Where the distance between centerlines of intersecting streets, 
roads, or highways is 1,000 feet or more, minimum spacing between 
sign structures shall be 300 feet. 
(e) All outdoor advertising shall be erected and maintained within the 
outdoor advertising corridor. 
(4) Subsection (3)(c)(ii) may not be implemented until: 
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(a) the Utah-Federal Agreement for carrying out national policy rela-
tive to control of outdoor advertising in areas adjacent to the national 
system of interstate and defense highways and the federal-aid primary 
system is modified to allow the sign placement specified in Subsection 
(3)(c)(ii); and 
(b) the modified agreement under Subsection (4)(a) is signed on behalf 
of both the state and the United States Secretary of Transportation. 
History: L. 1967, ch, 51, § 5; 1971, ch. 61, 
§ 4; 1981, ch, 136, § 3; 1989, ch. 144, § 2; 
1991, ch. 137, § 48; 1997, ch. 263, § 5; C. 
1953, 27-12-136.5; renumbered by L. 1998, 
ch. 270, § 207; 1999, ch. 21, § 94. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
ment, effective May 5, 1997, in Subsection 
(IXa) substituted the exception language for 
"No" and "may not" for "shall*; substituted "the 
maximum allowed square footage* for "325 
square feet" in Subsection (l)(b); expanded the 
types of permitted signs in Subsection (lXc); 
added Subsections (l)(d) through (2Kb); added 
the introductory phrase in Subsection (3) and 
redesignated former Subsections (2Xa) through 
(2Xe) as Subsections (3Xa) through (3Xe); 
added Subsection (3XcXi)(B) and redesignated 
Subsection (3)(c)(i) as (3Xc)dXA); rewrote Sub-
section C3Xc)(ii)(B) which required the highway 
to have been opened by September 1, 1987; 
redesignated Subsection (3) as Subsection (4); 
and made stylistic changes. 
The 1998 amendment, effective March 21, 
1998, renumbered this section, which formerly 
appeared as § 27-12-136,5; in Subsection (3) 
made changes to conform to the creation of Title 
72; and in Subsection (4Xb) substituted "Sub-
section (4Xa)" for "Subsection (a).w 
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3,1999, 
substituted "Subsection (3XcXhT for "Subsec-
tion (cXuT in Subsection (3XcXiXA). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Utah Sign, Inc. v. Utah DOT, 896 
P.2d 632 (Utah 1995). 
72-7-506. Advertising — Regulatory power of department! 
— Notice requirements. 
(1) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act, the department may make rules no more restrictive than 1 
chapter to: 
(a) control the erection and maintenance of outdoor advertising alonjj 
the interstate and primary highway systems; 
(b) provide for enforcement of this chapter; 
(c) establish the form, content, and submittal of applications to ere 
outdoor advertising; and 
(d) establish administrative procedures. 
(2) In addition to all other statutory notice requirements: 
(a) the department shall give reasonably timely written notice to 
outdoor advertising permit holders of any changes or proposed changes i 
administrative rules made under authority of this pari; and 
(b) any county, municipality, or governmental entity shall, upon writt 
request, give reasonably timely written notice to all outdoor advertisi 
permit holders within its jurisdiction of any change or proposed change J 
the outdoor or off-premise advertising provisions of its zoning provision 
codes, or ordinances. 
Histoiy: L. 1967, ch. 51, § 6; 1971, ch. 61, 
§ 5; 1981, ch. 136, § 4; 1990, ch. 300, § 2; 
1991, ch. 137, § 49; 1994, ch. 120, § 40; 1997, 
ch. 263, § 6; C. 1953, 27-12-136.6; renii 
bered by L. 1998, ch. 270, § 208. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 ame 
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J33-5-1. Introduction 
The Utah-Federal Agreement was executed by the governor of Utah and the secretary of the United States Department of 
Transportation's Federal Highway Administrator on January 18,1968. It sets out the parameters by which Utah agrees to 
manage and regulate outdoor advertising along the federal highway system. Though never placed in the Utah Code, the 
legislature has ratified the governor's execution of the agreement under Section 72-7-501 (Supp. 2001). 
333-5-2 Utah-Federal Agreement. 
FOR CARRYING OUT NATIONAL POLICY RELATIVE TO CONTROL OF OUTDOOR ADVERTISING IN AREAS 
ADJACENT TO THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF INTERSTATE AND DEFENSE HIGHWAYS AND THE FEDERAL-AID 
PRIMARY SYSTEM. 
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into this 18th day of January, 1968, by and between the United states of America 
represented by the Secretary of Transportation acting by and through the Federal Highway Administrator, hereinafter referred 
to as the Administrator, and the state of Utah, acting by and through its Governor, hereinafter referred to as the State. 
Witnesscth: 
WHEREAS, the governor is authorized by Senate Bill No. 94, enacted by the Thirty-seventh Utah State Legislature, to 
enter into agreements with the Secretary of Commerce, whose functions, powers and duties in regard to highway matters have 
been transferred to the Secretary of Transportation by Public Law 89-760, 89th Congress, on behalf of the State of Utah to 
comply with Title I of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965; and 
WHEREAS, Section 131(d) of Title 23, United states Code provides for agreement between the Secretaiy of Transportation 
and the several states to determine the size, lighting, and spacing of signs, displays, and devices, consistent with customary' sue, 
which may be erected and maintained within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the richt-of-wav within areas adiarpnt to thp 
WHEREAS, the purpose of said agreement is to promote the reasonable, orderly, and effective display of outdoor 
advertising while remaining consistent with the national policy to protect the public investment in interstate and primary 
highways, to promote the safety and recreational value of public travel and to preserve natural beauty; and 
WHEREAS, the State of Utah elects to implement and cany out the provisions of Section 131 of Title 23, United states 
Code, and the national policy in order to remain eligible to receive the full amount of all federal-aid highway funds to be 
apportioned to such state on or after Januaryi, 1968, under Section 104 of Title 23, United States Code. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto do mutually agree as follows: 
I. Definitions 
A. The tenn "Act" means Section 131 of Title 23, United States Code (1965), commonly referred to as Title I of the Highway 
Beautification act of 1965. 
B. Commercial or industrial zone means those areas which are reserved for business, commerce, or trade pursuant to 
comprehensive local zoning ordinance or regulation, or enabling state legislation, including Highway Service areas lawfully 
zoned as Highway Service Zones, in which the primary use of the land is reserved for commercial and roadside sen-ices other 
than outdoor advertising to serve the traveling public. 
C. Unzoned commercial or industrial area means those areas not zoned by state or local law, regulation or ordinance, 
which are occupied by one or more industrial or commercial activities, other than outdoor advertising signs, the lands along the 
highway for a distance of 600 feet immediately adjacent to the activities, and those lands directly opposite on the other side of 
the highway to the extent of the same dimensions provided those lands on the opposite side of the highway are not deemed 
scenic or having aesthetic value as determined by the Utah Road Commission. 
All measurements shall be from the outer edge of the regularly used buildings, parking lots, storage or processing areas of 
the activities, and shall be along or parallel to the edge of pavement of the highway. 
D. Commercial or industrial activities, for purposes of the unzoned area definition above, mean those activities generally 
recognized as commercial or industrial by zoning authorities in this state, except that none of the following activities shall be 
considered commercial or industrial: 
1. Agricultural, forestry, grazing, farming, and related activities, including, but not limited to wayside fresh produce stands. 
2. Transient or temporary activities. 
3. Activities not visible from the main-traveled way. 
4. Activities conducted in a building principally used as a residence. 
5. Railroad tracks and minor sidings. 
Should any commercial or industrial activity, which has been used in defining or delineating an unzoned area, cease to 
operate for a period of six continuous months, any signs located within the former unzoned area shall become non-conforming. 
E. Sign means any outdoor sign, light, display, device, figure, painting, drawing, message, placard, poster, billboard, or 
other thing which is designed, intended, or used to advertise or inform, any part of the advertising or informative contents of 
which is visible from any place on the main traveled way of the interstate or federal-aid primary highway. 
F. Erect means to construct, build, raise, assemble, place, affix, attach, create, paint, draw, or in any other way bring into 
being or establish, but it shall not include any of the foregoing activities when performed as an incident to the change of 
advertising message or customary maintenance or repair of a sign or sign structure. 
G. Center line of the highway means a line equidistant from the edges of the median separating the main-traveled way of a 
divided interstate or other limited-access highway, or the center line of the main-traveled way of a non-divided highway. 
H. Visible means capable of being seen (whether or not legible) without visual aid by a person of normal visual acuity. 
I. Main-traveled way means the traveled way of a highway on which through traffic is carried. In the case of a divided 
highway, the traveled way of each of the separate roadways for traffic in opposite directions is a main-traveled way. It does not 
include such facilities as frontage roads, turning roadways, or parking areas. 
II. Scope of Agreement 
This agreement shall apply to: 
A All zoned and unzoned commercial and industrial areas within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way of all 
portions of the interstate and primary systems within the State of Utah in which outdoor advertising signs, displays and devices 
may be visible from the main-traveled wav of said wrtp-m 
The State hereby agrees that, in all areas within the scope of this agreement, the State shall effectively control or cause to 
be controlled, the erection and maintenance of outdoor advertising signs, displays, and devices erected subsequent to the 
effective date of this agreement other than those advertising the sale or lease of the property on which they are located, or 
activities conducted thereon, in accordance with the following criteria: 
A. In zoned and unzoned commercial and industrial areas, the criteria set forth below shall apply to signs, displays and 
devices erected subsequent to the effective date of this agreement. 
General 
THE FOLLOWING SIGNS SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED 
1. Signs which imitate or resemble any official traffic sign, signal, or device. 
2. Signs which are erected or maintained upon trees or painted or drawn upon rocks or other natural features. 
3. Signs which are erected or maintained in such a ;manner as to obscure, or otherwise interfere with the effectiveness of 
an official traffic sign, signal, or device, or obstruct or interfere with the driver's view of approaching, merging or intersecting 
traffic. 
Size of Signs 
1. No sign shall exceed the following dimensions: 
(a) Maximum area -1000 square feet 
(b) Maximum height—25 feet 
(c) Maximum length—60 feet 
2. The area shall be measured by the outer limits of the advertising space. 
3. A sign structure may contain no more than two facings visible and readable from the same direction on the main 
traveled way on any one sign structure. Whenever two facings are so positioned, neither shall exceed 325 square feet. 
4. Back-to-back or V-type sign structures will be permitted with the maximum area being allowed for each facing; and 
considered as one structure and subject to spacing as herein below provided, but must be erected so that no more than two 
facings are visible to traffic in any one direction. 
Spacing of Signs 
1. Signs may not be located within 500 feet of any of the following which are adjacent to the highway: 
(a) Public parks 
(b) Public forests 
(c) Playgrounds 
(d) Cemeteries 
2. Interstate Highways and Limited-Access Highways on the Primary System. 
(a) Spacing between sign structures along each side of the highway shall be a minimum of 500 feet except that this spacing 
shall not apply to signs which are separated by a building or other obstruction in such a manner that only one sign located 
within the minimum spacing distance set forth above is visible from the highway at any one time. 
(b) No sign may be located on an interstate highway or freeway within 500 feet of an interchange, or intersection at grade, 
or rest area (measured along the interstate highway or freeway from the sign to the nearest point of the beginning or ending of 
pavement widening at the exit from or entrance to the main-traveled way). 
3. Non-Limited Access Primary Highways. 
The location of sign structures situated between streets, roads or highway entering into or intersecting the main traveled 
"ay shall conform to the following minimum spacing criteria to be applied separately to each side of the primary highway: 
(a) Where the distance between centerlines of intersecting streets or highways is less than 1000 feet, a minimum spacing 
between structures of 150 feet (double-faced, V-type and/or back-to-back) mav be permitted between such intersecting streets 
>r highways. " 
f M \ATU 4.1- _ J* -. 
4. Explanatory Notes 
(a) Alleys, undeveloped rights-of-way, private roads and driveways shall not be regarded as intersecting streets, roads or 
highways. 
(b) Only roads, streets and highways which enter directly into the main-traveled way of the primary7 highway shall be 
regarded as intersecting, 
(c) Official and "on premise" signs, as defined in Section 131 (c) of Title 23, United states Code, shall not be counted nor 
shall measurements be made from them for purposes of determining compliance with the above spacing requirements. 
(d) The minimum distance between signs shall be measured along the nearest edge of the pavement between points 
directly opposite the signs. 
Lighting 
Signs maybe illuminated, subject to the following restrictions: 
1. Signs which contain, include, or are illuminated by any flashing, intermittent, or moving light or lights are prohibited, 
except those giving public service information such as time, date, temperature, weather, or similar information. 
2. Signs which are not effectively shielded as to prevent beams or rays of light from being directed at any portion of the 
traveled way of the highway and which are of such intensity or brilliance as to cause glare or to impair the vision of the driver 
any motor vehicle, or which otherwise interfere with any driver's operation of a motor vehicle are prohibited. 
IV. Interpretation 
The provisions contained herein shall constitute the acceptable standards for effective control of signs, displays, and 
devices within the scope of this agreement. 
Nothing contained herein shall be construed to abrogate or prohibit a municipality from exercising a greater degree of 
control of outdoor advertising than that required or contemplated by the Act of from adopting standards which are more 
restrictive in controlling outdoor advertising than the provisions of this Agreement. 
Standards and criteria contained in Section III shall apply to signs erected subsequent to the effective date of this 
Agreement. Existing signs in zoned and unzoned commercial or industrial areas will be considered to be conforming to said 
standards and criteria. 
In the event the provisions of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 are amended by subsequent action of Congress, or 
the provisions of Chapter 51, Section 5, Laws of Utah, 1967, are amended by subsequent action of the Utah state Legislature, 
the parties reserve the right to re-negotiate this Agreement or to modify it to conform with any amendment. 
V. Effective Date 
This agreement shall become effective when signed and executed on behalf of both the State and the Untied States of 
America. 
IN WITNESS WHEkEOF, the State has caused this Agreement to be duly executed in its behalf, and the Secretary of 
transportation has likewise caused the same to be duly executed in his behalf, as of the dates specified below. 
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Tab 18 
R907-1-1 General Administrative Procedures. 
R907. Transportation, Administration. 
Rule R907-1. Appeal of Departmental Actions. 
R907-1-1. General Administrative Procedures. 
All applications, Requests for Agency Action, and appeals from Notices of Agency Action shall be processed as 
informal adjudicative proceedings pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46b, Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), unless 
another rule specifically designates a proceeding as formal or either party requests conversion to a formal proceeding 
and the presiding officer decides that conversion is in the public interest and does not prejudice the rights of any party. 
An evidentiary hearing will be held only for formal adjudicative proceedings. However, nothing in this rule is intended to 
prohibit the presiding officer from holding a meeting of all parties for purposes of settlement, fleshing out of the issues, 
oral argument, or presentation of evidence. Adjudicative proceedings are subject to agency review or appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46H2 only when statute or a rule specifically provides for review. This rule does not apply 
to employee grievances, personnel actions, or requests for records under the Governmental Records Access and 
Management Act (GRAMA). When used in these rules, "director" means Presiding Officer except when used as Executive 
Director. 
Tab 19 
R933-2-5 Sign Changes, Repairs, and Maintenance. 
R933. Transportation, Preconstruction, Right-of-Way Acquisition. 
Rule R933-2. Control of Outdoor Advertising Signs. 
R933-2-5. Sign Changes, Repairs, and Maintenance. 
(1) Sign changes or repairs, including those for signs in a commercial or industrial zone, are subject to the following 
requirements: 
(a) The face of a controlled sign may be removed for maintenance and renovation or change of advertising copy using 
basically the same face material. The shape and size of advertising space may not be changed except as provided in these 
rules. Replacement of the sign face must be accomplished within a 60 day period from the date of its removal. 
(b) A nonconforming sign with "Grandfather Status" may not be relocated, structurally altered, nor repositioned, including 
reversing the direction of the sign face. 
(c) A conforming sign may be reshaped or modified as to height or size, or relocated upon proper written request, Form R-
407, provided the change is in compliance with the Act and these rules. Any change shall be completed within 60 calendar days 
from the date of the approval of the request. A fee of $100 shall accompany the R-407 application to change the sign, in 
addition to any applicable fee under Subsection R933-2-4(14). 
(d) A conforming sign that is damaged by vandals, storms, wind, or acts of nature can be re-erected or changed, or both, 
upon proper written request and approval on Form R-407. 
(e) A nonconforming sign that is damaged but not destroyed by vandals or acts of nature may be repaired to the same size 
or shape upon proper written application and approval. Normal maintenance may be included in the repair, but no structural 
changes affecting the sign's value may be allowed. The sign may be purchased by the State if agreement is reached by the 
State and the sign owner. The compensation to the sign owner shall be the depreciated value of the sign immediately before 
damage, less cost of re-erection or repair. 
(0 Repairs and ordinary maintenance may be made on conforming and nonconforming signs so long as repairs do not alter 
the basic advertising space or illumination, or change the material of the sign structure. 
(g) Nonconforming signs destroyed by natural disaster are not eligible for compensation, unless at the time of destruction 
they have been appraised and committed for removal and the State has approved a purchase agreement. 
(2) The following provisions govern maintenance: 
(a) A legally permitted nonconforming sign may remain standing subject to the provisions of the Act and these rules so 
long as it is not changed, except for advertising copy, and is not purchased or condemned pursuant to law. 
(b) Signs shall be properly maintained. Improper maintenance is considered: 
(i) Paint faded or peeling extensively; 
(ii) Message not visible or illegible; 
(iii) Sheets or panels loose or sagging; 
(iv) Structural supports leaning; 
(v) Abandoned. 
(c) A sign with any of the deficiencies listed in Subsection R933-2-5(2)(b) is not in a reasonable state of repair, is in 
violation of the law, and is subject to removal. 
(d) The crossing of a right-of-way line of any State highway at other than an established access approach to erect or 
maintain a sign without the written permission of the Department, is unlawful. 
Tab 20 
R933-2-4 Permits. 
R933. Transportation, Preconstruction, Right-of-Way Acquisition. 
Rule R933-2. Control of Outdoor Advertising Signs. 
R933-2-4. Permits-
(1) All controlled outdoor advertising signs legally in existence prior to the effective date of the 1967 Act, or that are 
legally created thereafter, must have a permit. This includes off-premise signs located on the side of or on top of any 
fixed object or building and visible from the main traveled way of an interstate or federal-aid primary highway. 
(2) Anyone preparing to erect a controlled sign shall apply for the permit before beginning construction of the sign. 
Permits shall be issued in the manner prescribed in the Act. Permits may be issued only for signs that are to be erected 
in commercial or industrial zones or in unzoned commercial or industrial areas, as defined by the Act. Insomuch as a sign 
cannot lawfully be constructed or maintained unless there is legal access to the property on which the sign is proposed 
to be located, a permit may not be issued if the applicant does not have legal access to that property. 
(3) Permits may be issued only for signs already lawfully erected or to be lawfully erected within 90 days from the 
date of the issuance of the permit. Within 30 days from the date of issuance, the permit must be affixed to the 
completed sign for which the permit was issued as provided in Subsection R933-2-4(5). 
(4) A permit affixed to a sign other than the sign for which it was issued is unlawful, and remedial action shall be 
taken by the permittee by the proper affixing of the permit to the correct sign within 30 days of notice to the permittee. 
(5) Permits shall be permanently attached to the sign in a position to be readily visible from the nearest highway in 
the direction of travel to the sign faces. If the sign is a single-face cross-highway reader, then the permit must be 
attached to the sign in a position readily visible from the nearest traveled portion of the highway. The permittee is 
responsible for the proper placement of the permit on the sign. 
(6) Sign permits that have been lost or destroyed must be replaced, and new permits for signs otherwise lawful shall 
be issued upon the payment of a $25 fee for each sign and the completion of a new permit application. 
(7) Permits shall be issued on a one year fiscal basis, and shall be renewed on or before the first day of July of each 
year. 
(8) The fee for a new permit is $100 for the one-year fiscal period or any part thereof. The permit expires June 30 of 
the fiscal year. The fee for permit renewal is $25 for the one-year fiscal period or any part thereof. Notwithstanding the 
specification in Subsections R933-2-4(8),(12), and (13)(a) of a $100 fee for a sign permit, the fee for the sign permit for 
a non-profit public service sign shall be $25, and the fee for renewal of the permit for that non-profit public service sign 
shall be $10. 
(9) The fee for permits issued within a one-year fiscal period shall not be prorated. 
(10) One-year permit renewals shall be made on renewal forms prepared by the Department. Completion of the 
renewal application and obtaining of the renewal permit prior to the expiration of the existing permit shall be the sole 
responsibility of the owner. The renewal may be applied for no sooner than 60 days prior to July 1 of the year in which 
the permit is to be renewed. 
(11) Written proof of lease or consent from site owner to erect or maintain an outdoor advertising sign must be 
furnished by the applicant at the time of application for an original permit. This proof may consist of an affidavit showing 
the landowner's name and address, the sign owner's name, and the sign location by route, milepost, address, and 
county. On renewal of the permit the applicant must certify that the sign site is still under valid lease to the applicant. 
(12) If a one-year permit on a conforming sign is not renewed on or before July 1 of the year of its term, a new 
permit application shall be required for a new permit, along with a fee of $100. 
(13) A permit is non transferable, and the permittee shall be liable for any violation of the law regarding the 
permitted sign. No new permit may be issued for a sign for which a permit has already been issued, except as follows: 
(a) Transfer of ownership of a permitted sign shall require the holder of the valid permit to release, in writing, his 
rights to continue to maintain his sign or use his location for outdoor advertising. The new owner applicant shall then 
submit to the Utah Department of Transportation the written release and proof of having obtained sign ownership, and a 
valid lease or consent for the remainder of the permit term. A $100 fee shall accompany the application and both 
application and fee must be received within 30 days of the ownership transfer. 
(b) A conforming sign that is unlawful and forfeited by the permittee may be acquired and permitted, providing the 
new sign applicant submits the completed permit application and proof of possession of a valid land lease or consent to 
maintain a sign at the described location and providing the new application and the sign are otherwise lawful. 
(14) A supplemental application fee of $100 shall be charged to cover administrative and inspection costs for every 
sign that was erected without a sign permit, Form R-299, or altered without prior written approval of the department, 
Form R-407. This supplemental fee is in addition to the regular $100 permit fee. 
(15) Each application for a new permit must be accompanied by the approved building permit of the local governing 
authority or a written statement from that authority that building permits are not required under its ordinances. 
(16) Where local authority has issued a building permit for construction of a sign, but construction is contrary to the 
Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, the action of the local authority does not require the State to issue a permit. 
(17) Federal agencies, State agencies, counties, cities and towns that use outdoor advertising signs along the 
interstate or primary highway systems shall have a permit for each controlled sign as provided in the Act and these rules. 
